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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Brazil's Knowledge Deficit
Brazil is a country rich in entrepreneurial spirit,1 economic
growth opportunities,2 and natural resources.' Yet, according to
experts, Brazil lacks the core human capital,4 namely, education,
and a market-friendly enabling environment6 that incorporates
1. "Brazilian entrepreneurs have the unique characteristic among such large and
relatively wealthy countries of being 'necessity entrepreneurs' .... [Tihese types of
entrepreneurs are most prevalent in countries with poor economic stability and low
job availability. Though Brazil is certainly not considered a 'poor' country with a
gross domestic product (GDP) of almost $1.4 trillion, it certainly suffers some of the
other characteristics of countries with a large group of necessity entrepreneurs, such
as unemployment and infrastructure problems." See JONATHAN ORTMANS, PUBLIC
FORUM INST., GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION EFFORTS TO FURTHER ENTREPRENEURSHIP
IN BRAZIL, NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2 (2005), available at http://
www.publicforuminstitute.org/nde/sources/reports/Brazil-2005.pdf.
2. "Although Brazil holds the potential to become an economic powerhouse, social
conditions stemming from Brazil's early years as a plantation society have continued
to cause inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power." See Brazil, MSN
ENCARTA (2006), http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=7615
54342 (last visited Dec. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Brazil, ENCARTA]. "Despite its status as
South America's leading economic power, Brazil remains an unrealized potential. It
has a large population that seeks entrepreneurial opportunities and an innovative
telecommunications sect that can provide a strong arena for these individuals."
ORTMANS, supra note 1, at 2.
3. Although "all Latin American countries may be classified as resource-rich in
absolute terms[, Brazil is] both resource-rich (relative to the world market) and
industrialising (relative to the regional market).. . ." Michel Fouquin et al., Natural
Resource Abundance and its Impact on Regional Integration: Curse or Blessing?,
ELSNIT/FUNDACAO GETuLio VARGAS CONFERENCE, April 7, 2006, 8 n.1, available at
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraplcommunications/pdf/2006/070406/fouquin.pdf. "The
economic development of Brazil has been strongly influenced by a series of economic
cycles in which different [natural] resources were exploited in different parts of the
country .... Brazil contains a wealth of mineral and plant resources that have not yet
been fully explored. It possesses some of the world's largest deposits of iron ore and
contains rich deposits of many other minerals, including gold and copper." See Brazil,
ENCARTA, supra note 2.
4. See Norman Gall, Democracy 4: Brazil Needs a New Strategy - Lula and
Mephistopheles, 37 BRAUDEL PAPERS 1, 11 (2005), available at http://www.braudel.org.
br/novo/publicacoes/bp/bp38-en.pdf.
5. See Cristovam Buarque, Brazil Agrees It Needs More Education But Nobody
Wants to Foot the Bill, BRAZZIL MAo., Apr. 20, 2006, available at http://www.brazzil.
comindex2.php?option=comcontent&do-pdf= l&id=9581.
6. "[Rligid government regulationg, difficulties in transferring foreign technology
to the domestic arena, and an underdeveloped infrastructure stifle the burgeoning
business opportunities. The country's failure to completely utilize the economic
potential of its citizens has left the economy vulnerable to continued damage from
unequal income distribution, high government debt, and dangerous inflation that
contributed to the 2003 recession and continues to suffocate potential entrepreneurial
development." ORTMANS, supra at 1. The World Bank's recently released Doing
Business 2007 report found that the registering of property in many Brazilian states
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strong recognition and protection of exclusive intellectual property
rights (IPRs).7 These deficiencies have substantially impaired the
Brazilian Government's ability to facilitate development of indige-
nous know-how (inventions) and the conversion of it into commer-
cially relevant products and processes (innovations).' The
Government of Brazil recognizes that it must remedy these short-
comings if it is to maintain and improve Brazil's international
competitiveness during the twenty-first century.9
The Government of Brazil, furthermore, has unsustainable
domestic priorities 0 and is plagued by endless systemic corrup-
tion.1 This has only further compromised its ability to deliver
is more difficult than in the rest of Latin America. See SIMEON DJANKOV ET AL., INT'L
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS 2007: How
TO REFORM 3 (2006), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/Doing
Business2007_Overview.pdf. According to the Bank's accompanying report, these
and other statistical indicators led the World Bank to rank Brazil "17[th] out of 22
countries in Latin America" and 121st out of 175 countries globally. ZENAIDA
HERNANDEZ ET AL., THE INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WORLD BANK
GROUP, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL 6-7 (2006), available at http://www.doingbusiness.
org/documents/doingbusiness in brazil_07.pdf.
7. The Brazilian Government is ideologically reluctant to recognize private IPRs
in the field of life science technologies, despite the existence of national patent and
data exclusivity legislation. See U.S. COM. SERV. BRAZ., CS BRAZ. MKT. RES.,
STATISTICS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2005), http://
www.buyusainfo.net/docs/x 5064324.pdf [hereinafter BRAZIL MARKET RESEARCH]. In
addition, leading Brazilian scientists have endeavored to help the Government of
Brazil to create an artificial legal distinction, in the minds of international regulators
and policymakers, between life sciences patents and all other patents. See Claudia
In~s Chamas et al., The Dynamics of Intellectual Protection for Biotechnology in
Brazil, Address at the Triple Helix 5 Conference on the Capitalization of Knowledge:
Cognitive, Economic, Social & Cultural Aspects (May 19, 2005), available at http:/!
www.triplehelix5.com/pdf/A196_THC5.pdf.
8. See ORTMANS, supra note 1, at 2; see also Markus Jaeger, Brazil: 0 Pats do
Futuro? Economic Scenarios for the Next 15 Years, DEUTSCHE BANK RES., May 30,
2006, at 3 ("The quality of the human capital stock in Brazil is relatively low. Large
income differentials generally coincide with a low overall level of human capital
endowment. Brazil is one of the countries with the highest degree of inequality in the
world and there is substantial evidence that inequality in low-income countries is
detrimental to economic growth.").
9. Gall, supra note 4, at 9-10.
10. See Mark F. Schultz & David B. Walker, How Intellectual Property Became
Controversial: NGOs and the New International IP Agenda, 6 ENGAGE: THE J. OF THE
FEDERALIST SoC'Y PRAC. GROUPS 82, 89 (2005) (citing Daniel Dutra, Brazil Space
Program to Get Greater Funding, BRAZZIL MAG., Jan. 28, 2005) ("In addition to
increasing costs, some governments display questionable priorities.... [For example],
Brazil [is] aggressively funding space programs .... [S]overeign nations . . . open
themselves to criticism when they claim inability to meet the basic health needs of
citizens but spend money on projects largely calculated to enhance their prestige.").
11. The Brazilian Government's failure to adequately address its urgent national
public health care, education, pension and physical infrastructure needs, is due
considerably to its rampant corruption scandals. See Gall, supra note 4, at 12-14;
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affordable national healthcare, digital knowledge, and economic
opportunities to the majority of Brazil's poorest citizens.12 The
Brazilian Government has been unable to resolve these domestic
issues and is acting out on the world stage to divert attention
away from them. This would explain why Brazil has endeavored,
during the past decade, to establish a new anti-private property
international economic order that exploits the private property
rights of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) member nation citizens and appeals to developing
and emerging economies. 3
The Brazilian Government has focused on two key policy
areas, global information technology and global health, in an
effort, assisted by certain United Nations (UN) agencies, to help
promote the 'public international good' of global knowledge.14 It
has articulated national and international positions concerning
each of these areas.1 5 Although these positions appeared initially
Jonathan Wheatley, New Corruption Charges Target Brazil Deputies, FIN. TIMES,
May 11, 2006, at 3; Jonathan Wheatley, Lula Accused of Knowing About Bribery, FIN.
TIMES, May 8, 2006, at 4; Raymond Collitt, Brazil Corruption Scandal Dogs Lula, Not
Congress, REUTERS, April 5, 2006; see also Fouquin, supra note 3, at 14.
12. At least one recent 2006 study has concluded that developing country citizens
have been denied access to essential medicines because of the abject poverty and poor
environmental conditions existing within their borders, misdirection of government
health budgets, inefficient bureaucratic administration of public services, weak
physical and institutional health infrastructures, lack of good governance, high tax
and tariff rates imposed on imported biotechnology and pharmaceutical products,
strict regulatory restrictions on medicines approved in other countries, and lack of
available and affordable private health insurance. See INT'L POLICY NETWORK, CIIL
SOCIETY REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND HEALTH (2006), http:l
www.policynetwork.netuploaded/pdf/CivilSociety-text-web.pdf.
13. In some ways, this new anti-IP economic order resembles the prior 'New
International Economic Order' that developing countries, including Brazil,
endeavored to establish for the purpose of restructuring the global economy during
the 1970's. See, e.g., THOMAS G. WEISS ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS AND CHANGING
WORLD POLITICS 239-240 (Westview Press 3d ed. 2001) (1989); THOMA S WALDE &
ABBA KOLO, CTR. FOR PETROLEUM, MINERAL LAW AND POL'Y, UNW. OF DUNDEE,
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXPROPRIATION OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1998), available at http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/speeches/
waelde2.htm.
14. See, e.g., Univ. of Oxford Ctr. for Brazilian Studies, Workshop: Global
Intellectual Property From a Brazilian Perspective (Nov. 4, 2005), http:/www.
brazil.ox.ac.uk/confreports/IP%20report%20final3.pdf [hereinafter Brazilian Studies];
MINISTRY OF SCIENCE & TECH., INFORMATION SOCIETY IN BRAZIL - GREEN BOOK 31-32
(2000) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]; Bernardo Sorj, U.N. Educ. Sci. and Cultural Org.
[UNESCOI, Brazil@digitaldivide.com: Confronting Inequality in the Information
Society 29-48 (2003), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001318/
131870e.pdf (discussing how a "large majority of consumption products are pre-
conditions of access to health, education, work, and sociability").
15. See discussion infra Part III.
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to be inconsistent with one another, they have, over time, become
more closely aligned. 6 In fact, each now emphasizes the benefits
to Brazilian society of creating basic scientific and technological
know-how and of making that know-how universal and accessible
to all, minimizing the cost.
B. Brazil Promotes a New Anti-IP Framework
Premised on Negative Sustainable Development
Brazil is an emerging economy and an aspiring regional and
global power possessing great potential. 7 The Government of
Brazil, however, has assumed a leadership role in international
fora by promoting a new but highly controversial global frame-
work that calls for the current high technology, knowledge and
information-based digital era to become 'universally accessible,'
'open source,' and essentially free of charge to developing coun-
tries." Brazil, along with a growing chorus of developing nations,
activists, and self-proclaimed new social and environmental think-
ers, has alleged that this new paradigm is predicated upon an
expanded notion of sustainable development (SD) 9 that eschews
strong IPRs.2° Furthermore, Brazilhas opportunistically defined
itself, for these and other purposes, as a developing country.2'
The Brazilian Government's allies in this effort include other
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Richard Lapper & Jonathan Wheatley, Why Lula Will Shun the
Populist Path, FIN. TIMES (London), July 11, 2006, at 13, available at http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/lbO48dd4-1109-1ldb-9a72-0000779e2340; Humberto Marquez, New
Member Venezuela Politicizes Mercosur, INSIDE COSTA RICA, July 6, 2006, http://inside
costarica.com/special-reports/2006-07/southamericavenezuela-mercosur.htm;
Richard Lapper & Jonathan Wheatley, Interview Transcript: Luiz Indcio Lula da
Silva, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/6d42ae3a-l10b-
lldb-9a72-0000779e2340.html; Richard Lapper & Jonathan Wheatley, Brazil's Lula
to Promote Doha Trade Talks During G8 Summit, FIN.TMES, July 12, 2006.
18. See discussion infra Part III.B.
19. See Yasmin Crowther, Stories for Our Times?, in SUSTAINABILITY: RADAR
CREATIVITY, Apr. 10, 2006, at 20, available at http://www.sustainability.com/
downloads-public/insight-radar/creativity.pdf.
20. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 14, at 31-32.
21. In 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted Resolution 3141 "directing
the President to terminate Brazil's designation as a developing country" when Brazil
was believed to be exploiting to maintain its qualification for preferred trade status
under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences. Newsroom, US Congress Moves to
Strip Brazil of Developing Country Status, BRAZZIL MAG. July 26, 2005, available at
http://www.brazzilmag.com/content~view/3341. According to the E.U., Brazil is an
"advanced" developing country. See Eur. Comm'n Trade and Dev., Different Needs,
Different Responsibilities: What is the EUAsking from Developing Countries?, EU AND
GLOBAL TRADE, Dec. 14, 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/development/
pr141205_en.htm.
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socialist Governments, neo-Marxist politicians, activist non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), anti-private property and anti-
free market academics,22 as well as some conservative libertari-
ans.23 Many of these advocates are well skilled in manipulating
public opinion and the organs of the UN to promote an alternative
global framework.24 Their desired international framework, in
large part, employs a definition of sustainable development that
potentially minimizes all private property ownership rights in
favor of public (shared) communal rights,2" along with the role of
22. Remnants of old socialist/communist thinking, such as statism, privileged
elitism, paternalism, and an above the law ethic for the privileged elite continue to
pervade Latin American countries including Brazil. See Aleksander Boyd, Sdo Paulo
Forum: The Backbone of Communism & Terrorism Spread in Latin America -
Interview with Olavo de Carvalho, VCRIsIs, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.vcrisis.comI
index.php?content=letters/200511210932; Antony P. Mueller, The Ghost That
Haunts Brazil, LUDWIG VON MISES INST., Aug. 5, 2002, http://www.mises.org/story/
1020; Augusto Zimmermann, In Brazil the Law is Never For You When You Have
Friends, BRAZZIL MAG., January 23, 2006, available at http://www.brazzil.coml
content/view/9509/78; Augusto Zimmermann, In Brazil Work is a Dirty Word Unless
You Hold Public Office, BRAZZIL MAG., Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www.brazzil.
comlcontent/view/9517/78.
23. There are some extreme libertarian ideologues who argue that IPRs are
government-granted monopolies which are anathema to pure laissez faire, 'state of
nature' capitalism. See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, IER Lawrence Klein
Lecture: The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS RESEARCH DEPARTMENT STAFF REPORT 339 (June 2004), available at
http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr339.pdf; MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K.
LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 1 (2005), http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/
general/intellectual/against.htm.
24. For example, during 2000, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) launched a joint project with the INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD), an NGO, on Intellectual
Property Rights and Sustainable Development. This project recently released a
report the purpose of which is "to contribute to a better understanding of the use of
patent exceptions for the pursuit of various national policy objectives," and to thus,
contribute to the debate over whether IPRs "adversely affect the pursuit of
sustainable development strategies .... " Christopher Garrison, Indep. Consultant to
Int'l Intell. Prop. Law & Pol'y, ICTSD & UNCTAD, Exceptions to Patent Rights in
Developing Countries: Issue Paper No. 17, Aug. 2006, at vii-viii, available at http:fl
www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc2006l2-en.pdf.
25. "Exclusive patent rights may constitute important tools for the promotion of a
country's technological capacities, depending on that country's level of development in
a particular sector. On the other hand, a government may prefer to keep certain
activities outside the scope of exclusive rights, considering it more beneficial for
society to have unlimited access to the products or services related to such activities."
Id. at vii. "One of the main issues of the globalized world is to control the colonization
of global public goods by private interests. The challenge to national governments -
which continues to be the most important institution for organizing social cohesion
and citizen rights - is to regulate the public interest and actively participate in the
construction of a new international order." Sorj, supra note 14, at 19. "Agenda 21 also
recommends property law changes in a variety of specific contexts." John C. Derbach,
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neo-liberal economics.26
The doctrine of sustainable development, 27 as defined in this
context,28 articulates the need to secure continuous international
science and technology transfer29 at concession rate prices. 0
Besides anti-market, anti-private property and anti-WTO advo-
cates, there is also a vocal group of American self-proclaimed mul-
tilateralists31 who believe that this is necessary in order to prevent
Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1, 80 n.402 (1998) (citing Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., [
16.7(a), 16.37, 26.4(b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), available at http://www.
unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=52&ArticleID=
[hereinafter Agenda 211); see also Agenda 21, T 16.46 (calling for "[g]lobal and
regional collaboration for basic and applied research and development" to enhance
capacity building).
26. See Derbach, supra note 25, at 3, 77.
27. The notion of sustainable development was effectively 'mainstreamed' at the
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) convened in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992 (the 'Earth Summit'). U.N. Econ. & Soc. Dev [UNESD], Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151]26 (Aug. 12,
1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconfl5l26-lannexl.
htm. UNCED produced the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, a
non-binding set of broad principles and a non-binding agreement called Agenda 21,
which is essentially a global action plan to achieve sustainable development. See
generally United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development [CSD], http:ll
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/aboutCsd.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2006).
28. In furtherance of environmental sustainability, "developing countries advocate
the creation of community or individual property rights in traditional knowledge or
skills concerning the use of native plant and animal species, or even in the plants and
animals themselves, particularly for their medicinal value." John C. Derbach, supra
note 25, at 81. Furthermore, they seek to enact "laws relating directly to real
property ownership [that] oblige owners to integrate environmental, social and
economic considerations into their day-to-day decision-making." Id. It is believed
that such laws "would encourage property owners to engage in sustainable
[environmental] activities based on self-interest." Id. See also Agenda 21, 7f 6.1, 6.7,
6.13(a), 6.13(g).
29. "The U.S. Trade Act 1974 established a link between IPR protection and trade.
However, for a long time, at the international level, there was no consensus about
such a link. Developing countries were concerned about their own development.
They claimed that transfer of technology was needed -for development. They also
pointed out the risk of being obliged to patent inventions related to public health and
nutrition (UNCTAD 70)." Brazilian Studies, supra note 14, at 1.
30. Lawrence A. Kogan, U.S. Private Property Rights Under International Assault,
ITSSD, Oct. 14, 2006, at 3-4, http://www.itssd.org/pdfgLAK-PrivatePropertyRights
UnderInternationalAssault.pdf.
31. See e.g., Francesco Guerrera & Richard Waters, IBM Chief Wants End to
Colonial Companies, FIN. TIMES (London), June 12, 2006, at 1; Barry Lynn,
Globalisation Must Be Saved From the Radical Global Utopians, FIN. TIMES (London),
May 30, 2006, at 15; Samuel Palmisano, Multinationals Have Been Superseded, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 12, 2006, at 19; Jacob Weisberg, The Inconvenient Truth About
Gore, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2006, at 11; Global Corp: We Need Better Ways to Manage
Backlash to Globalisation, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2006, at 14; Letter from Congressman
Tom Allen et al. to Dep't of Health and Human Servs. Secretary Michael Leavitt (May
10 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1
the emergence of extreme economic, scientific, technological and
social disparities and popular backlashes against globalization
that will serve to threaten international peace and security.
32
These advocates also claim that the Millennium Development
Agenda requires such actions to enable developing countries to
liberate themselves from endemic poverty and disease, so that
they may ultimately achieve economic and social parity with the
developed world.33 In other words, the 'enlightened' notion of sus-
tainable development, originally articulated almost twenty years
ago, has since been effectively hijacked, distorted and propa-
gandized into a negative anti-market, anti-private property and
anti-WTO doctrine that focuses only on the flaws, rather than the
strengths, of the established international order.
3
1
Recent research, however, has shown that the pursuit of such
19, 2006), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/who/59wha/congressO5192006.
pdf [hereinafter Leavitt] (proposing adoption of WHO Executive Board's
recommendation for a new international agreement on medial research and
development (R&D) by arguing that "the U.S. Government's practice of including
extensive intellectual property provisions in bilateral trade agreements [will not
necessarily] ... lead to more R&D investment").
32. See, e.g., Tim Radford, Two-Thirds of World's Resources Used Up, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Mar. 30, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,
1447863,00.html; The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General's High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, T 52-59, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.
org/secureworld/report2.pdf.
33. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, The Millennium Development Goals Report-
2006, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Aft., U.N. Doc. DESA (June 2006), available at http://unstats.
un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2006/MDGReport2006.pdf,
Brazilian Studies, supra note 14, at 4 ("[11n November 2004, Brazil and Argentina
alleged that WIPO [the World Intellectual Property Organization] - even though
being a UN Agency - was not acting in accordance with the Millennium Development
Agenda goal.") (emphasis added).
34. The doctrine of sustainable development is arguably a social welfare state
doctrine that describes free market capitalism, neo-liberal economics, and strong legal
protection of private contract and intellectual property rights in negative fashion. See
e.g., Lawrence A. Kogan, Precautionary Preference: How Europe's New Regulatory
Protectionism Imperils American Free Enterprise, ITSSD, July 2005, at 93, available
at http://www.itssd.org/White%20Papers/PrecautionaryPreference-EURegProtec
tionism-FULLVERSION.pdf [hereinafter Kogan, Precautionary Preference];
Lawrence A. Kogan, Exporting Precaution: How Europe's Risk-Free Regulatory
Agenda Threatens American Free Enterprise, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., Nov. 2005, at 99,
available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/ll0405MONOKogan.pdf; see also Derbach,
supra note 25, at 94-95 ("Here, perhaps more than in any other area of international
law, substantial concern exists that the activities fostered and encouraged by treaties
themselves will prevent or undermine national efforts to achieve sustainable
development."). "Trade treaties also trump soft law instruments such as Agenda 21,
including its recommendations on production and consumption. Unlike Agenda 21,
trade liberalization agreements have created and strengthened a substantial
constituency of economic beneficiaries who support continued efforts to open up trade.
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a negative paradigm of sustainable development actually harms,
rather than helps developing country prospects for scientific, tech-
nological, economic and social advancement.35 Prior research, as
well, performed by famous French author and historian Alexis de
Tocqueville, recognized how exclusive private property ownership
in 19th century America held a positive and taming influence over
the dark forces of revolution and war which had then plagued con-
tinental Europe."
Given this reality, it has become ever clearer that the Govern-
ment of Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has por-
trayed itself as something other than what it really is. In other
words, while pretending to work diligently on the world stage as a
political moderate and dependable market-friendly force 37 within
a highly volatile and populist region of the world," the country has
actually operated behind the scenes to help craft a new version of
the 1970's New International Economic Order (NIEO)39 that
endeavors to undermine exclusive private property rights and the
rule of law.4°
Put starkly, the central achievement of Rio was an attempt to superimpose a
nonbinding framework on long-existing legal norms." Id.
35. See Lawrence A. Kogan, 'Enlightened' Environmentalism or Disguised
Protectionism: Assessing the Impact of EU Precaution-Based Standards on Developing
Countries, NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, Apr. 2004, available at http://www.wto.
org/english/forums-e/ngo e/posp47_nftc enlightened e.pdf; Lawrence A. Kogan,
Looking Behind the Curtain: The Growth of Trade Barriers That Ignore Sound
Science, NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, May 2003, at 46-62, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/forums-e/go-e/posp47_nftclookingbehinde.pdf.
36. "There is no country in the world where the sentiment for property shows itself
more active and more restive than in the United States, and where the majority
evinces less inclination to doctrines that threaten to alter the constitution of goods in
any manner whatsoever." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 610-11
(Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1840).
37. See Mary Anastasia O'Grady, There's No Such Thing As a Free HIV Cocktail,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2004, at A15, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/wsj/
2004 ! WJ040405.html.
38. See Jonathan Wheatley & Daniel Dombey, Bolivian Nationalisation Leaves
Lula's Foreign Policy in Disarray, FIN. TIMES (London), May 15, 2006, at 10.
39. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
[NEIO], G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974).
40. "During a series of conferences in the mid-1970's, the Group of 77 [developing
countries] formulated its ultimate agenda for restructuring the global economy. The
main thrust of the call for the New International Economic Order came during the
Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in late spring 1974, where
members adopted the Declaration and Program of Action on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order.... The NIEO demands were wide-ranging but
can be classified into four broad themes: economic sovereignty; trade; aid; and
participation .... The NIEO movement ran out of steam [during the 1980's, and) ...
[d]eveloping countries had the votes inside the United Nations, but they lacked
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C. Brazil Works to Undermine the Established
International Order
The Government of Brazil and its allies have undertaken
numerous provocative activities within various intergovernmental
fora, such as the WTO, WHO, WIPO, UNCHR, UNDP, UNEP and
UNESCO.4 These remain the enduring foundations of the estab-
lished international order, which was first conceived by the
United States and its allies following World War II, in the absence
of a world government. That order is comprised of longstanding
and time-proven international principles of law, economics and
politics formalized collectively by the UN and the Bretton Woods
institutions-the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1948
and 1994) and the WTO.
42
The goal of the established international order was and still is
the facilitation of international trade and investment as well as
economic growth and development for the sake of ensuring inter-
national peace and security.43 The established international order
is strongly rooted in the recognition and protection of strong pri-
vate property rights, adherence to the rule of law, benchmarked
economic and military power outside the world organization that could be converted
to bargaining success." WEISS, supra note 13, at 184.
41. In addition to its efforts to help reform the WTO's Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), Brazil has endeavored to expand its
'open source,' 'universal access' paradigm to biotechnology, chemistry, music, art, and
science through various UN agencies. Those agencies are the UN Education, Science
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the UN World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO); the UN International Telecommunications Union (ITU); the
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS); the UN World Health
Organization (WHO); the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); the UN
Environment Program (UNEP); the UN Development Program (UNDP); and the UN
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC).
42. See generally Global Policy Forum, NGOs and the Bretton Woods Institutions,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/wbank/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
43. "During and after World War II, governments developed and enforced a set of
rules, institutions, and procedures to regulate important aspects of international
economic interaction .... [T]his order, known as the Bretton Woods Regime, was
effective in controlling conflict and in achieving the common goals of the states that
had created it .... Some [] believed that a liberal international economic system
would enhance the possibilities of peace, that a liberal international economic system
would lead not only to economic prosperity and economic harmony, but also to
international peace. One of those who saw such a security link was Cordell Hull, the
U.S. Secretary of State from 1933-1944." See JOAN E. SPERO & JEFFREY A. HART, THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1-2 (S. Martin's Press 5th ed. 1997)
(1981); see also LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS, 1-2, 386-389, 407-410, 421-422 (Wadsworth
Publ'g 3d ed. 1999) (1988).
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objective science and economic cost-benefit analysis, continuous
incentive-based technological innovation, and an aversion to trade
protectionism.44
Together, these principles have reinforced the universally
accepted proposition that private property, economic growth,
industrialization, innovation, and trade are good things in them-
selves and must be promoted and preserved.45 "The fundamental
purpose of property rights, and their fundamental accomplish-
ment, is that they eliminate destructive competition for control of
economic resources. Well-defined and well-protected property
rights replace competition by violence with competition by peace-
ful means."46 This result is not only desirable, but also essential,
because these mechanisms also serve as perhaps the only remedy
to the poverty, ill health and environmental degradation that per-
vade developing nations.47 The United States has long champi-
oned exclusive ownership of private property, especially
intellectual property (IP),4s as have the members of OECD.
44. "Psychological factors have often been more decisive than economic
considerations in state decisions to increase barriers to trade. It was the need to
change popular attitudes about 'protectionism' that presented the most difficult
obstacle to proponents of freer trade in the postwar era .... Probably the most useful
function performed by GATT was helping to resolve disputes over alleged infractions
of its trading rules. The lesson of the 1930's, burned indelibly into the pages of
economic history, is that the greatest danger to a liberal trading system is retaliation
that touches off a spiral of increasing protectionism." ZIRING, supra note 43, at 389,
392-394; see also SPERO, supra note 43, at 52.
45. See Interview with Ronald Bailey, Economist, Professor of Economics at
Stanford University's Graduate School of Business, Post-Scarcity Prophet: Economist
Paul Romer on Growth, Technological Change, and an Unlimited Human Future,
REASON MAG., Dec. 2001, available at http://www.reason.com/0112/fe.rb.post.shtml;
see also DANIEL W. DREZNER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. TRADE STRATEGY
FREE VERSUS FAIR: CRITICAL POLICY CHOICES 22 (2006), http://www.cfr.org/contentI
publications/attachments/CPCTrade.pdf.
46. See Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, in LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (David R. Henderson ed., 2002), available at
http://www.econlib.org(LIBRARY/En/PropertyRights.html.
47. See President's Remarks at the Initiative for Global Development's 2006
National Summit on June 15, 2006, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1139, 1142 (June
19, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060615.
html ("Free nations produce the vast majority of the world's economic output....
Nations that build institutions that secure the rule of law and respect human dignity
also are more likely to create an economic climate that fosters investment and
growth.").
48. But see SYLVIA KRAEMER, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES: OPEN SYSTEMS IN ACTION 1, 8 (2006) ("[TIhe principle of 'open systems' has
been in use in human society for over two millennia [and should be] understood as an
essential characteristic of a large variety of historical and contemporary ideological
and institutional proclivities [and] can help explain a broad array of institutional
variations .... [Tihe history of science, technology, and politics in the United States
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Although the established international order may have had
some objectionable features, as has been pointed out by the
nations of Europe and increasingly, by Brazil and Argentina who,
on behalf of the developing world, have called for major reforms
amounting to a new world order,4 9 the established order has nev-
ertheless been, and continues to be, an overwhelming success.5 °
Indeed, even though the prevailing global system has required
periodic revisions, it has created the greatest sustained engine of
international economic growth and prosperity, improved human
health and education, and technological innovation the world has
ever known.5 As complex and elaborate as it has become, the
established order has, nonetheless, remained flexible enough to
permit provisional exceptions or derogations upon demonstration
of genuine national needs and exigencies."
[reflects] an interplay of institutions, ideas, and issues in the ongoing tension between
open and closed systems [in which] effective policymaking . . . [is] something that
occurs within the dynamic 'range of play' [involving] three essential sets of variables
... politics .. .ideology . .. and law." (emphasis in original)).
49. See, e.g., DIRK MESSNER ET AL, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, GOVERNANCE
REFORM OF THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS AND THE UN DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM,
DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION (2005), http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/
wbank/2005/05governance.pdf.
50. See e.g., Ngaire Woods, Bretton Woods Institutions, in OxFORD HANDBOOK ON
THE UNITED NATIONS WEISS 15-16 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2006);
Michael P. Dooley et al., Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., The Revived Bretton Woods
System, 9 INT. J. FIN. ECON. 307-313 (2004), available at http://web.ku.edu/-intecon/
Read/Dooley04.pdf; KLAus LIEBSCHER, GOVERNOR, The Importance of the Bretton
Woods Institutions for Small Countries, PRESENTED AT THE OESTERREICHISCHE
NATIONALBANK Conference: 60 Years of Bretton Woods - Governance of the
International Financial System - Looking Ahead (June 21, 2004) (transcript available
at http://www.oenb.aden/service-events/fruehere-va/va2004/bretton-woods/the_
importance ofthebretton woods_institutions for small countries-opening-address
.jsp); Derbach, supra note 25, at 102 ("Governments should strive not just for peace
and security, social development and economic development but also for protection of
the environment and natural resources on which the rest depend. Moreover, they
should seek to foster those goals for both present and future generations. Apart from
environmental protection, the framework is directed toward a more equitable
society.").
51. See DEAN T. JAMISON, DISEASE CONTROL PRIORITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
3-4, 6 (Dean T. Jamison, et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006) (1993) (expressing
that technologic improvements have increased the life expectancies in developing
countries throughout the world, specifically doubling such expectancies in Chile).
52. For example, Article 30 of the TRIPS agreement contains a number of
exceptions to patent enforcement. However, the availability of these exceptions to
WTO member governments is conditioned upon satisfaction of certain requirements.
Generally speaking, the invocation of any such exception must "not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation" of the patent and must "not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the [patent] owner . . . , taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
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II. BRAZIL THREATENS U.S. AND OECD NATION PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Both the TRIPS and the WIPO Agreement clearly recognize
and protect exclusive individual private property rights. 3 In addi-
tion, so do the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Ameri-
can Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, 4 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights," the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human Rights,56 and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action.57
World Trade Organization, Annex 1c, Legal Instruments-Results of The Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.
org/english/docs.e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf. It has been claimed that the exceptions
recognized as existing at the time that the TRIPS agreement was negotiated consist of
the following: 1) de minimis use; 2) experimental use; 3) medical prescriptions; 4)
freedom of international movement of foreign vessels; 5) Bolar regulatory review
exception to Hatch-Waxman Act; and 6) patent exhaustion. See Garrison, supra note
24, at x. Interestingly, the thesis of this author's paper is that "the approach of a new
[WTO] Panel to the issue of exceptions under Art. 30 TRIPS must likely be expected
to be different from that which the Panel took back in 2000." Id. Other exceptions to
the international trade rules exist within Article XX to the GATT 1947, but they, too,
are circumscribed by general conditions for eligibility. In order to invoke any one of
ten enumerated exceptions (Art. XX (a)-(j)) as a justification to adopt and/or apply
regulatory or standards-based measures, a GATT/WTO member government must
demonstrate that "such measures [are] not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail" and that it is not "a disguised restriction on
international trade." See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/englislidocs-e/legal-e/
gatt47-e.pdf.
53. See TRIPS, supra note 52; see also Convention Establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization, art. 3, July 14, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 782, 784.
54. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, AG/RES. 1591
(XXVIII-O/98) (May 2, 1948), available at http://www.oas.org/juridicofEnglish/ga-
Res98/Eresl591.htm.
55. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
[ICESCR], G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 15((1)(a)-(c)(3), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (recognizing the importance of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, of which property rights are
recognized as a fundamental principle).
56. See G.A. Res. 152, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/625/Add.2 (1998)
(adopting Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, UN
Educ., Scientific and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], 29th Sess., 29 C/Resolution 19,
reprinted in Records of the General Conference, UNESCO, 29th Sess., 29 C/
Resolution 19, at 41 (1997)), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/
001096/109687eb.pdf.
57. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157723 (July 12, 1993),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.
23.En.
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A. Property Rights Broadly Defined
1. Property Consists of Both Things and Ideas
The following discussion sets forth a basic definition of prop-
erty that describes the relationship between persons and things,
including ideas. Broadly speaking, the notion of private property
determines the rights that persons have in things. Typi-
cally, the existence of such rights is predicated on two fac-
tors: (1) whether the person has sufficient ability to control
possession, use, and transferability of the thing; and (2)
whether the underlying policies of the law are furthered by
bestowing property rights on the thing. When a person has
the unrestricted right to possess, use, and transfer a thing,
it is granted property status and the person is the owner of
the thing. When a person has no rights of possession, use,
and alienation, the thing is denied property status, and it
becomes part of the public domain."
As so defined, property includes tangible natural assets and
resources, especially raw land and converted real estate, as well
as man-made structures and personal assets, which may be effi-
ciently and cost-effectively managed with the proper incentives for
both private and public benefit. 9
In addition, property also has increasingly encompassed
intangible human know-how, ideas and creativity (IP) that can
and inevitably do lead to incremental and breakthrough inven-
tions as well as innovations that benefit both individuals and
society.
[One policy] granting property status to ideas provides an
incentive for innovators to develop new ideas by giving the
innovator the right to control use of the idea. As a result,
the public will gain the benefit of the idea because economic
motives will spur the innovator to share it with the public.
[Another] policy underlying intellectual property law is to
regulate and manage competition. Innovators should be
entitled to monetary gain from their ideas.... The grant-
ing of property status to ideas is consistent with the basic
definition of property .... 60
58. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within The Traditional Definition of
Property? A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 648-49 (1994).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 649.
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2. Exclusive Private Property Rights Have Historical
Significance
One of the key features of private property is its exclusive
nature. "[T]he three basic elements of private property are (1)
exclusivity of rights to the choice of use of a resource, (2) exclusiv-
ity of rights to the services of a resource, and (3) rights to
exchange the resource at mutually agreeable terms."61
Ideas that can be exclusively possessed, used, and trans-
ferred by a person are granted property status. Once control
of an idea is lost to the public, property status ends. The
concept of novelty has been developed to determine
whether a person has control of an idea. If a person devel-
ops a new idea that is not generally known, the idea is
novel and potentially subject to property status. This result
is consistent with the basic definition of property because it
recognizes that an idea that is both new and not generally
known can be controlled by its creator.
The right to own and enjoy real and personal property, includ-
ing IP, and the inventions and innovations derived from it, has
historical significance beyond 18th century English statutory and
common law. 63 The Federalist Papers also clearly reflect that pri-
vate property rights have long been among the most fundamental,
inalienable, and liberating of all natural rights guaranteed to U.S.
citizens by the U.S. Constitution and its accompanying Bill of
Rights.' Founding Father James Madison wrote in Federalist
Paper No. 10 that "[t]he protection of... the faculties of men, from
which the rights of property originate ... is the first object of
government."65
In addition, in Federalist Paper No. 54, Madison wrote that
"[g]overnment is instituted no less for protection of the property,
than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the other,
therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are
61. Alchian, supra note 46 (emphasis added).
62. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 58, at 649 (emphasis added).
63. See PAT CHOATE, HOT PROPERTY: THE STEALING OF IDEAS IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 26-27 (2005) (stating that U.S. IP law concepts have derived
substantially from England's Statute of Monopolies, its Statute of Anne, and from
English common law).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The U.S. Constitution and accompanying Bill of
Rights provide that federal, state and local governments shall not "take private
property... for public use[ ] without just compensation." Id.
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 40, 41 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
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charged with the government."66 Several years later, in an article
published in the National Gazette, Madison wrote what is argua-
bly his most articulate expose on private property rights:
[Property means] that dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion
of every other individual .... [Ilt embraces everything to
which a man may attach a value and have a right; and
which leaves to every one else the like advantage. In the for-
mer sense, a man's land, or merchandize, or money is called
his property. In the latter sense, a man has a property in
his opinions and the free communication of them .... He
has a property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of
his person. He has an equal property in the free use of his
faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ
them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his
rights. 7
Furthermore, French author and historian Alexis de Toc-
queville wrote about the liberating power of private property, as
envisioned by the U.S. Constitution, to promote democracy, scien-
tific and creative discovery, and innovation.
68
As soon as citizens began to own land other than by feudal
tenure, and transferable wealth was recognized, and could
in its turn create influence and give power, discoveries in
the arts could not be made, nor improvements in commerce
and industry be introduced, without creating almost as
many new elements of equality among men. Once works of
the intellect had become sources of force and wealth, each
development of science, each new piece of knowledge, each
new idea had to be considered as a seed of power put within
reach of the people.69
Moreover, since 1948, the world community has deemed the right
to private property a fundamental and inalienable human right. 0
Since 1992, the Constitution of the Independent and Sovereign
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 264-67 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
67. JAMES MADISON, Property, THE NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 14
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-67 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (emphasis
in original).
68. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3, 5 (Francis Bowen &
Phillips Bradley eds., Henry Reeve trans., Random House 1945) (1840).
69. Id.
70. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 17, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec.12, 1948), available at http:ll
www.udhr.orgIJDHR/default.htm.
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Republic of Mongolia has been consistent with this vision with
Chapter 2 entitled Human Rights and Freedoms and Article 16
entitled Citizens' Rights. These provisions have expressly pro-
vided for the protection of exclusive private property rights,
including patents and copyrights.71
B. Brazil Monitors OECD Nations' Property Rights
Debates
Brazilian politicians are likely influenced, to some extent, by
the current political debates concerning the scope of European and
U.S. patent system reform, and the effectiveness of the current
European and U.S. regulatory frameworks that finance univer-
sity-based R&D and facilitate commercial innovations by private
industry.72 These crosscurrents have generated more policy con-
flict than consensus among the various expert groups within the
Government of Brazil. It may even have emboldened Brazil's rul-
ing party to promote a culture of IP opportunism that has now
transcended national boundaries and debates, proof of the essen-
tial link between private IPRs and innovation.73
1. The Age-old Debate Concerning Private vs. Public
Property Rights
Clearly, the Brazilian Government's strategy, in part, is to
exploit the age-old societal debate over what is and should be 'pri-
vate' versus 'public' property74 and the extent to which govern-
71. See MONG. CONSTITUTION arts. 16, §§ 3, 8, available at http://www.concourt.am/
wwconst/constit/mongolia/mongol-e.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
72. See generally F. SCOTT KIEFF, COORDINATION, PROPERTY & INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: AN UNCONvENTIONAL APPROACH TO ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS &
DOWNSTREAM ACCESS, WASH. UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW & STAN. UNIV. - HOOVER INST.,
June 2006, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=910656 ("Stronger...
property rule[ ] enforcement facilitates the good type of coordination that increases
competition and access.").
73. Guilherme Patriota of the Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva is a member
of a new WHO panel on IPRs and public health, which is an outgrowth of the
controversial WHO Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
Innovation and Public Health [CIPIH] released this past November. Mr. Patriota has
theorized that "there is an inconsistency between intellectual property rights, which
grant a monopoly to the right holder, and trade principles, which are based on
competition. Developing countries are in a 'very difficult environment."' WILLIAM
NEW, VIEWS MIXED ON WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON PUBLIC HEALTH AFTER FIvE
YEARS, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.
php?p=460&res=1024&print=O (summarizing Guilherme Patriota's statements from
a panel on policy related IPRs and public health on November 14, 2006).
74. See Alchian, supra note 46. "The definition, allocation, and protection of
property rights is one of the most complex and difficult set of issues that any society
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ment should protect and regulate each. No doubt, the Government
of Brazil is aware that this debate continues today in various
countries throughout the world,75 including China,76 Vietnam,77
France,78 the EU,79 Finland, Norway and Sweden, ° and even
within the United States.8 It also likely realizes that civil society
activists and socialist political parties have largely precipitated
this debate, at both the national and international levels, in order
to promote greater public welfare benefits at the expense of pri-
vate interests, and to establish an express public policy of societal
parity over societal progress.82 Within Europe, Brazil, and certain
less developed countries, influential NGOs have exacerbated the
division between these two forms of property ownership, and have
secured the imposition of more regulation, both nationally and
internationally, to redefine and limit how science, technology and
has to resolve, but it is one that must be resolved in some fashion. For the most part
social critics of 'property' rights do not want to abolish those rights. Rather, they want
to transfer them from private ownership to government ownership. Some transfers to
public ownership (or control, which is similar) make an economy more effective.
Others make it less effective. The worst outcome by far occurs when property rights
really are abolished." Id.
75. See id. ("The two extremes in weakened private property rights are socialism
and 'commonly owned' resources. Under socialism, government agents-those whom
the government assigns-exercise control over resources. The rights of these agents to
make decisions about the property they control are highly restricted. People who
think they can put the resources to more valuable uses cannot do so by purchasing the
rights because the rights are not for sale at any price .... Similarly, common
ownership of resources-whether in what was formerly the Soviet Union or in the
United States-gives no one a strong incentive to preserve the resource.").
76. See, e.g., Howard W. French, China Media Battle Hints at Shift on Intellectual
Property, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, § International, at A03; Joseph Kahn, A Sharp
Debate Erupts in China Over Ideologies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, § 1, at 1.
77. See, e.g., Amy Kazmin, State Control Stops Vietnam Realising its IT Potential
Progress Towards an Economy Centred on High-Technology Industry is Being
Hampered by Vested Interests, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 24, 2006, § Asia-Pacific, at 7.
78. See John Thornhill, Lone Voice Calls on France to Tame the State, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 26, 2006, § Europe, at 5; Tom Braithwaite, Threat to Apple Itunes
Business from French law, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 22, 2006, at 19.
79. See Stephanie Bodoni, Half of EU Countries Set to Miss Enforcement Directive
Deadline, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (London), Mar. 15, 2006, http://www.managingip.
com/default.asp?page=9&PubID=198&SID=619370&ISS=21503&LS=EMS67693;
Interoperability and the Software Patents Directive: What Degree of Exemption is
Needed?, FoUND. FOR A FREE INFO. INFRASTRUcTURE, http://swpat.ffii.org/papers/
eubsa-swpat0202/itop/index.en.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
80. See Tom Braithwaite & David Ibison, Apple Faces New Threat to iTunes
Music, FIN. TIMES (London), June 10, 2006, § Int'l News, at 6.
81. See discussion infra Part III.C.6.
82. See Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, http://www.ffii.org/
Statutes (last visited Aug 30, 2006) (supporting the development of public information
goods); Arvind Panagariya, The Pursuit of Equity Threatens Poverty Alleviation, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jun. 1, 2006, § Comment, at 11.
2006] BRAZIL'S IP OPPORTUNISM 21
industrial IP know-how should be generated, accessed and
utilized. 3
2. Brazil Observes the European Debates Concerning
IPRs and Innovation
The Brazilian Government has likely observed how the EU
Commission and several EU Member States have embraced NGO
demands for a more public property than private property-centric
regulatory approach to health, environment and intellectual prop-
erty/innovation issues 84 than that called for by United States85 and
international law,86 and it has arguably tried to exploit this differ-
ence." Unfortunately, Europe's more social welfare state and,
83. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Exporting Europe's Precaution: How Europe's Risk-
Free Agenda Threatens American Free Enterprise, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., Nov. 2005, at
37-42, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/110405MONOKogan.pdf; see also D.
BETTCHER & K LEE, Globalisation and Public Health, 56 J. EPIDEMIOL COMMUNITY
HEALTH 8-17 (2002), available at http://jech.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/56/1/8 ("NGO
influence has been greatest when it has captured the imagination of mass publics in
powerful states."); Roger Bate & Richard Tren, Do NGOs Improve Wealth and Health
in Africa?, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., June 2003, at 7, available at http://www.aei.org/
docLib/20030612_batepub.pdf.
84. See, e.g., R.C. Longworth, Activist Groups Gain Influence in Global Body, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 1999, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/issues/ngos99.
htm; BRIJESH NALINAKUMARI & RICHARD MACLEAN, THE SHIFTING ROLES OF NGOs -
MOVING TOWARD A 'SUPERPOWER,' PERC REPORTS (2005), available at http://www.
perc.org/perc.php?id=757; Lee Jong-Wook, Addressing Global Health: WHO
Confronts AIDS, Drugs, and the Future of Health, 26 INT'L TRADE 2 (2004), available
at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1274; Rene Loewenson, Civ. Soc'y Initiative,
Annotated Bibliography on Civil Society and Health: Civil Society Influence on Global
Health Policy, WHO, CSI/2003/B14, April 2003, available at http://www.tarsc.org/
WHOCSI/pdfiWHOTARSC4.pdf.
85. This has also occurred within the United States. See Scott McLarty, AIDS
Drugs for Africa, ZMAG, July 2000, available at http://www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/
july00mclarty.htm (referencing President Clinton's EO titled Access to HIV/AIDS
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technologies).
86. See Tobias Buck & George Parker, Washington Bridles at EU's Urge to
Regulate, FIN. TIMES (London), May 12, 2006, § Europe, at 6.
87. It is arguable that the Brazilian Government is trying to create a division
between the U.S. and Europe concerning the scope of private intellectual property
rights under international law, while at the same time staking out a position for itself
that is closer to the European approach. See U.N. Dep't of Pub. Rel., Brazil, Chile,
France, Norway, United Kingdom Launch New International Drug Purchase Facility
to Improve Access to Treatment for HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, DEPT. OF PUB. INFO.
MEETINGS COVERAGE AIDS/127, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2006/aidsl27.doc.htm. This may reflect its growing ties with the EU, particularly
with the French Government. See Marcos Chagas, Chirac Wants More Brazil-France
Cooperation on Biotechnology and Space, BRAZZIL MAG., May 26, 2006, available at
http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/6499/53. It may also indicate the Brazilian
Government's willingness to support the idea of European-style regional economic
and legal integration for purposes of forming a "continent-wide" trading bloc to
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thus, communal treatment of knowledge and property ownership
has had an increasingly negative impact on the innovation poten-
tial of European, and particularly, German pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology, computer software, and information and communi-
cation technology sectors. 8
For example, the EU's relatively weaker 89 but more expen-
sive9" IP protections circumscribed by civil law notions of ordre
public,91 equity and morality,9 2 public welfare interests," and free-
compete against the United States and its current and future Latin American trading
partners. According to recent media reports, "[tihe leaders agreed to form a study
group in Rio de Janeiro to look at the possibility of creating a continent-wide union,
and even a South American parliament. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da
Silva, a former metalworker who was re-elected in October, assured his fellow leaders
that the group could rise above its historical divisions to unite the continent - though
the process would not be easy." Latin Leaders Look To European Union As Model,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 10, 2006; Dan Keane, Unity Plan Develops at South American
Summit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 9, 2006; Eduardo Garcia, Morales Calls For EU-
style Unity in South America, REUTERS, Dec. 10, 2006.
88. See Andrew Jack & Patrick Jenkins, The Birthplace of Aspirin Finds Its Drug
Innovation Numbed, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at 13 ("[Flor much of the 20th century
they were industrial powerhouses that pioneered global breakthrough medicines,
from aspirin to the birth control pill. Today, Germany's pharmaceuticals companies
are weaklings.").
89. See Ingrid Marson, EU Prefers 'Computer-Aided' Patents, ZDNET UK, Jun. 14,
2005, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/business/legal/0,39020651,39203722,00.htm ("[Tihe
European Parliament [EP] proposed a number of changes to the directive on the
patentability of computer-implemented inventions, including a change to the name of
the directive to make it clear that software . . . innovations in the field of data
processing . . . cannot be patented."); Munir Kotadia, EU Votes Through Software
Patent Changes, ZDNET (UK), June 18, 2005, available at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/
business/legal/0,39020651,39155028,00.htm.
90. See Tobias Buck, 'One Final Effort' to Create a Low-Cost EU Patent, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 16, 2006, at 1; EuR. SOFTWARE AsS'N, RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION'S CONSULTATION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM IN EUROPE 1, available at http:f!
www.europeansoftware.orgpdf/EuSftwAssn Response.to-patent-questionnaire.pdf.
91. "[O]rdre public originated in French law ... [and] encompasses several and
distinct concepts. The first concept ... incorporates two distinct powers. Judges are
allowed limited discretion by virtue of certain articles of French Civil Code to prevent
enforcement of transactions which are 'held to offend public order."' Timothy G.
Ackerman, Dis'ordre'ly Loopholes: TRIPS Patent Protection, GATT, and the ECJ, 32
TEx. INT'L L.J. 489, 495-496, 510 (1997) (quoting DENNIS LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY 6
(1953)). "The second concept, termed ordre public externe, is related to the first and,
in the area of private international law, is interchangeable with public policy. It may
be invoked to prevent the application of foreign law, otherwise applicable under
principles of international law, on the basis that foreign law 'would sanction conduct
that offends against the forum's concept of fundamental norms."' Id. (quoting M.
Forde, The 'Ordre Public' Exception and Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions, 29
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 259, 259 (1980)); see also Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and
Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 9
(2001).
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dom of expression and human rights,94 more or less favor public
interests over private interests, and this has had a serious chilling
effect on national and regional innovation and competitiveness.
In addition, such policies have strengthened the political influence
of national socialist parties and civil society activist organizations,
which have increasingly demanded institutionalization of what
were once purely academic notions (open source and universally
accessible information technology and health care).95
As the result of such regulations and policies, 96 a growing
number of European-based multinational companies have shifted
their research and development facilities to the United States,
which better recognizes the essential link between private prop-
erty rights and innovation, and thus, has laws more favorable to
and protective of private IP ownership. This has prompted the
European Commission to urgently reformulate its regional and
92. Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2004).
93. See F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual
Property Standards, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2245-54 (2000). "Many nations excluded
drug products from patentability because they considered drugs (and for analogous
reasons, food products) to be of such great importance to the national welfare. Even
Switzerland, home to three of the world's leading pharmaceutical companies,
abstained until 1977 from granting drug patents." Id. at 2247-48.
94. See e.g., Marco Pistis, The European Convention on Human Rights: Copyright
Implications, MONDAQ, June 4, 2006, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=
40204.
95. See e.g., WALT SCACCHI, INST. FOR SOFTWARE RESEARCH UNIV. OF CAL IRVINE
UNDERSTANDING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE EVOLUTION: APPLYING, BREAKING, AND
RETHINKING THE LAWS OF SOFTWARE EVOLUTION (2003), available at http://
opensource.mit.edu/papers/scacchi3.pdf, Jill Coffin, Analysis of Open Source
Principles in Diverse Collaborative Communities, FIRST MONDAY, Sept. 18, 2006,
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issuell_6/coffin/index.html; David H . Freedman,
The Linux Revolution - Part I: Some Call Miguel de Icaza a Sellout, But the Mexican
Open-Source Firebrand Says the Best Place to Continue the Battle Against Microsoft is
Within a Big Corporation, TECH. REVIEW, Sept. 2004, at 46; Wade Roush, The Linux
Revolution - Part II: Linux is Finally Offering Windows Users a Real Choice, TECH.
REVIEW, Sept. 2004, at 50.
96. See Press Release, Council of the E.U., Adoption of A Regulation On
Compulsory Licensing of Patents Relating To The Manufacture of Pharmaceutical
Products For Export To Countries With Public Health Problems (Apr. 28, 2006),
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/06/
120; Commission Regulation 816/2006, Compulsory Licensing Of Patents Relating To
The Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for Export to Countries With Public
Health Problems, 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l 157/l_15720060609en00010007.pdf; Council for TRIPS,
Implementation of Paragraph 11 of The General Council Decision of 30 August 2003
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of The Doha Declaration on The TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/
englisbnews e/news05_etripsdecision_e.doc.
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global policies concerning R&D investment and innovation in
order to maintain international competitiveness and stem indus-
try flight and the accompanying brain drain. 7 It has also drawn
the socialist governments of Brazil and Europe closer together on
IP issues, 98 given that, they both evidently lag behind the United
States in patented inventions99 and commercialized innovations. 100
3. Brazil Observes the American Debates Concerning
IPRs & Innovation
Although the United States has arguably struck the most suc-
cessful balance between private and public intangible property
rights the world has ever known, considering that it remains both
the world's largest economy and the world leader in innovation, 1 1
97. See Comm'n Staff Working Paper, European Competitiveness Report 2004,
SEC(2004) 1397 (Aug. 11, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise
_policy/competitiveness/docdcomprep_2004_en.pdf; Innovation and Entrepreneurship
in the Information Society: Final Report of the 5-Year Assessment of ESPRIT,
ESPRIT, June 25, 1997, http://cordis.europa.eu/esprit/src/carneiro.htm; Jean-Michel
Chass~riaux, Long Term Research in ESPRIT in the Perspective of the 5th
Framework Programme, ERCIM NEWS ONLINE, April 1997, http://www.ercim.org/
publication/Ercim News/enw29/chasseriaux2.html; Tobias Buck, EU Is 50 Years
Behind the US for Innovation, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 2006, § Europe, at 8;
Pierre Simon, President, Eurochambres, EU is Failing to Close US Innovation Gap,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 20, 2005, § Letters to the Editor, at 12.
98. See Inter-American Dev. Bank [IADB], Brazil: Technological Innovation and
New Management Approaches in Agricultural Research -AGROFUTURO (BR -L1001
Loan Proposal), July 20, 2004, http://www.iadb.org/exr/doc98/apr/br1595e.pdf (Loan
No. 1595/OC-BR approved $33 million of $60 million on Dec. 1, 2004).
99. "The use of the patent system internationally has increased markedly in
recent years . . . [despite] the growth rate of patent filings by non-residents (7.4%
average annual increase since 1995) and in the increase in patent filings in countries
such as Brazil, China, India, the Republic of Korea and Mexico .... The use of the
patent system remains highly concentrated with only five patent offices (United
States of America, Japan, Republic of Korea, China and the European Patent Office)
accounting for 75% of all patent applications and 74% of all patents granted." WIPO,
WIPO PATENT REPORT: STATISTICS ON WORLDWIDE PATENT AcnvITY (2006), available
at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/patent-report-2006.pdf
(presenting an overview of worldwide patenting activity based on statistics up to the
end of 2004).
100. See Michael Luger et al., European Trend Chart on Innovation: Annual
Innovation Policy Trends Report for United States, Canada, Mexico and Brazil 2005,
EUR. COMM'N ENT. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL i-iii, 4-5 (2005).
101. See id. at i; see also ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD], SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY SCOREBoARD 7-9 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/41/0/17130709.pdf ("In the United States, investment in knowledge - the
sum of investment in R&D, software and higher education - amounted to almost
seven percent of GDP in 2000, well above the share for the European Union or
Japan .... R&D expenditure has risen faster in the United States (5.4% a year) than in
the European Union (3.7%) and Japan (2.8%).... OECD data on patent families (a set
of patents filed in various countries to protect a single invention) show the existence
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the United States' IPR framework covering patents and trade
secrets has increasingly become the subject of heated national
debate." 2 Brazilian politicians have likely monitored the recent
congressional hearings on U.S. patent reform."3 Many articles
have also likely influenced their commentaries and panel
presentations disputing the utility of the current regulatory
framework by which U.S. federally funded university-based R&D
is commercialized by hi-tech industries.10 4
Some of these debates have become politically and ideologi-
cally charged, as they have led to legislative proposals that would,
if enacted, likely undermine U.S. exclusive private property
rights, both here and abroad. 05 If foreign governments 10 6 with
weak IPR regimes believe that American society is uncertain
about the scope of protection to accord IPRs, they will opportunis-
of more than 40,000 patent families in 1998 in the OECD area, a 32% increase from
1991. The United States accounted for around 36%, followed by the European Union
(33%) and Japan (25%)." (emphasis added)).
102. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the
United States, Aug. 2006, available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/papers/
scherer/PATPOLIC.pdf (unpublished comment, on file with Harvard University).
103. Perspectives on Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other Litigation
Reform, Notice of Subcomm. Hearing before The S. Comm. on the Judiciary
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property (May 23, 2006); Anne Broache, Senators Offer
Sweeping Patent System Changes, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 4, 2006, http://news.com.
comI2100-1028_3-6102493.html; H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h5096.pdf, Rick Boucher, Overview of
Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, http://www.boucher.house.gov/index2.
php?option=com content&dopdf=l&id=678 (commenting on H.R. 5096); Patents
Depend on Quality Act of 2006: Hearing on H.R. 5096 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) (statement of congressman Howard Berman
representing the 28th District of California).
104. See e.g., Dianne N. Irving, Revisiting the Bayh-Dole Act (1980): Spawned Big
Biotech Now Has Opposite Debilitating Effects, LIFEISSUES.NET, Sept. 22, 2005, http:l
www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_104bayhdole.html (citing Clifton Leaf, The Law of
Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE MAG., Sept. 19, 2005, at 250); Bayhing for Blood
or Doling Out Cash, ECONOMIST.coM, Dec. 24, 2005, http://www.economist.com/
science/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story-jd=5327661; David Mowery, U.N. Indus. Dev. Org.
[UNIDO] Meeting in Venice, Oct. 3, 2002, Developing Countries and TRIPS (Oct. 27,
2002), available at http://www.unido.org/en/doc/7983; David C. Mowery &
Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-Industry Technology
Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115 (2005);
David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities:
An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL'Y 99 (2001).
105. See e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5135, S5245-52 (May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Lugar & Sen. Leahy), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?
dbname=2006_record&page=S5245&position=all; Press Release, Senator Patrick
Leahy, Bill to Foster Low-Cost Drugs for World's Poorest (May 21, 2006), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200605/051906.html.
106. BRIC is used to refer to a combination of the economies of Brazil, Russia,
India, and China.
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tically seek to exploit our uncertainty to the detriment of U.S. pri-
vate property owners abroad. How can we demand that such
nations protect our IPRs (i.e., patents, data exclusivity, trade
secrets, etc.) and invest in their own IP, if we take measures
domestically that weaken long established U.S. Constitutional IP
protections? We must remember that what we say and do in the
United States, concerning IP rights, will reverberate throughout
the world and have an impact on both the international IP frame-
work and other countries' national IP laws and policies. In other
words, we must ensure that the type of IP message we convey both
at home and abroad is positive and consistent. °7
4. Brazil's 'Gaming' of OECD Nation IPRs Violates
Constitutional and Human Rights
During the past seven years, the Brazilian Government, prod-
ded by activists and supported by the WHO, has repeatedly
threatened to 'take' the private IPRs of OECD life science compa-
nies operating in Brazil (via issuance of compulsory licenses) for
an ostensible 'public use' without paying 'just compensation."" In
addition, the Brazilian Government has threatened to abrogate
U.S. pharmaceutical patents and/or to otherwise disclose confi-
dential U.S. and European company pre-clinical testing data,
much of which qualifies as proprietary trade secrets, if such com-
panies fail to sell their HIV/AIDS and other drugs at-or-below
cost. It is believed, however, that Brazilian generic drug makers
and corrupt Brazilian politicians, rather than the poor and HIV-
107. See PREPARED TESTIMONY OF EDWARD JUNG FOUNDER, INTELLECTUAL
VENTURES, Before The US - China Economic & Security Review Commission Hearing
on Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Dangers of Counterfeited Goods Imported
Into the United States, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/
2006hearings/writtentestimonies/06_06_07wrts/06_06_7_8jung-edward.php.
108. See Ministry of Health of Braz., The Government Declares Anti-retroviral
Kaletra to be of Public Interest and Will Produce it in Brazil, PR NEWSWIRE, June 24,
2005, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY
=/www/story/06-25-2005/0003950348&EDATE; WHO Congratulates Brazil for the
Breaking of the Patent of the Aids Medicine, EUROPEAN AIDS TREATMENT GROUP, July
1, 2005, available at http://www.eatg.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&
file=article&sid=467&mode=thread&order=O&thold=O; Merck to Allow Brazil to Copy
AIDS Drug Stocrim, Valor Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 2, 2004, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 10000086&sid=anv5lyXhZdtk&refer=latinamerica;
Brazil to Break AIDS Drug Patents, BBC NEWS, Dec. 1, 2004, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4059147.stm; Keith Alcorn, Brazil wins 75% Discount on New
HIV Drug, AIDSMap News, Nov. 11, 2003, available at http://www.aidsmap.com/enl
news/5719B079-1568-4614-89D7-C51F8A3DC6Al.asp; Alex Bellos, Roche Bows to
Brazil on AIDS. Drug, GUARDIAN, Sept. 9, 2001, available at http://www.guardian.co.
uk/international/story/0,3604,545328,00.html.
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infected people of Brazil, primarily benefit from such intimidation
and extortion-like activities. 9
Brazil's threatened actions arguably amount to 'constructive
takings"10 of exclusive U.S. private property, and thus, violate
109. See Slavi Pachovski & Lawrence A. Kogan, The Wolf and the Stork: How
Brazil's Breaking of U.S. Drug Patents Threatens Global Trade and Public Health,
ITSSD, June 14, 2005, http://www.itssd.org/White%20Papers/TheWolfandtheStork-
Brazil-snon-patentabilitylaw.pdf.
110. "[Ilt is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State can
interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so
useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State
does not purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally
remains with the original owner." Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 122 (1983) (emphasis added). "Sales at inadequate prices, brought about
through physical threats or other forms of coercion, have repeatedly been held to
constitute expropriation. Summarizing the case law on this subject, one commentator
has found that there is a general consensus that proven threats of coercion ... are
sufficient duress to make an otherwise valid transfer a [taking]." Id. at 171 (citations
omitted). Concerning Iranian Revolutionary Guards' coercion of an Iranian
apartment house owner to forsake exercise of negotiated contract right to invoke price
escalation clause upon sale, and thus, twenty-two million dollars, "Weston ... argues
that the more intrinsically coercive a government measure is, the more justified the
demand for compensation . .. [He also] argues that 'host country deprivative
'regulations' that appear actually to retard global well-being by hindering economic
development .. should be deemed 'constructive takings.'" Andrew Paul Newcombe,
Regulatory Expropriation, Investment Protection and International Law: When Is
Government Regulation Expropriatory and When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 90-
91 (1999) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Toronto), available at http://ita.
law.uvic.ca/documents/RegulatoryExpropriation.pdf; see also Case Concerning
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), 1926
PCIJ Ser. A, No. 17, 39 ("Polish expropriation measures directed against the German
owner of a factory also constituted an indirect expropriation of another German
company which had contractual rights of managing and operating the plant.. .for the
use of its patents, licences, experiments, etc., have been directly prejudiced by the
taking over of the factory by Poland" (emphasis added)); CME Czech Republic B. V. v.
The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, Partial Award of 13 September
2001, reprinted in 14 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 109, 1 591 (2002); Guillermo
Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (2003) ("An indirect expropriation may occur if the
investor's expected entitlement to the benefits are impaired by host state
interference, even if property is not legally taken by the state, or when the host state
itself acquires nothing of value but at least has been the instrument of its
redistribution."); G.H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? -
The Decision of the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal, 88 AJIL 585, 598 (1994); W.
Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the
BIT Generation, in 74 THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAw 115, 119-22 (James
Crawford & Vaughan Lowe eds., 2004); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD],
'Indirect Expropriation' and the 'Right to Regulate' in International Investment Law 3-
7 (OECD Directorate for Fin. & Enterprise Aff., Working Papers on International
Investment No. 2004/4, Sept. 2004, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/
33776546.pdf (citing two contrasting examples of legal texts which address non-
compensable regulation)).
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U.S. companies' constitutional rights. The President and the Con-
gress have sworn to protect these rights no matter where such
property is located.11' As previously acknowledged, the right to
own and enjoy exclusive private property has been recognized as a
fundamental and inalienable human right."2
5. Brazil's 'Gaming' of U.S. IPRs Threatens U.S.
Economic Competitiveness
The Government of Brazil's international conduct also threat-
ens to dampen foreign and Brazilian industry confidence in and
enthusiasm for investment in basic research and development,
and to discourage international and Brazilian commercialization
of those inventions."' It may even substantially impair the ability
of Brazil and its industries to secure real economic and social
advancement in the future.
Of even greater concern, however, is the influence that Bra-
zil's continued anti-IP activities has had on the thinking of other
emerging and developing countries,'14 and the impact that it will
have on future U.S. international competitiveness. Indeed, a sub-
stantial portion of the U.S. economy is now based on the perform-
ance of IP-based assets and the research and development of those
assets is increasingly being exported abroad for 'competitiveness'
reasons.' Indeed, one recent economic study estimates that
111. See discussion infra Part III.C.6.
112. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 70, at art. 17 ("1.
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 2.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.").
113. Apparently, as the international investment community has discovered, the
Brazilian Government's words (i.e., Brazil's IPR legislation) do not match its actions
(i.e., the government's implementation of the national law) - Brazil does not 'walk the
talk.' See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1990), http://www.kreative.net/ipbenefits/iped/body-9-chapter.htm
("[SIome in Brazil express the view that basically the country has a good intellectual
property system .... This view is plausible because it is common to assess protection
in terms of specific statutory provisions .... The test of whether protection is weak or
not ... is determined by people's decisions made in reaction to the system. A lack of
confidence in the system is a primary indicator of weakness." (emphasis added)).
114. Id. ("If people seem to be more inventive in the United States or Europe or
Japan, it is not an accident. It is not because of genes or schooling or intelligence or
fate. Implementation of the intellectual property system is critical because of the
habit of mind which is fostered in the population. Human ingenuity and creativity
are not dispersed unevenly across the globe. Those talents are present in every
country. In some, unfortunately, the enabling infrastructure of effective intellectual
property protection is missing.").
115. See Steven Lohr, Outsourcing is Climbing Skills Ladder, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16,
2006, available at http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/2006/Outsourcing-Ladder-Lohrl6
feb06.htm (including the companies of Dow Chemicals, IBM and Hewlett-Packard)
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[t]he current value of the intellectual property which
embodies . . . [U.S.] ideas - from computer software and
musical recordings to patented pharmaceuticals and infor-
mation technologies - . . . is worth between $5 trillion and
$5.5 trillion, equivalent to about 45 percent of United
States GDP and greater than the GDP of any other nation
in the world.116
Consequently, Brazil's attempts to weaken intellectual prop-
erty rights internationally will certainly jeopardize America's con-
tinued ability to function as the engine of global scientific and
technological innovation and economic growth."7 And, if Brazil is
successful, America's long-held advantages in international trade
and innovation and its higher GDP and living standards will
likely be significantly reduced."8
("A new study [prepared by] the nation's leading advisory groups on science and
technology suggests that more and more research work at corporations will be sent to
fast-growing economies with strong education systems like China and India. In a
survey of more than 200 multinational corporations [from the United States and
Western Europe] on their research center decisions, 38% said they planned to 'change
substantially' the worldwide distribution of their research and development work over
the next three years - with the booming markets of China and India, and their world-
class scientists, attracting the greatest increase in projects."). Europe is also
experiencing its own wave of R&D outsourcing. See Annie Kahn, The New Frontiers
of French Research, LE MONDE, Sept. 15, 2005, available at http://www.truthout.org/
issues_06/091605LA.shtml.
116. See Robert J. Shapiro & Kevin A. Hassett, The Economic Value of Intellectual
Property, USA FOR INNOVATION, Oct. 2005, at 3, available at http://www.
usaforinnovation.org/news/ip-master.pdf.
117. "Although intellectual property protection is a necessary condition for
encouraging innovation in all sectors, it is the ability to market products effectively
that provides the incentive for continued innovation and generates the returns on
investment necessary to fund new research and development and production of new
products. This cycle of innovation produces significant economic and social benefits by
accelerating economic growth and raising standards of living." U.S. TRADE REP.,
SPECIAL 301 REPORT 9-10 (2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-
Library/ReportsPublications/2005/2005_Special_301/asset upload file195_7636.pdf;
see also Bruce P. Mehlman, Assistant Sec'y for Tech. Policy U.S. Dep't of Com.,
Offshore Outsourcing and the Future of American Competitiveness, Address Before
the ITA ISAC-13 Advisory Committee (Oct. 14, 2003), available at http://www.
technology.gov/Speeches/BPM 2003-Outsourcing.pdf; S. Joseph L. Leiberman,
Offshore Outsourcing and America's Competitive Edge: Losing Out in the High
Technology R&D and Services Sectors, May 11, 2004, at 3, 14-15, 23, http://
lieberman.senate.gov/documents/whitepapers/Offshoring.pdf ("Higher skilled
professional jobs ranging from engineering, computer chip design, to nanotechnology
research are also starting to move overseas. . . .U.S. corporations are moving
sophisticated design and R&D overseas to their own subsidiaries abroad or
contracting the work to third parties to assist product development in existing
manufacturing facilities abroad.... The continued shift of corporate R&D to overseas
is a threat to our economic prosperity and national security.").
118. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) has alleged that
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III. BRAZIL CHALLENGES THE ESTABLISHED GLOBAL
IPR FRAMEWORK
A. Brazil Actively Engages in 'Regime Shifting' to
Reform International IP Law
Brazil and other developing countries that have become dis-
satisfied with the TRIPS and WIPO agreements 19 and the Ameri-
can capitalist economic model of 'risk and reward,' which serves as
the basis for the current international IP framework, are now
employing, with the assistance of well-funded global civil society
Brazil's continued theft of intellectual property rights cost American businesses an
estimated 900 million U.S. dollars in losses in 2003 alone. Intellectual property
related industry in the United States accounts for 15% of GDP and 10% of the
American workforce. See Breaking Patents is Not the Way to Go, Says US to Brazil,
BRAZZIL MAG., May 18, 2005, available at http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/
2470/49.
119. "[Mlany developing countries and civil society groups [had] bec[olme
increasingly critical [during the 1990's] of the legal and policy constraints that the
nesting of trade and IP rules [in the TRIPS agreement and a second generation WIPO
treaties] had imposed. NGOs in particular were frustrated at being shut out of
negotiations by the limited participation rights provided to non-state actors in WTO,
WIPO, and bilateral trade talks. The dramatic expansion of intellectual property that
nesting and bilateralism had engendered provided these groups with an alternative
strategy. By the late 1990s, new coalitions of state and non-state actors were shifting
their energies to multilateral venues within other international regimes whose
principles, norms, and rules were being undermined by TRIPs and TRIPs plus
treaties. These coalitions were highly strategic in their selection of issue areas,
venues, and arguments. They emphasized subjects-such as public health, human
rights, and biodiversity-with high visibility and the potential to generate strong
public support. They selected forums that were open to participation by non-state
actors or venues in which the United States was not a participant (having refused to
ratify the relevant treaties). And they attempted to influence international
bureaucrats and legal and technical experts whose support would give their claims
the imprimatur of neutrality and legitimacy. Having selected these venues, these
coalitions adopted a twofold strategy. First, they challenged TRIPs and TRIPs-plus
bilateral treaties on moral, legal, political, and economic grounds. And second, they
established new and often conflicting legal rules in an effort to rollback or block
further expansion of intellectual property rights.... The result of these initiatives is
that IP is now nested within many distinct international regimes, which together form
a multi-modal, multi-venue 'conglomerate regime' or a 'regime complex,' made up of
multilateral, regional, and bilateral treaties, soft law resolutions and declarations,
and competing networks of state and non-state actors." Laurence R. Helfer, Nesting
and Complexity in the International Intellectual Property Regime, Presented at the
Interdisciplinary Nested and Overlapping Institutions Conference at Princeton
University's Woodrow Wilson School of Government (Feb. 2006), at 1-3, available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-smeunier/Helfer%20memo.pdf (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Heifer, Nesting].
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(activist NGOs),"2 ° a strategy known as 'regime shifting.'12' Sup-
porters of the socialist welfare state model of sustainable develop-
ment have also employed this strategy with relative success in the
fields of international environmental and human rights law.
122
NGOs, for one, "have proposed to curtail [IPRs] in one interna-
tional forum after another, even where IP was the main issue: the
WTO, WIPO, UNESCO's proposed Convention on Cultural Diver-
sity, the UN's World Summit for the Information Society, the
World Health Organization, and others."23 Brazil and other
developing countries have engaged in regime shifting despite the
overall mutual and balanced concessions to which they agreed to
and the specific IPR-related bargains they reached previously at
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations leading to the consum-
mation of the WTO Agreements.24
120. "For NGOs, particularly those shut out of a forum by state-only access rules,
regime shifting also offers the obvious advantage of greater access to lawmaking
processes. By attending meetings, submitting documents to expert and working
groups, and interacting with government officials inside and outside of negotiating
halls, NGOs can shape debates over principles, norms, and rules in ways that are
foreclosed to them within more state-centric regimes." Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 2, 50 (2004) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
Helfer, Regime Shifting].
121. "A regime refers to the principles, norms, and rules governing a particular
issue area of international relations, and to the formal institutional structures and
decision making procedures through which those principles, norms, and rules are
developed. Regimes form when the interests of states converge around certain shared
objectives that can best be achieved through interstate cooperation. . . . [An]
international 'regime' describes a concept that is broader than simply a single
intergovernmental organization or a particular international agreement." Id. at 5
n.16.
122. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Looking Behind the Curtain: The Growth of Trade
Barriers That Ignore Sound Science, NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, May 2003, http:/
/www.nftc.org/default/white%20paper/TR2%20final.pdf; see also Kogan, 'Enlightened'
Environmentalism, supra note 35.
123. Schultz & Walker, supra note 10, at 82; see also Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra
note 120, at 54 ("One important consequence of post-TRIPs regime shifting has been a
sharp increase in intellectual property lawmaking in four international regimes,
including two regimes (public health and human rights) not previously concerned
with the products of human creativity or innovation.").
124. Indeed, as the result of the "negotiation of a 1995 agreement between the WTO
and WIPO [intergovernmental organizations]" and the enactment of both the TRIPS
agreement and a second generation of technical WIPO treaties, U.S. and EU IPRs
were collectively promoted at the international level. It was hoped that these
international treaties would establish a stable "bimodal' [IP] regime in which the two
intergovernmental organizations would cooperate and share policy space . . . [This
was followed by the introduction of] ... a new form of bilateral treaty [that was used]
to induce developing countries to ratify these new WIPO agreements (or standards
equivalent to them) in exchange for favorable [U.S. and EU] trade and investment
treatment." Helfer, Nesting, supra note 119, at 1.
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Their goal is to reform WTO and WIPO law from the inside
and to develop new customary international law norms beyond
those legal regimes from the outside that can eventually swallow
up the general principles, norms, and rules that comprise the
corpus of IP law.12 In other words, if regime shifting is achieved
in the name of promoting international regulatory harmoniza-
tion,12 6 the temporary and provisional exceptions and derogations
(e.g., compulsory licensing) to the general rule of strong IPR pro-
tection made expressly available in the TRIPS and WIPO Copy-
right and Patent agreements will ultimately overtake and
subsume the general rule.'27 This would result in the establish-
ment of a new treaty-based presumption against the adoption of
strong international IP protections, along with a reversal of the
burden of proof to show harm-from the party challenging IP pro-
tections to the party defending them. Thus, "higher standards of
[IP] protection [would be allowed] only when it is clearly necessary
... and where the benefits outweigh the costs of protection."'28
The ostensible public health and knowledge goals that Brazil
and other developing nations, such as Argentina, assert as the pri-
mary motivation behind such regime shifting are likely overshad-
owed by their more ambitious but less transparent economic and
125. See, e.g, Kogan, Precautionary Principle, supra note 34, at 57-61; Lawrence A.
Kogan, Exporting Europe's Protectionism, 77 NAT. INT. 91, 96-97 (2004); Kogan,
Precautionary Preference, supra note 34, at 11.
126. See Trans-Atlantic Trade Vision, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2007 (criticizing the
often hidden goals behind regulatory harmonization); Pascal Lamy, Address Before
the Eur. Soc'y of Int'l Law (May 19, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/spple/sppl26_e.htm); see also Matthew Ocheltree, Conversation with
Rufus Yerxa, WTO Deputy Director-General, on the Doha Round, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, May 24, 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=888&&prog=zgp&proj=zted (summarizing
remarks of Rufus Yerxa, which emphasized that despite the many criticisms lodged
against it, the multilateral trade system is the foundation of all of the most important
trade relationships in the world, including US-European Union, US-Japan, and US-
China).
127. WTO, Gen. Council Trade Negotiations Committee, Doha Work Programme:
The Outstanding Implementation Issue on the Relationship Between the Trips
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. WT/GC/W/564 (May
31, 2006), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN highLightParent.asp?qu=
&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FTN%2FC%2FW41%2EDOC%2EHTM
[hereinafter Doha Work Programme].
128. WIPO, Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration
Of Issues Raised in Document, 16, U.N. Doc. WO/GA/31ill (Apr. 6, 2005), available
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/iim_/iim-14.pdf. ' WIPO . . .must be
open to, and actively consider, alternative non-intellectual property-type systems for
fostering creativity, innovation and the transfer of technology, while recognizing the
benefits and costs of each system." Id.
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trade policy (protectionist) objectives.'29 More importantly, how-
ever, opportunistic activities like these further challenge interna-
tional confidence in the foundations of GATT-WTO law, increase
transaction costs, raise international political and economic ten-
sions and only weaken the resolve of nations to pursue interna-
tional trade, scientific and technological advancement to eradicate
poverty and to maintain international peace and security130 - the
original goal of the Bretton-Woods system.
131
According to one international law expert, IPR regime shift-
ing has essentially entailed
[the] shifting [ofl negotiations to international regimes
whose institutions, actors, and subject matter mandates
are more closely aligned with these countries' interests.
Within these regimes, developing countries are challenging
established legal prescriptions and generating new princi-
ples, norms, and rules of intellectual property protection for
states and private parties to follow. Intellectual property
regime shifting thus heralds the rise of a complex legal
environment in which seemingly settled treaty bargains
are contested and new dynamics of lawmaking and dispute
settlement must be considered.'32
He explains furthermore "regimes are broader than specific trea-
ties or organizations [and] reflect[] the fact that states (and,
increasingly, non-state actors) can cooperate without creating for-
mal institutions or legally binding commitments."'33
Substantively speaking, regimes consist of principles, norms
and rules. In the context of IPRs,
[tihe norms . . .include an obligation for states to create
legal monopolies (in the form of exclusive rights controlled
by private parties) that generate incentives for human
innovation and creativity and to allow foreign creators and
129. See generally Pachovski & Kogan, supra note 109; Pedro da Motta Veiga,
Brazil and the G-20 Group of Developing Countries-Managing the Challenges of WTO
Participation: Case Study 7, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION:
CASE STUDIES (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/res-e/booksp-e/casestudies e/case7_e.htm.
130. See Doha in the Doldrums-Rising Protectionism is Putting the World Economy
at Risk, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 6, 2006, § Leader, at 18; see also Caroline Daniel,
Shake-up Signals Downgrading of Trade Policy, FIN. TIMES, April 18, 2006; Alan
Beattie & Edward Alden, US Not Prepared to accept 'Doha Lite', FIN. TIMES, June 10,
2006, at 8, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ed70bf36-f804-11da-9481-0000
779e2340.html.
131. See discussion supra note 47.
132. Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 120, at 6.
133. Id. at 10.
20061
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inventors to market their products in different national
jurisdictions on equal footing with local creators and inven-
tors .... [The] rules encompass the specific prescriptions
and proscriptions by which these principles and norms are
given effect, such as the most favored nation and national
treatment rules, specific exclusive rights and minimum
standards of protection, and coordinated procedural mecha-
nisms or priority rules.'
International regimes also have an institutional component.
They "consist [ ] of the cooperative arrangements states use to cre-
ate principles, norms and rules,"'35 and can range from highly
structured intergovernmental organizations with staffs, facilities
and budgets to informal networks of government officials who
exchange information and coordinate national policies with each
other.136
Regime rules are often shaped by power politics and tailored
to favor the national interests of stronger and more influential
states, though power alone does not determine how international
regimes subsequently evolve.'37 Intergovernmental organizations
and international institutions have played an increasing role in
limiting the actions of stronger and more influential states (i.e.,
the United States).3 ' This has afforded weaker states and non-
state actors greater latitude to influence the development of prin-
ciples, norms and rules.139 Consequently, the distributions of
power among different nations present at the inception of a given
regime are not likely to serve as a good predictor of how that
regime will later evolve. 40
Indeed, relatively weaker states, such as Brazil, may lead
other less developed countries, together with non-state actors (i.e.,
NGOs, activists, etc.) to deliberately alter the status quo ante by
moving treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives or standard
setting activities from one international venue to another through
a process known as forum shopping.' Alternatively, or in addi-
tion thereto, weaker states and non-state actors may endeavor to
alter the substantive principles, norms and rules of a particular
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 13
140. Id. at 13-14.
141. Id. at 11.
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regime by generating "'counter-regime norms' - binding treaty
rules and nonbinding soft law standards that seek to alter the pre-
vailing legal landscape."42
[Clounter-regime norms may be revolutionary rather than
evolutionary, posing more fundamental challenges to
underlying principles. [States and non-state actors] who
question the economic and social benefits of granting intel-
lectual property rights to foreign creators and inventors are
asserting norms that fall into this latter category.
14 3
State and non-state actors may affect change through proposals or
amendments within the regime whose principles, norms, and
rules they are challenging, or they may decide to shift to a differ-
ent regime altogether in the event they encounter significant
resistance. 144
This decision usually entails a comparative analysis of the
participating states and their level of influence, the law-making
methods, the monitoring and dispute settlement procedures, and
the relative roles of intergovernmental institutions and nongov-
ernmental organizations. 145 Given that many of the same state
and non-state actors may be participating in multiple regimes
simultaneously, that once distinct regimes have become more
interdependent over time, and that individual regimes no longer
focus singularly on isolated well-defined issues, this has become a
complex and other than orderly process. This is especially the
case with respect to IPRs, 46 where it has become more difficult to
ascertain a given regime's boundaries, and thus, to decide
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id. at 14-15.
144. Id. at 12. For example, "[a] state that expands the negotiation of new free
trade obligations from a multilateral setting to a regional trade pact or to a web of
bilateral trade agreements is engaging in intra-regime shifting. A state that
introduces rules to protect the global environment into an intergovernmental
organization previously devoted to lowering trade barriers is attempting an inter-
regime shift." Id. at 13.
145. Id. at 15.
146. "In the case of intellectual property rights, developing countries and their
allies are shifting negotiations and hard and soft lawmaking initiatives to
international regimes whose institutions, actors, and subject matter mandates are
more closely aligned with these countries' interests. Within these regimes,
developing countries are challenging established legal prescriptions and generating
new principles, norms, and rules of intellectual property protection for states and
private parties to follow. Intellectual property regime shifting thus heralds the rise of
a complex international environment in which seemingly settled treaty bargains are
contested and new dynamics of lawmaking and dispute settlement must be
considered." Id. at 6.
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whether to shift regimes at all."'
1. Brazil's IPR Regime Shifting from TRIPS to WHO and
UNHRC
The WHO, an intergovernmental organization, has been
responsible for creating principles, norms, and rules concerning
the subject of public health. Its norm building activities have
focused during the past thirty years on pharmaceuticals. The
Organization introduced the concept of 'essential drugs' and urged
its member nations to adopt 'national drug policies.' The WHO
first became concerned with IPRs in 1996, following the enact-
ment of the TRIPS Agreement that imposed expanded obligations
on states to protect pharmaceutical patents."4 Since that time, it
has produced several resolutions and a guidebook that recom-
mends to developing countries how to exploit the flexibilities con-
tained within the TRIPS Agreement.
Since 1996, the WHO has closely monitored the implemen-
tation of TRIPs, advising WHO member states on ways to
achieve their national health goals by making use of so-
called "safeguards" already in TRIPs that grant flexibility
to balance intellectual property protection against public
health objectives. Brazil, South Africa, and Zimbabwe,
together with public health NGOs . . . were the principal
catalysts for the WHO's critical review of TRIPs .... The
[WHO's] guide recommended that states make use of flex-
ibilities already contained in TRIPs-including its transition
periods, parallel importation rules, and compulsory licens-
ing provisions-to minimize the effects of pharmaceutical
patents on limiting the availability of essential drugs. 4 9
Although the United States and EU objected to the guide-
book's language and were unsuccessful in thwarting its publica-
tion, they were, nevertheless, able to delete certain inflammatory
language within a subsequent 1999 WHO General Assembly reso-
lution. Prior to their efforts, the language had highlighted "'the
negative impact of new world trade agreements on ... the issue of
access to and prices of pharmaceuticals in developing countries'
and urged states 'to ensure that public health rather than com-
mercial interests have primacy in pharmaceutical and health
147. Id. at 15-16.
148. Id. at 42.
149. Id. at 43 (internal citations omitted).
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policies.'' o
However, they could not prevent Brazil and other developing
nations from later shepherding such language into a controversial
2000 UN human rights resolution (2000/7)11 for strategic regime
shifting purposes.152 That resolution declared that "there are
apparent conflicts between the IPR regime embodied in the TRIPS
Agreement and international human rights law,"153 and sought to
establish "the primacy of human rights obligations over economic
policies and agreements" (i.e., property rights)."' First, it
encouraged NGOs to persuade their governments to integrate
their economic and human rights into their laws and policies.155
Second, it requested that national governments and intergovern-
mental bodies integrate into their laws and policies and protect
the social function of IP.156 Third, it recommended that intergov-
ernmental organizations such as the WHO, WIPO, UNDP, UNEP
and UNCTAD undertake a critical examination of TRIPS "includ-
ing a consideration of its human rights implications." 57 This
highly debated resolution was later recycled and adopted again,
without a vote, in August 2001.158
150. Id. (quoting Chakravarthi Raghavan, Health: Assembly Adopts New Revised
Drug Strategy, South-North Development Monitor, May 24, 1999, http://www.twnside.
org.sg/title/assembly-cn.htm (noting the deletion of these statements from proposed
resolutions)).
151. See UNHCHR, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub/2/2000/L.20 (Aug. 17, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Sub-
commission Intellectual Property Resolution], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsfY0/c462b62cfa07b13c12569700046704e?Opendocument.
152. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict
or Coexistence?, 5 MiNN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 56 (2003).
153. "Declar[ing] ... that ... there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual
property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and
international human rights law, on the other... " 2000 Sub-commission Intellectual
Property Resolution 2; see also id. at pmbl. ("[A]ctual or potential conflicts exist
between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic,
social and cultural rights .... " (emphasis in original)).
154. Id. 3. ("Remind[ing] all Governments of the primacy of human rights
obligations under international law over economic policies and agreements."). For
example, the UN Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
"set out an ambitious new agenda for intellectual property lawmaking within the UN
human rights regime. The principle animating this new agenda was 'the primacy of
human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements."' Helfer, Regime
Shifting, supra, note 120, at 49-50 (quoting 2000 Sub-commission Intellectual
Property Resolution, supra note 151).
155. 2000 Sub-commission Intellectual Property Resolution, supra note 151, 14.
156. Id. 5-6.
157. See id. 12.
158. See U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts. [UNHCHR], Sub-Comm. on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Res. 2001/21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub/2/
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Developed countries, particularly those in the EU, opposed
ceding to the WHO competence to review health-related IP
issues."9 But they later softened their position as the HIV/AIDS
crisis worsened.160 This position reversal later proved very costly,
as the WHO adopted an approach that has since been skeptical of
IPRs, though somewhat less critical than the more aggressive
approach adopted by those UN human rights bodies in which Bra-
zil actively participated.'61 The WHO approach has also set forth
suggestions on how states may reconcile competing WTO/WHO
regime objectives.'62 A March 2001 bulletin
accepts that patents create necessary incentives for the
development of new drugs, but questions whether those
incentives are adequate to ensure investment in medicines
needed by the poor. With respect to pharmaceutical pat-
ents, the bulletin emphasizes that essential drugs are differ-
ent than other commodities, and it advocates the use of
'TRIPS-compliant mechanisms' to lower drug prices and
increase their availability .... [T]he bulletin [also] recom-
mends against implementing TRIPS-plus intellectual prop-
erty protection standards (such as standards more
stringent than those mandated by TRIPS) and urges gov-
ernments to monitor the implementation of TRIPS to for-
mulate comprehensive proposals for reviewing the treaty in
the future.'63
In May 2003, the WHO World Health Assembly (WHA)
adopted a resolution (WHA 56.27) recommending the creation of a
time-limited body whose purpose was to evaluate the impact of IP
protections on the development of new drugs and to issue a report
analyzing its findings."M This well-recognized body is otherwise
2001/L.21 (Aug. 16, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Sub-commission Intellectual Property
Resolution], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/
E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.2001.21.En.
159. See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra at 120, at 47 n.187.
160. See id. at 39.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 39-40 (quoting WHO, Globalization, TRIPS and Access to
Pharmaceuticals, WHO Policy Perspectives on Medicines, No. 3, U.N. Doc. WHO/EDM
2001.2 (Mar. 2001)).
164. See id. at 40; see also CIPIH, Background on the Commission, http://www.
who.int/intellectualproperty/background/enindex.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
The resolution was accompanied by a report that essentially concludes that the scope
of intellectual property rights must be narrowed to stimulate healthcare innovation,
reduce drug prices and to prevent market monopolies, all of which contributes to
ensuring access to essential healthcare. See The Secretariat, WHO, Intellectual
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known as the Committee on Intellectual Property Rights, Innova-
tion and Public Health (CIPIH).i15 The analysis was to have
focused on IPRs, innovation, public health, and the appropriate
funding and incentive mechanisms that were needed to promote
the development of new drugs and other products that were dis-
proportionately required by developing countries. "The resolution
also urged all members 'to reaffirm that public health interests
are paramount in both pharmaceutical and health policies' and 'to
consider, whenever necessary, adapting national legislation in
order to use to the full the flexibilities contained in [TRIPS].' '"16
Brazil was the lead developing country in this effort, arguing that
"access to new medicines 'must not be impeded by patent
protection.' 1
67
One international law expert believes that the efforts made
by Brazil and other developing countries to expand the scope of
the WHO's jurisdiction to include health and IP issues do not
reflect an attempt to roll back IPR protections.1 6 ' He contends,
rather, that they were intended to heighten member governments'
recognition of the flexibilities already inherent within the TRIPS
Agreement.1
9
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, IT 16-19, U.N. Doc. A56/17 (May 12,
2003), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA56/ea5617.pdf.
165. See The Director-General, WHO, Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and
Public Health: Terms of Reference For Review Group, U.N. Doc EB113/INF./DOC.1
(Jan. 15, 2004), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/EBI13/eebll3idl.
pdf.
166. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 120 (citing WHA, Intellectual Property
Rights, Innovation and Public Health, WHA 56.27, 1(1), 1(2), 2(2) (May 28, 2003)
(emphasis added)).
167. Id. (quoting WHO, Globalization, TRIPs and Access to Pharmaceuticals, WHO
Policy Perspectives on Medicines, No. 3, U.N. Doc. WHO/EDM/2001.2 (Mar. 2001)).
"The final draft of the resolution represent[ed] a compromise between developing
countries led by Brazil - which argued that access to new medicines 'must not be
impeded by patent protection' - and the United States, which advanced a competing
resolution urging member states to promote innovation by encouraging respect for
strong intellectual property rights." Id. at 44 (citing WHA56/NGO News Center,
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, (May 28, 2003), at
Executive Summary, available at http://www.wha56.org/1054122412598/view); see
also Daniel Pruzin, WHO Creates Body to Study Impact of IP on Drug Development,
20 INT'L TRADE RPTR. 957, 958 (June 5, 2003)). Dissatisfied with the outcome, the
U.S. Government subsequently tried to shape the implementation of this resolution's
recommendations. See Letter from William R. Steiger, Ph. D., Special Assistant to the
Secretary for Int'l Aff., U.S. Dep't of Hum. Health & Servs., to the Honorable J.W.
Lee, Director-General of the WHO, United States Proposed Terms of Reference and
Areas for Substantive Consideration of an Intellectual Property Body (Oct. 30, 2003),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rnd/usawho-ocr.pdf.
168. Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 120, at 40.
169. Id.
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These events reveal that developing states and public
health NGOs have used the WHO not as a forum for rolling
back intellectual property protection standards, but rather
as a venue for advocating the use of flexibilities already
embedded within TRIPS.... [T]his approach to reconciling
the public health and intellectual property regimes
strongly influenced the negotiating strategy adopted by
developing states seeking to reaffirm their right to invoke
TRIPS safeguards when confronted by public health
crises. 7'
This expert's analysis obviously places a 'positive spin' on the con-
troversial activities undertaken by the Brazilian and other devel-
oping country governments. However, the reality is that Brazil
and its fellow complainants have not stopped there. Contrary to
his assertion, it would seem that they are most definitely seeking
to rollback IP protection anyway they can!1
In May 2004, the WHA adopted another WHO resolution that
took account of and expanded upon the prior 2003 resolution
noted above.'72 WHA Res. 57.14 urged member states as a matter
of priority "to consider, whenever necessary, adapting national
legislation in order to use to the full the flexibilities contained in
the [TRIPS Agreement] .,,7 It also urged WHO member states to
ensure that bilateral trade agreements, an allusion to U.S.
TRIPS-plus Free Trade Agreement (FTA) provisions, take into
account the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and recognized
by the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement on
Public Health.
17 4
Furthermore, on January 24, 2006, the Governments of
170. Id. (citing WTO, Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health,
WTO Doha Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov.
14, 2001)).
171. See Schultz & Walker, supra note 10, at 131.
172. See WHA, Scaling Up Treatment and Care Within a Coordinated and
Comprehensive Response to HIVIAIDS, U.N. Doc. 57.14 (May 22, 2004), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA57/A57_R14-en.pdf.
173. Id. T 2(4).
174. Id. T 2(6).
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Kenya 7 5 and Brazil'76 were finally able to secure the ear of the
WHO Executive Board. They proposed a new resolution for adop-
tion (EB117/Conf.Paper No. 3),177 that alluded to "the primacy of
human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements"
and cast serious doubt about the ability of the current interna-
tional IPRs paradigm to stimulate innovation, promote technology
transfer and enhance public welfare - i.e., to secure at-or-below
cost price universal access to essential medicines and life sciences
know-how. 78 Three days later, on January 27, 2006, the WHO
Executive Board voted to adopt this resolution (EB117/R.13) and
to submit it to the WHA for consideration.1 79 Brazil, in other
words, was ultimately successful in shifting regimes-moving the
prior 2000 and 2001 resolution language it had advanced within
the UN Human Rights Sub-commission on the Promotion and Pro-
175. Kenya submitted its first draft of this resolution to the WHA in November
2005. See WHO, Proposed Resolution on a Global Framework on Essential Health
Research and Development, 117th Sess., Nov. 16, 2005, available at http://www.
cptech.org/ip/health/rndtf/kenya1162005.html. The draft resolution, in its preamble,
cites a controversial report that had been issued by the UK Government in 2002 as
the basis for moving forward on this initiative. See COMM'N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS.,
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2002),
available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfiullfinal.pdf.
Due to the international furor created by this UK report, the Kenyan delegation
dropped that reference prior to submitting the final version for WHA consideration.
See WHO, Resolution from Kenya on a Global Framework on Essential Health
Research and Development (Jan. 20, 2006), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/rndtf/kenya01202006.html.
176. While Brazil and Kenya have primarily been associated with this draft
resolution, "[t]he governments of... Thailand and South Africa [also] played a
particularly important role in moving this initiative forward . . . ." James Love,
CPTech Statement on WHO EB Resolution on Global Framework for Essential Health
R&D, CPTECH, Jan. 27, 2006, http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2006-
January/009037.html.
177. See WHO, Global Framework on Essential Health Research and Development
(Draft Resolution proposed by Brazil and Kenya), U.N. Doc. EB117/Conf.Paper No.3
(Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://www.medico-international.de/kampagne/
gesundheitdownloads/kenya-brazil-eb_20060124.pdf [hereinafter Essential Health
Research].
178. See WHO, Executive Board Proposal, [Global Framework On] Essential Health
Research and Development, at 2, U.N. Doc. EB117.R13 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/EB117/B117_R13-en.pdf.
179. Although the WHO Executive Board had agreed to adopt the resolution during
its 117th session, various portions of the text and several of the proposals remained
open for discussion. It therefore recommended that a committee be established to
review a forthcoming report expected during April 2006 from the WHO Commission
on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health. See WHO, Jan. 23-27,
2006, Report of the Executive Board on its 116th and 117th Sessions, 17, U.N. Doc.
A59/2 (May 11, 2006), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA59/
A59_2-en.pdf.
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tection of Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights into the
WHO.1 80
Three assumptions underlie this resolution's many points: 1)
IPRs are not necessary to promote innovation since most (70%)
"drug approvals are for medicines that do not provide incremental
benefits over existing ones";"8 ' 2) IPRs "are [only] one of several
important tools to promote innovation, creativity and the transfer
of technology. . . ."; and 3) a "proper balance [must be provided]
between [IPRs] and the public domain and IP rules ... need to be
... implemented in a manner that is consistent with the funda-
mental right of every human being to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health and the promotion of follow-on
innovation.""2
The draft resolution's authors thus sought to dramatically
change the way research and development for new essential
medicines is to be financed and conducted globally for the benefit
of developing countries, taking into account the limited role that
IPRs must ultimately play in such activities. The resolution, for
this purpose, references all four of the IPR-related resolutions
noted previously, and calls for the consideration of "alternative
simplified systems for protection of intellectual property," which
may provide greater incentives for research and development
efforts and investments than the current system. 3 Although both
the Governments of the United States and the EU have thus far
opposed this resolution, Is4 it has become a growing partisan politi-
180. See 2000 Sub-commission Intellectual Property Resolution, supra note 151;
2001 Sub-commission Intellectual Property Resolution, supra note 158.
181. Essential Health Research, supra note 177, at 1. See Joseph A. DiMasi &
Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-on Drug Research and Development Trends
in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development, 22 PHARMACOECONOMICS 1, 8-10
(Supp. 2 2004), available at http://biag.org./BIAG/images/articles/art06.pdf ("The
original approval in a drug class is often referred to as a breakthrough drug. It is
thought by some that drugs in the class that follow the breakthrough drug typically
do not contribute anything that is clinically noteworthy."). But see id. at 10 (stating
that other findings contradict the previous statement in that during recent studies,
"the first drug in a class to reach the US marketplace was not the first to enter clinical
testing either in the US or anywhere in the world").
182. Essential Health Research, supra note 177, at 2.
183. Id. at 1 ("Recalling Resolutions WHA 52.19.. .WHA 54.10, WHA 56.27 and
WHA 57.14 .. "). The resolution was introduced and tabled for consideration at the
very recent 59th World Health Assembly meeting in Geneva, Switzerland (5/21-5/28/
06). Id.
184. See, e.g., Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen to Intellectual Property Watch,
US Declares Opposition to WHO R&D Resolution As Proponents Raise Questions, May
22, 2006, http://ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-trackback.php?p=311 (last visited Nov. 1,
2006); Posting of Ellen T. Hoen, ellen.t.hoen@paris.msf, to Ip-health Archives, NEWS
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cal issue on both sides of the Atlantic.
8 5
The "alternative simplified IP systems referred to within
draft resolution EB117/R. 13 are likely 'borrowed' from the utopian
archetypes provided by anti-free market, anti-IP HIV/AIDS activ-
ists,""8 6 who, as a matter of ideology, 187 advocate the abandonment
of drug patents in favor of a more government-centralized and
state socialized system of R&D and healthcare.' s That system,
which would sanction the royalty-free copying of drug patents for
public health policy reasons, would require a massive redistribu-
tion of global wealth. They call for
radically altering the intellectual property rights environ-
ment for new drugs. The scheme eliminates patent protec-
tion for pharmaceuticals so that new drugs are sold at
generic prices immediately after regulatory marketing
approval. R&D is financed via a tax or tax-like mechanism
that is required to raise predetermined amounts at the
national level. The national global R&D budgets are deter-
mined according to a [proposed medical R&D] treaty and
are a fixed percentage of a nation's Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). s9
on European Commission position at the WHA (May 24, 2006, 11:07:01), http://
lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2006-May/009596.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2006).
185. See Leavitt supra note 31; Sixty-four Members of the European Parliament,
Call to the World Health Assembly, to the European Commission, the Council and to
the National Governments for a Global Framework on Essential Health Research and
Development, May 18, 2006, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/who/59wha/meps
05182006.pdf.
186. Susan K. Sell & Aseem Prakash, Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest
Between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights, 48 INT'L STUD.
Q. 143, 145, 154-55, 170 (2002) ("Unlike the business network that attributes the
HIV/AIDS crisis to poverty and poor governance, the NGO network constructs the
policy problem as one of excessively stringent IPR norms that make HIV/AIDS
medicines unaffordable, thereby working against public health objectives.").
187. Andr~s Mejia-Vergnaud, Drug Delusions at the WHO, MANILA TIMES, May 02,
2005, available at http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2006/may/20/yehey/opinion/
20060520opi6.html ("Under the new 'Global Framework,' priorities and parameters of
medical research and development would be defined by a new bureaucratic agency,
not by the real needs of patients.").
188. Schultz & Walker, supra note 10, at 90.
189. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and R&D Incentives:
Comments on the Hubbard and Love Trade Framework for Financing Pharmaceutical
R&D, June 25, 2004, at 4, 16, available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/
news/en/Submission3.pdf (emphasis added); see also Tim Hubbard, Reply to the
Comments Requested by CIPIH and WHO to the CPTech Proposal for a Med.
Research and Dev. Treaty (MRDT) (Aug. 15, 2005), at 1-2, available at http://www.
who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/SubmissionsHubbard.pdf; Schultz &
Walker, supra note 10, at 87 (citing Letter from James Love, Dir., CPTech, to CIPIH
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Anti-private property and anti-free market academics and politi-
cians, as well, have weighed in with their own alternatives.
On innovation grounds, pharmaceutical patents are unnec-
essary in low income populations, since such markets can-
not do much to support global pharmaceutical profits. The
public health needs of low income populations require pat-
ented drugs to be made produced at the marginal cost of
production, without R&D cost recovery. Nonrival access to
pharmaceutical knowledge achieves both goals
simultaneously. "9
In addition, there are apparently, still, other alternatives that
have been submitted and evaluated. They include:
1) A proposal.., for a mandatory employer-based research
fee to be distributed through intermediaries to researchers
(Love 2003);
2) A proposal.., for zero-cost compulsory licensing patents,
in which the patent holder is compensated based on the
rated quality of life improvement generated by the drug,
and the extent of its use (Hollis 2004);
3) A proposal.., for an auction system in which the govern-
ment purchases most drug patents and places them in the
public domain (Kremer 1998); and
4) A proposal . . . to finance pharmaceutical research
through a set of competing publicly supported research cen-
ters (Kucinich 2004).191
One other proposal was to reward the development of new drugs
using an evidence-based system regarding health outcomes.192
The objectivity of the academics that have promoted these
alternatives to the current U.S. and international private property
rights-based patent and R&D systems appears strained at best. 193
(Feb. 24, 2005), available at http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndsignonletter.
html).
190. Kevin Outterson, Nonrival Access to Pharmaceutical Knowledge, Submitted to
the CIPIH (Jan. 3, 2005), at 1, available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/
submissions/KevinOutterson3january.pdf.
191. See Dean Baker, Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues?, CTR. FOR
ECON. & POL'Y RES. (Sept. 21, 2004), at 3, available at http://www.cepr.netl
publications/intellectual-property_2004_09.htm.
192. See James Packard Love, Drug Development Incentives to Improve Access to
Essential Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 408 (May 2006), available at
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/405.pdf (discussing how H.R. 417, the
Medical Innovation Prize Fund, was proposed by Representative Sanders [I-VT]
during 2005 as "a working model for a new paradigm of drug development").
193. "The immediate cause of high drug prices is government granted patent
monopolies, which allow drug companies to charge prices that are often 400 percent,
2006] BRAZIL'S IP OPPORTUNISM 45
In fact, at least one such academic has proposed that the U.S.
Bayh-Dole Act be amended to legislatively impose a 'public inter-
est limitation' on IPRs created as the result of federally funded
basic research and development."' In addition, he has suggested
that the U.S. Government surrender national sovereignty to the
WHO by delegating power to the Organization to "issue a compul-
sory license.., on behalf of the patent holder to relevant generic
manufacturers to produce... drug[s] ... [in] recogni[tion of the]
"9195right of access to essential medicines ....
Within this menu of multiple, murky, mystifying, and myopic
options, lay two discernible certainties. First, no matter which
or more, above competitive market prices." Baker, supra note 191, at Executive
Summary. Indeed, Professor Baker's anti-patent and pro-government intervention
views are not dissimilar to those held by other individuals whom he has credited in
his report as giving "helpful comments on an earlier draft." Id. They include James
Love, a healthcare and anti-intellectual property and anti-business activist (his
controversial work is referenced throughout this article) and Simone Baribeau,
researcher-activist-author and contributor to Marxist publication Political Affairs.
See Politicalaffairs.net: Marxist Thought Online, http://www.politicalaffairs.netl
article/author/view/1118 (last visited Nov. 1, 2006). Political Affairs is a monthly
magazine of partisan Marxist ideology, politics, and culture, and a publication of the
Communist Party, USA. See About Us, Political Affairs - A Marxist Monthly,
available at http://www.politicalaffairs.netarticle/static/17/1/3 (last visited Nov. 1,
2006); Dr. Aidan Hollis would seem to be in favor of greater governmental
intervention in the healthcare markets. He is an assistant professor of economics at
the University of Calgary in Alberta, who is credited with "devis[ing] a different
approach [for stimulating drug innovation]: the government would set up a fund to
compensate drug companies based on how much their new drugs improve the quality
of life and how often they were used." Eduardo Porter, Do New Drugs Always Have to
Cost So Much?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004. Professor Hollis also authored an article
that appears to have resonated with the WHO CIPIH. He also credits James Love for
providing him with "helpful comments, questions and critiques which forced me to
clarify my thinking." See Aidan Hollis, An Optional Reward System for Neglected
Disease Drugs (Univ. of Calgary, Inst. of Health Econ., Working Paper Last Updated
May 18, 2005), available at http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/optionalrewards.pdf
("The essence of the proposal is to offer rewards to drug innovators who relinquish the
exclusivity rights of their patents, with the rewards to be based on the incremental
health effects of the innovation in developing countries."). Prof. Hay, a
pharmaceutical economist and associate professor at the University of Southern
California School of Pharmacy, also seems to be an advocate for more governmental
intervention in the healthcare markets - i.e., in the pricing of medicines and medical
treatments. See Joel W. Hay & Minnie M. Yu, Drug Patents and Prices: Can We
Achieve Better Outcomes, in MEASURING THE PRICES OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS 152, 154
(Jack E. Triplett ed., 1999) ("[D]oes current policy for patent protection and monopoly
pricing of innovative medications achieve the best possible outcomes for society? We
will argue that the answer is emphatically negative .. ."); see generally id. at 152-94.
194. Jonathan Kahn, Rights and Practical Access to Medicine, 84 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 409 (May 2006), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/
405.pdf.
195. Id.
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one of these idyllic alternatives is ultimately chosen, the individ-
ual private property rights of citizen-owners within OECD
nations, especially the United States, are likely to be sacrificed
without their consent for the ostensible (illusory) benefit of serv-
ing the global public interest, and perhaps even simultaneously
rehabilitating 'Brand America.'196 This is the end-result sought by
anti-private property and anti-free market activists, academics,
bureaucrats and politicians, who have painstakingly erected the
opaque multilateral process that is now unfolding.
Television and written media focusing on the issue of HIV/
AIDS have conveyed this message in a less than candid and trans-
parent manner.9 Beginning with a discussion of this devastating
disease, recent television programming then implored individuals
and corporations, as a matter of morality and human decency, to
take all necessary actions in addition to underwriting taxpayer-
funded government aid to eradicate HIV/AIDS internationally no
matter the cost. 9 " Through use of such an approach, this pro-
gramming had, in effect, bypassed private property and economic
concerns. As a result, an unsuspecting public is unaware that it
has been denied an open and informed debate that sheds light on
the many other debilitating global diseases for which additional
funding, subsidization, and private property right sacrifices will
also be required.'99
Anti-private property and anti-free market activists, bureau-
crats, academics and politicians are reluctant to publicize this
kind of information, especially within the United States, because
of the serious negative political ramifications it would have during
election time. Tragically, developed nation citizens do not realize
196. See e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives
Right, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CSR No. 19, Nov. 2006, at 12, 15, 47,
available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/PatentCSR.pdf
(reasoning that because "patents and copyrights have become one of the most
contentious issues in U.S. trade negotiations" with developing countries, the U.S.
government's insistence that developing countries adopt U.S. IP protections for all
privately owned U.S. patented pharmaceuticals and copyrighted recordings and
movies, would only "generat[e] ... [further] trading partner... citizen... resentment"
against the United States) (emphasis added).
197. See CNN Presents: The End of AIDS: A Global Summit with Bill Clinton,
(CNN television broadcast Apr. 29, 2006), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0604/29/cp.02.html.
198. Id.
199. See WHA, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, U.N. Doc.
57.14, 1, 4 (Nov. 20, 2001) (including broad language that covers almost any
disease, now and in the future, that is characterized as having reached epidemic
proportions).
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that, although this appeal is now focused on and limited to HIV/
AIDS drugs, it will eventually expand to include many other dis-
eases and be used to curtail their private property rights in other
economic areas beyond healthcare. In addition, the written media
have more recently based their appeals for all corporations,
including small and medium-sized enterprises, no matter where
they are located, to contribute more than philanthropic aid, in
order to eradicate HIV/AIDS based on the notion of corporate
social responsibility.
20 0
Any one of these choices will likely be prohibitively expensive
from both an individual and societal perspective, as the OECD
nations, including the United States, are likely to be the ones who
will subsidize the health care costs of developing country govern-
ments and citizens. Presumably, this subsidization will occur with
all OECD members paying their fair share, but this is highly
doubtful. Given the extent of pharmaceutical price controls cur-
rently being imposed in countries such as Australia, Canada,
Japan, and the Member States of the EU, some of which are
extremely proud of their social welfare systems, it is arguable that
Americans are likely to bear most of these costs, especially in the
near term. In fact, this concern was duly noted within a recent
2004 United States Commerce Department study evaluating
pharmaceutical pricing in high income countries. It called for
higher patented drug prices in Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia
and other OECD countries in order to reduce the degree to which
American consumers subsidize global drug development costs."1
The report concludes that these countries have been free rid-
ing off American patent rent extraction by setting govern-
ment reimbursement prices too low... A recent speculative
estimate, based on industry data and calculations... sug-
gests that eliminating OECD price controls on patented
drugs would increase revenues by $17.6 to $26.7 billion per
year, with additional R&D of $5.3 to $8 billion per year.
Implicit in this estimate is the assumption that about a
third of incremental revenues would be spent on
R&D. 202
200. See Richard Holbrooke & Mark Moody-Stuart, Business Has Vital Role to Play
in Fighting Aids, FIN. TIMES (London) May 21, 2006, at 21, available at http://news.ft.
comlcms/s/e9c83790-e8f2-llda-bllO-0000779e2340.html; see also Carlo Stagnaro &
Lawrence A. Kogan, Corporate Social Restriction, TCSDaily.com, Apr. 4, 2006, http://
www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=040406F.
201. Outterson, supra note 190, 7.2.
202. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Despite the fact that U.S. taxpayers have continued individually
0 3
and collectively" 4 to fund the world's largest HIV/AIDS relief pro-
grams2 5 for the benefit of stricken developing country citizens,
these additional higher costs are likely to assume the form of sig-
nificantly increased U.S. official development assistance, bilateral
technical assistance and international financial assistance, larger
national and international tax levies, and higher United States
pharmaceutical prices.2 6
These certainties notwithstanding, the CIPIH continued its
relentless assault on the WTO and WIPO-anchored international
IP framework, primarily patents and trade secrets, with the
release of its April 2006 report.27 The report opens with the fol-
lowing bold conclusions:
Intellectual property rights are important, but as a means
not an end .. .We know they are considered a necessary
incentive in developed countries where there is both a good
technological and scientific infrastructure and a supporting
market for new health care products. But they can do little
203. See, e.g., Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Global Health, http://www.
gatesfoundation.org/GlobalHealth (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
204. See Bush Touts Foreign HIV/AIDS Funding as 'Great Compassion' and 'In
Our National Interest', MedicalNewsToday.com, http://www.medicalnewstoday.coml
medicalnews.php?newsid=37072 (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) ("[Tlhe President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is a five-year, $15 billion [federal
government] program that directs funding for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria
primarily to fifteen focus countries and provides funding to the Global Fund To Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.") [hereinafter Bush Touts Foreign HIVIAIDS
Funding]; see also KaiserNetwork.org, Daily HIVIAIDS Report, Politics and Policy:
Bush Touts PEPFAR, Urges Congress to Reauthorize Ryan White CARE Act, Dec. 2,
2005, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=l&DRID=
34092; U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Oceans & Int'l Envtl. & Sci. Aff., Helping Those
in Greatest Need: Fighting HIVIAIDS is a U.S. Priority, Sept. 22, 2003, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2003/24196.htm; Press Release, The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria (Dec. 1, 2006), available at http:/www.
theglobalfund.org/en/media-center/press/pr_061201.asp
205. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, FACT SHEET: IMPLEMENTING
THE PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF, July 2, 2003, available at http://
usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2003/Jul/03-85849.html.
206. See Maggy Farley, 14 Nations Will Adopt Airline Tax to Pay for AIDS Drugs -
France Leads the Effort Meant to Provide Greater Access to Medicines, L.A. TIMES,
June 3, 2006, at A14, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/lt/2006/LT060602.html.
207. See WHO, CIPIH, Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights,
U.N. Doc. 02/H434 (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/
documents/thereport/CIPIH23032006.pdf [hereinafter WHO, Public Health]. The
CIPIH had apparently deferred submission of its report to the WHO Executive Board
for consideration at the prior January 2006 Executive Board meeting. See The
Secretariat, WHO, Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, 1,4,
U.N. Doc. EB 117/9 (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/
pdfLfiles/EB 117/B1 17_9-en.pdf.
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to stimulate innovation in the absence of a profitable mar-
ket . . . which can apply in . . . developing country
markets. °s
It then premises its conclusions on several assumptions that
seemingly reflect a preconceived anti-patent/private property ide-
ology shared by several of the Commission's developing country
members. 09 It seems "[a] key message of the report is that
because the market demand for diagnostics, vaccines and
medicines needed to address health problems mainly affecting
developing countries is small and uncertain, the incentive effect of
IPRs may be limited or nonexistent."210 Further,
[tihe report recognizes [that] patents are irrelevant for the
development of the products needed to address the diseases
prevailing in developing countries. . . .The extension of
pharmaceutical patent protection to developing countries,
mandated by the TRIPS Agreement, can do very little to
prompt the development of such products, while it generates
costs in terms of reduced access to the outputs of innova-
tion. Where patents exist and are enforceable, medicines
can be unaffordable for governments and patients in devel-
oping countries.21'
Consistent therewith, left-leaning academics have argued that,
"misuse or waste of IP slows the development of new health tech-
nologies for developing countries."2"2 A comprehensive review of
the WHO report's assumptions and conclusions, however, reveals
a broader anti-private property and anti-market agenda similar to
that advanced by Brazil and Argentina in other international
208. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
209. See id. at 168, 171.
210. See Tomris Turmen & Charles Clift, Public Health, Innovation and
Intellectual Property Rights: Unfinished Business, 84 BULL. OF THE WHO 338 (May
2006), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/338.pdf.
211. WHO, Public Health, supra note 207, at 224 (emphasis added) (referencing the
comments of Dr. Carlos and Dr. Pakdee Pothisiri in the report annex).
212. See Anatole Krattiger & Richard T. Mahoney, Intellectual Property and Public
Health, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 340 (May 2006), available at http://www.
who.int/bulletinvolumes/84/5/340.pdf (citing E. van Zimmerman et al., A Clearing-
house For Diagnostic Testing: The Solution To Ensure Access To and Use Of Patented
Genetic Inventions?, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 352 (May 2006), available at http:/
/www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/845/352.pdf); David J. Winters, Expanding Global
Research and Development for Neglected Diseases, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 414
(May 2006), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/414.pdf; S.F.
Musungu, Benchmarking Progress In Tackling The Challenges Of Intellectual
Property And Access To Medicines In Developing Countries, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 366 (May 2006), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/366.pdf.
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fora.
213
[Miarket mechanisms and incentives, as well as allocative
decisions of companies, lead to insufficient investment in
R&D specifically directed to the needs of developing coun-
tries. Because the market fails to induce adequate invest-
ment in products needed in developing countries, it is
necessary that other measures be put in place to promote
relevant innovation.214
At least two of the Commission's ten members criticized the
report's assumptions and conclusions as lacking substantiation,215
while a third disputed the main conclusion, that patent reform
was necessary at all.216
Furthermore, the report recommends that an alternative
open source/universal access cycle of innovation be developed in
lieu of the linear innovation model employed in the United
States.17 It justifies this in terms of morality,1 8 fairness (i.e., edu-
213. See WHO, WHO Bulletin Interview: Do Patents Work For Public Health? -
Interview with Carlos Correa, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 349 (May 2006),
available at http://www.who.inttbulletin/volumes/84/5/whonews.pdf.
214. WHO, Public Health, supra note 207, at 31.
215. See id. at 226-27. "The actual level of patenting, the scope of protection, and
the effects of such factors on price and competition were not adequately examined.
Instead of collecting empirical data, the report relies on the untested assumption that
relaxing IPR rules will generally benefit developing countries. The assignment of
intellectual property rights, however, may lead to more efficient use of resources
(information, etc.) and licensing can promote the transfer of technology into the local
economy. Furthermore, small patents around basic technology can work as a barrier
against monopolization and help local businesses or applied research enter the
market .... The report did not analyze the effects of patents on competition in
developing countries ...." Id. at Comments of Dr. Hiroko Yamane (emphasis added).
216. See id. at 225; see also id. at Comments of Dr. Trevor Jones ("The report
implies a direct link between patent ownership, product price, and access in the
developing world. Patents rarely confer a monopoly in a therapeutic field and are not
the basis for price-setting .... Concerning access, patents are not the issue, but the
overwhelming poverty of individuals, absence of state healthcare financing, lack of
medical personnel, transport and distribution infrastructure plus supply chain
charges which can make affordable originator or generic products unaffordable... The
report calls for further reform of the 'patent system.' There is a need to improve the
competence of the patent agencies and enforcement procedures in developing world
countries but the basis for granting a patent and the TRIPS Agreement do not need
reform, especially following the WTO General Council Resolution of December 6th
2005."; id. at Comments of Dr. Favio Pammolli ("As for [IPRs], an undifferentiated
recommendation ... that all developing countries should lower IP standards, is not
supported by analysis .... Patent protection per se does not create monopoly positions
in the final market .... Countries that do not protect pharmaceutical patents do not
necessarily experience higher rates of access, even if generic products are
manufactured locally." (emphasis added)).
217. WHO, Public Health, supra note 207, at 35-39.
218. Id. at 21 ("Although much of this report is couched in the language of science,
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cational reciprocity),219 and by reference to the human right to
health221 (e.g., the ICESCR). 2 1 Civil society groups2 2 and academ-
ics 221 have portrayed the right to health, for political purposes, as
being distinguishable from, in conflict with, and having primacy
over, economic rights such as private property rights-IPRs.224
Although the report's conclusions 225 have failed to make this case
successfully, they have since, nevertheless, been elevated within a
recent draft CIPIH resolution to the level of a proposed global
strategy and plan of action (i.e., the development of a proposed set
of international guidelines/standards). 226 The long-term goal is for
a newly established WHO intergovernmental working group to
formalize the resolution into an international R&D and innova-
medicine, economics, or law, it should not be forgotten that there is an underlying
moral issue.").
219. Id. at 166 (discussing the emigration of scientists from countries such as China
and India to developed countries and their return to their home countries, bringing
talent both to and from the nations).
220. Xavier Seuba, A Human Rights Approach to the WHO Model List of Essential
Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 405 (May 2006), available at http://www.
who.int/bulletinvolumes/84/5/405.pdf.
221. See ICESCR, supra note 55.
222. WHO, Public Health, supra note 207, at 22 (referring to CESCR Article 12.1
and General Comment No. 14 to Article 12).
223. See Davinia Ovett, Policy Brief on Intellectual Property, Development and
Human Rights: How Human Rights Can Support Proposals for a World Intellectual
Property Organization Development Agenda, 3D --- TRADE - HUMAN RIGHTS -
EQUITABLE ECONOMY [3D] (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.3dthree.org/pdfL3D/
3DPolBrief-WIPO-eng.pdf ("Strict IP rules have had an adverse impact on the ability
of many governments to fulfill their human rights obligations, of which obligations to
ensure access to affordable medicines, educational goods and adequate food."); see also
3D, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA,
INFORMATION NOTE 5 (June 2006), available at http://www.3dthree.org/pdf 3D/
3Dnote5_WIPO June06.pdf ("[Hiuman rights law requires impact assessments and
evaluations of WIPO norm-setting and technical assistance in order to ensure that
such activities do not impede the realization of human rights, nor constitute a move
away from the realization of development objectives."); id. T D; 3D, TRADE-RELATED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND HUMAN RIGHTS -
MOROCCO, $ 3 (April 2006), available at http://www.3dthree.org/pdf 3D/3DCESCR
Morocco.April06Eng.pdf ("Morocco's policies on access to medicines and the
realization of human rights are threatened by strict trade-related intellectual
property (IP) rules in trade agreements.").
224. Seuba, supra note 220, at 406; see also Helena Nygren-Krug & Hans V.
Hogerzeil, Human Rights: A Potentially Powerful Force for Essential Medicines, 84
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 410 (May 2006), available at http://www.who.intlbulletinl
volumes/84/5/405.pdf.
225. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, A WHO Report Finds System Fails the Poor, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. (May 21, 2006), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/21/
news/who.php.
226. See WHA, CIP: Report, %1 8, U.N. Doc. A59/16 Add.1 (May 18, 2006), available
at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA59/A59_16Add1-en.pdf.
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tion treaty.227
Based on Brazil's proposed additions to this resolution, there
can no longer be any doubt as to its true purpose(s). In addition to
facilitating international 'norm building,' the resolution is
intended: 1) To confirm for all time that WTO Members must, con-
sistent with a broad reading of the Doha Declaration, interpret
and implement the TRIPS Agreement in a manner supportive of
their right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote
medicines for all at the expense of private IP rights;228 and 2) "[t]o
initiate consultations on the possibility of elaborating a frame-
work convention on research, development and innovation in pub-
lic health in order define priorities and determine financing
options."229 The Swiss chair of a drafting group at the WHA has
even proposed to merge the CIPIH resolution with the prior Bra-
zil-Kenya resolution (that called for alternatives to the current
international IP-patent framework) to accelerate commencement
of this initiative.23 0 A somewhat modified form of the CIPIH reso-
lution was ultimately acceded to by the United States and adopted
by the WHO at the recent WHA meeting (Resolution WHA
59.24).231 Notwithstanding the resolution's 'softer' language, with
the establishment of an intergovernmental working group to
227. Id. 8.2[31 (stating that the resolution takes direct aim at U.S. bilateral free
trade agreements' TRIPS-plus provisions, which urge Member States and, where
applicable, regional economic integration organizations "to ensure that bilateral trade
agreements do not seek to incorporate TRIPS-plus protection in ways that may reduce
access to medicines in developing countries" (emphasis added)).
228. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, 17, U.N. Doc. WTI
MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
229. WHO, CIPIH, Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the Meeting of the
Committee of the Executive Board, UN Doc. A59/16, Annex 1 (May 18, 2006).
230. See Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen & William New, World Health
Assembly Debates New Draft Text Merging IP Resolutions, to INTELL. PROP. WATCH,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=316&res=1280&print=O (May 25, 2006).
231. See WHA, May 27, 2006, Public Health, Innovation, Essential Health Research
and Intellectual Property Rights: Towards a Global Strategy and Plan of Action,
WHA59.24, U.N. Doc. A59VR/9, available at http://www.who.intlgb/ebwha/pdf files/
WHA59/A59_R24-en.pdf [hereinafter Resolution WHA 59.241; Frances Williams,
WHO To Prompt R&D For Poorer Countries, FIN. TIMES, May 29, 2006, at 4 ("The
WHO accord followed what health officials called a 'miraculous' change of tack by the
US, which had previously indicated strong opposition to any steps that might imply a
weakening or sidestepping of the drug patenting system. In return, developing
countries led by Brazil and Kenya dropped demands for a binding research and
development framework and explicit support for 'open access' and other models of
promoting health research outside the patent system." (emphasis added)); see also
WHO Agree "Breakthrough" Deal to Research and Develop Drugs, M&C NEWS, May
27, 2006, http://news.monstersandcritics.com/health/article_1167569.php.
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"draw up a global strategy and plan of action,"232 it is clear that the
activists still intend to press for development and adoption of a
binding treaty in the longer term.233
The WHO report and the subsequent resolution each fail, nev-
ertheless, to substantiate (or prove) the need for IP reform. First,
as a matter of logic, there is no such conflict between human
rights and private property rights.2 4 Second, as a matter of
human rights law, Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights expressly states that, "1. Everyone has the right to
own property alone as well as in association with others; 2. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."23 In fact, vari-
ous other provisions within this seminal document, when read
together with Article 17, as well as with certain provisions of the
ICESCR, support the conclusion that there exists no hierarchy at
all among the various types of human rights, whether health, edu-
cation, or economic-related. 6
Third, it is more likely that the extraordinary emphasis
placed by these documents on healthcare as a fundamental
human right has more to do with non-IPR-related issues. They
232. Resolution WHA 59.24, supra note 231, at 3(1); see id. at 3(3-4).
233. See Posting of James Love to http://lists.essential.org/pipermaillip-health/
2006-May/009641.html (May 29, 2006, 11:52:02) ("[Tlhe Kenya/Brazil resolution
referred to considerations of soft or hard obligations, and all sorts of mechanisms to
advance the idea of a multilateral R&D initiative. It is most likely that short term
work will involve softer norms, but everything is still on the table, including the
possibility for hard norms as a longer term project. I think the public sector, open
access and open source type things are still in the mix, mentioned specifically in the
CIPIH report itself, and implicit in other parts of the new resolution . . ").
234. Alchian, supra note 46 (arguing that private property rights do not conflict
with human rights and moreover protect individual liberty as private property rights
are the rights of humans to use specified goods and to exchange them; "restraint on
private property rights shifts the balance of power from impersonal attributes toward
personal attributes and toward behavior that political authorities approve.").
235. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 70, at art. 17.
236. See id. pmbl., arts. 2, 3, 8, 12, 17, 25, 27-29, 30; ICESCR, supra note 55, at
pmbl., arts. 1.2, 2.2, 4, 5.1, 15.1, 15.3, 25; see, e.g., Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (interpreting federal statutory law and U.S.
constitutional due process to hold that "where there are no alternative government-
approved treatment options, a terminally ill, mentally competent adult patient's
informed access to potentially life-saving investigational new drugs, determined by
the FDA after Phase I trials to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials
warrants protection under the Due Process Clause"). The Appellate Court
subsequently denied the FDA's Motion for Rehearing finding that Alliance had Article
III standing to pursue the case on the merits. See Abigail Alliance v. Von
Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Although there were no opposed economic
interests at issue in this case at either the District or Circuit Court levels, some will
nevertheless argue that the ruling recognizes the existence of such a hierarchy in the
United States.
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include: 1) establishing a minimal international standard of
human healthcare to which all persons are entitled and all devel-
oping country governments must adhere (especially those suscep-
tible to corruption, mismanagement and/or poor governance - i.e.,
those "that systematically violate[ ] human rights . . . [or] 'failed
states' that are chronically incapable of meeting the basic security
needs of their own populations");237 2) defining international aid
requirements and related UN and member state foreign aid pro-
grams and budgets; 28 and 3) providing much-needed empirical
evidence that healthy populations are indeed more productive and
wealthy239 to justify the need for international health care aid.
Fourth, a close inspection of the WHO report, itself, plus sub-
sequently prepared CIPIH IGWG documents, will reveal the hid-
den agenda of these developing country governments and activist
groups: to acquire U.S. and OECD nation scientific and technolog-
ical know-how on the cheap by discrediting the current interna-
tional and U.S. IP frameworks that protect it. In other words, by
successfully convincing WHO member states that the current
international and U.S. private IP rights-based scientific and tech-
nological discovery process is flawed and that the very successful
medicines, vaccines, medical treatments, and biomedical innova-
tions produced240 as the result of the current international and
U.S. private IP rights-based commercialization process are 'over
237. Dean T. Jamison et al., International Collective Action in Health: Objectives,
Functions, and Rationale, 351 LANCET 514, 516 (Feb. 14, 1998).
238. Id.; see also WHO, Nov. 2, 2006, Intergovernmental Working Group on Pub.
Health, Innovation and Intell. Prop. [IGWG], Elements of a Global Strategy and Plan
of Action, U.N. Doc. A/PHJIIGWG/1/4 [hereinafter IGWG Nov. 2, 2006]; id. 91 7
(noting, as an area for action, the "provi[sion] [ofi support for development of
innovative capacity through investment by developing countries in human resources
and the knowledge base, especially in tertiary education"); id. 8 (noting, as an area
for action, "[i]mproved delivery, access and appropriate use could be addressed by
encouraging governments to invest in the health-delivery infrastructure and in
financing the purchase of medicines and vaccines through insurance"); id. 9 (noting,
as an area for action, the "establish[ment] [of] a funding mechanism for research and
development for neglected diseases").
239. See JAMISON, supra note 51, at 7-9.
240. CIPIH, Public Health Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, WHO
2006, 20-21, available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/reporten/index.
html (last visited Jan. 3, 2007) (discussing the UN Millennium project and concluding
that "innovation for 'medicines and other products' must be situated within a wider
picture of efforts across sectors to improve health and development," defining "other
products" to include not only those for improved diagnosis and prevention, but also
low technology interventions that can be "brought to bear on complex public health
challenges"); see also WHO, Dec. 8, 2006, IGWG, Elements of a Global Strategy and
Plan of Action - Progress to Date in the Intergovernmental Working Group, annex 2,
n.1, U.N. Doc. A/PHI/IGWG/1/5, available at http://www.who.int/gb/phi/PDF/phi-
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priced,' Brazil and others will better be able to establish a new
global anti-IP paradigm. Such a paradigm would establish the
primacy of public health considerations over private property
rights,'241 and thereby provide for the legal appropriation of U.S.
IPRs for developing country public use and benefit at less than
fair market value.242 Fortunately, it may be reported that the Bra-
zilian Government delegate to the CIPIH IGWG was somewhat
frustrated by the lack of tangible progress in moving many of the
work action items forward that Brazil had favored during the
working group's most recent meetings243 which they have criti-
igwgl_5-en.pdf [hereinafter IGWG Dec. 8, 2006] ("The term 'products' hereafter
should be understood to include vaccines, diagnostics and medicines.").
241. See IGWG, Dec. 8, 2006, supra note 240, at annex 2, app. (referencing
Comments of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on behalf of the Eastern Mediterranean
Region, "[tihese statements of principles remain incomplete if we do not also refer to a
third principle which completes the circle, and that is that human public health
considerations have precedence over rights to intellectual property protections."
(emphasis added)).
242. See id. 2-3 ("The text in the annexes has not been the subject of an
intergovernmental negotiation process. The basis of Annex 1 ["Elements of a Plan of
Action"] was document A/PHI/IGWG/1/4 .... The text in Annex 2 ["Elements of a
Global Strategy"] was prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Working
Group on the basis of material drawn from the Constitution, Health Assembly
resolutions and other relevant sources."). This intergovernmental working group
document clearly prefers to 'manage' foreign private IP in order to convert it to host
country public IP, rather than to promote and create indigenous private IP; see also
id. at annex, 6 ("Management of intellectual property. The plan of action should
address the development of capacities for the management of intellectual property
and technologies in developing counties... establish or work within national and/or
regional institutional frameworks to promote and manage intellectual property ...
explore and implement alternative incentive schemes for research and development
. . . strengthen education and training in the management of intellectual
property. . .promote interrelation between national regulatory authorities for
medicines and health products and intellectual property offices, and define a
workplan for harmonization; focus on specific aspects of the intellectual property
system, such as test data exclusivity, 'me-too' patents, and patent linkages."
(emphasis in original omitted)).
243. See Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, tgerhardsen@ip-watch.ch, to INTELL.
PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=484&res=1280&print=O
(Dec. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Gerhardsen, WHO Group Lays Foundation] ("Some
countries had specific suggestions, such as Brazil . . . . Many of the omitted
recommendations were brought back in during the week and are now reflected in the
final paper, but Brazil still took issue with the process toward the end. Brazil told the
meeting that the discussion paper, as of 7 December, was inadequate as it still did not
reflect affordability and price of medicines, patent pooling and access to health as an
overriding human right .... 'Everything Brazil found important is not in there'
Sabina Voogd... told Intellectual Property Watch ... [Ilssues highlighted in Brazil's
submission, such as technology transfer to developing countries according to Article 7
of the WTO Agreement on [TRIPS], 'early working' exception and general
encouragement of generic market entry upon patent expiry, data exclusivity
regulations related to clinical trials data that delays the entry of generic medicines
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cized all along.244
Fifth, factors other than foreign IPRs are largely to blame for
the poor healthcare and access to medicines suffered generally by
middle income and developing country citizens, and these have
mostly to do with misplaced government priorities, policy failures,
and/or corruption. 245 With respect to Brazil, at least one recent
study found that import tariffs and federal and state taxes have
increased the drug prices paid by Brazilian patients more than 82
percent above the prices charged by pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers.24 In addition, there is widespread reporting of the Brazilian
Government's failure to adequately address its urgent national
public health care, education, pension and physical infrastructure
needs,247 of the Brazilian Government's rampant corruption scan-
dals,246 and of the Brazilian Government's questionable priority on
spending hundreds of millions of dollars per year on an interna-
tional image-enhancing space program.249 As noted above, it is
well recognized how sustained national spending on public health
care improves a middle income or a developing country's long-
term economic, technological and social productivity and attracts
and ensuring strict application of the patentability criteria, were not included in the
original draft." (emphasis added)).
244. Id. at 173 (formulating an approach to facilitating technology transfers,
assuming that technology owners are willing to part with is, based in part on the
TRIPS Agreement, which requires developed countries to provide incentives to their
enterprises to promote and encourage the transfer of technology to least developed
countries, and which involves enhancing the capacity of developing countries to
receive and use complex technologies).
245. See CIVIL SOCIETY REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 12. These
failings were recognized by the WHO CIPIH intergovernmental working group; see
also IGWG Nov. 2, 2006, supra note 238; IGWG Dec. 8, 2006, supra note 240, at annex
2, 1 5 ("[I]t is important to strengthen capacity of local public institutions and
businesses in developing countries in order to contribute to, and participate in,
research and development efforts (resolution WHA59.24)." (emphasis in original)); id.
6 ("Capacity building is needed in developing countries in science and technology,
regulation, clinical trials, the transfer of technology, traditional medicine, and
intellectual property.").
246. See Libby Levison & Richard Laing, The Hidden Costs of Essential Medicines,
ESSENTIAL DRUGS MONITOR 20-21 (2003), available at http://mednet2.who.int/
edmonitor (follow hyperlink to EDM 33) (noting that Brazil imposes an import tariff
of 11.7%, a VAT of 18%, and a state government tax of 6% on imported
pharmaceuticals, and because the impact of hidden costs is compounded, each hidden
cost has a 'carry on' effect.).
247. See, e.g., Buarque, supra note 5; see also WHO, Public Health, supra note 207,
at Comments of Dr. Trevor Jones.
248. See, e.g., Gall, supra note 4, at 12; Jonathan Wheatley, Fresh Corruption
Charges Target Brazil's Deputies, FIN. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at 6.
249. Schultz & Walker, supra note 10, at 89 (citing Dutra, supra note 10).
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badly needed domestic as well as foreign investment.25 °
2. Brazil's IPR Regime Shifting Recognized by WHO and
Latin America
It is not difficult to conclude that Brazil has been encouraged
to continue its regime shifting activities by UN officials. Dr. Ber-
nard Fabre-Teste, the WHO adviser for disease in the Western
Pacific region, made a bold pronouncement. 251 He said that he
supported developing countries' rights to circumvent national pat-
ent laws protecting the property rights of foreign HIV/AIDS drug
manufacturers in order to provide citizens with the public health
care they deserve.2 2 He believed that this could be accomplished
either through aggressive use of the flexibilities contained within
the TRIPS Agreement, or through the taking of other unilateral
actions, including the importation of generic copies of AIDS drugs
from third countries, such as India, China and Vietnam.255
Although Brazil was not mentioned as one of these countries,
Fabre-Test did refer to Brazil's successful threats of compulsory
licensing and patent abrogation against U.S. and European HIV/
AIDS drug manufacturers that resulted in significantly reduced
medication prices.254 Apparently, the WHO and Fabre-Test agree
with Brazil that "[t]his kind of decision is really a sign of political
commitment [for] public health."
2 55
In addition, WHO officials, together with officials from the
Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), the Brazilian Health
Ministry and several Brazilian research centers/universities, have
collectively authored a report highlighting the importance of hav-
ing refocused and shifted the debate about IPRs and health care,
at both the national and international levels, from the WTO to the
WHO.256
250. See JAMISON, supra note 51, at 7-8 (noting that foreign investors "shun
environments in which the labor force suffers a heavy disease burden").
251. See Meraiah Foley, WHO Urges Nations to Bypass Patent Laws for HIVIAIDS






256. See Humberto Costa, foreward to HUMBERTO COSTA ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT: CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH 10 (Jorge A.Z. Bermudez & Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira eds., 2004), available
at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/Trips-ingles%20nova%20
versao%202005.pdf (noting the recent development in the field of public health of
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Consequently, all developing countries, including Brazil, now
have the WHO's blessing to directly or indirectly produce generic
copies of any patented drugs they believe are required, without
first obtaining the consent of, or paying 'just compensation' to, the
patent right holder, all in the name of promoting the public inter-
est - i.e., open source/universal access to health. This is perhaps
why a regional bloc of nineteen Latin American and Caribbean
nations confidently announced their execution of an agreement, in
January 2006, to act collectively in an effort to reduce the price of
HIV/AIDS drugs by, among other things, increasing their drug
manufacturing capabilities ."7
Judging from the CIPIH's recent April 2006 report, the inter-
national recognition and approbation that the Brazilian Govern-
ment has thus far received for its national efforts in minimizing
life science company patent protection seemingly extends also to
Brazil's national policy towards clinical test data and trade
secrets.258 Brazil remains one of two emerging economies with a
growing generic drug manufacturing sector (the other is India)
that, along with Egypt,259 has thus far refused to both enact and
implement WTO/TRIPS-consistent national legislation recogniz-
ing the exclusivity of undisclosed health-related clinical test data
examining the implications of intellectual property rights on access to medicines,
highlighted by the 49th World Health Assembly, during which the consequences of
globalization and trade agreements on access to medicines was brought to the
forefront).
257. See 19-Nation Bloc to Negotiate Price of AIDS Drugs, CNN.coM, Jan 14, 2006,
http://www.procaare.org/archive/procaare/200601/msgO0025.php.
258. See Gerhardsen, WHO Group Lays Foundation, supra note 243 (referring
specifically to data exclusivity).
259. See Brazil fights for affordable drugs against HIVIAIDS, 9 REV PANAM. SALUD
PUBLICA [Pan. Am. J. Public Health] 331-337 (May 2001), available at http://www.
scielosp.org/pdf/rpsp/v9n5/5137.pdf (noting that PhRMA has charged that Brazil is
noncompliant with the "data exclusivity" provisions of TRIPS); Latha Jishnu, Data
Exclusivity: The Cost of Protecting Data, Bus. WORLD, Jan. 26, 2004 (according to
Dilip Shah, secretary-general of the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance, which comprises
some of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, the IPA does not accept the
principle of data exclusivity, and that India should not permit data exclusivity);
Rehab El-Bakry, Jagged Little Pills: Drug Makers Struggle with Pricing and Patents,
21 Bus. MONTHLY, Apr. 2005, available at http://www.amcham.org/eg/publications
BusinessMonthly/April%2005/coverstory.asp (according to Magdy Rady, a former
adviser to the minister of health, "only in cases where a drug is not already approved
in a benchmark country does the Ministry of Health apply the.., method.., of drug
testing and data gathering. In this case, the ministry requests that the drug company
submits [sic] previously undisclosed data on a drug's formula, efficacy and trials for it
to review. 'It's only in this case that data is considered exclusive . . . [blut this
scenario has never actually taken place in Egypt.'").
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and trade secrets.26° Pharmaceutical and biotech companies typi-
cally submit this data to safety orientated regulators to secure
pre-market authorization to commercialize their products.
Arguably, the CIPIH has once again transcended WTO juris-
dictional and national sovereignty lines by opining as to the 'cor-
rect' meaning of the WTO/TRIPS data protection/exclusivity
provisions. In fact, although a plain reading of TRIPS Article 39,
which falls under Section 7 of the TRIPS agreement, entitled Pro-
tection of Undisclosed Information, reveals that its objective is to
prevent the commission of the tort of unfair competition by pro-
tecting proprietary intellectual property rights inherent in both
undisclosed information generally (trade secrets), and in the par-
ticular types of testing data and other information generated,
composed, presented and submitted to governments or govern-
mental agencies (which may or may not include trade secrets),
62
the WHO has denied that any such property right exists at all!
263
260. See Jon W. Dudas, Sec. of Comm'n for Intell. Prop. and Dir. of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, Remarks Prepared for Delivery to the Confederation of Indian
Industries at the India International Center, New Dehli, India (Dec. 7, 2006),
available at http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/prl20706.html ("The U.S. Government
would like to work with India to encourage the establishment of [TRIPs] - a consistent
data protection regime for innovative pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical test
data. Innovative pharmaceutical companies expend immense resources and capital to
collect data for their clinical dossiers. Allowing third parties to rely on this
information to obtain marketing approval without authorization of the right holder
provides an unfair commercial advantage to third parties, creating a disincentive for
innovative products to be developed and registered in India. As a result, the Indian
population may have lower access to new medicines. It is my understanding that a
growing number of Indian pharmaceutical companies, technology firms and
educational and research institutions favor the development of a TRIPs-consistent
data exclusivity regime. We will continue to encourage the Indian Government to
implement this protection, which is consistent with Article 39 of the TRIPs Agreement."
(emphasis added)).
261. See generally WHO, Public Health, supra note 207.
262. See CARLOS MARIA CORREA, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE
REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENTS 9 (2002), available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/
protectionlprotection.pdf (arguing that the requirement for member countries of
TRIPS to establish protections for submitted test data is narrowly drawn, and allows
for substantial flexibility of implementation in favor of the public's interest in
promoting competition, driving down price, and affording greater accessibility to
medicines); id. at 55 ("'Unfair competition' [is] defined as 'any act of competition
contrary to honest commercial practices in industrial or commercial matters."'
(quoting Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883,
art. 10bis, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305)); id. at 44-45 (citing
STEPHEN LADAS, 3 PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1975)).
263. WHO, Public Health, supra note 207, at 143 (arguing that Article 39.3 of the
TRIPS agreement creates neither property rights, "nor a right to prevent others from
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Interestingly, at least one of the WHO report's authors has
articulated for international consumption a series of arguments to
justify this interpretation.26 Unfortunately, his position, that the
meaning to be ascribed to a particular 'unfair' circumstance or
practice will vary from country to country as a matter of cultural
diversity26 and national law,"' is aimed at reframing the legal
technical discussion about data exclusivity into a debate about
cultural preferences, which is likely to be far from apolitical.
Most troubling of all, there appears to be a concerted interna-
tional effort under way to reinterpret and expand the focus and
scope of WHO core competencies and functions beyond, even, the
WHO Constitution's original mandate.2 67 Lacking the necessary
relying on the data for the marketing approval of the same product by a third party,
or from using the data, except where [dishonest] commercial practices are involved;"
this is in contrast to some countries, such as the United States, that have adopted sui
generis regimes prior to TRIPS which grants that for a period of five years from
marketing approval, no other company may seek regulatory approval of an equivalent
product based on that data without approval of the originator company).
264. See CORREA, supra note 262.
265. See id. at 39 ("The concept of 'unfair' is relative to the values of a particular
society at a given point in time. It varies among Members, and this variation is in fact
one of the premises on which the discipline of unfair competition is grounded. There is
no absolute universal rule to determine when certain practices should be deemed
unfair. . ").
266. This commentator states that the legal doctrine of unfair competition protects
fairness in commercial activities, and lists a number of acts that certain WTO
members have considered "fair" and "honest" practices in commercial behavior. See
id. at 55 ("They may include competitor's misrepresentation, fraud threats,
defamation, disparagement, enticement of employees, betrayal of confidential
information commercial bribery, among others. In many but not all jurisdictions, the
misappropriation of trade secrets is regulated under unfair competition law, as is the
case with the TRIPS Agreement."). He also states that, given such cultural diversity,
it is inevitable that some countries "may consider it an 'unfair practice' for a 'follower'
company to commercially benefit from the data produced by the originator, via a
marketing approval system based on 'similarity'; or hold that such commercial benefit
gives rise to claims of'unjust enrichment' leading to a compensation for the use of the
data. In others, it may be regarded as the legitimate exploitation of an externality
created during legitimate competition in the market." Id. at 40 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
267. See ELISABETrA MINELLI, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: THE MANDATE OF A
SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.gfmer.ch/TMCAMlWHO-
Minelli/Pl-4.htm; see also Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, tgerhardsen@ip-
watch.ch, US Advises Developing Country FTA Partners Not to Follow WHO IP Plan,
to INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/webloglindex.php?p=485&res=1280
&print=0 (Dec. 11, 2006) (discussing how U.S. developing country trading partners
received an e-mail "in the form of a 'd6marche' from the US Government before the 4-
8 December meeting of the WHO Intergovernmental Working Group on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights. The demarche said that it had
become apparent that the WHO was trying to go beyond its competency and address
intellectual property rights and trade, which could have impact on the scope and
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WHO membership consensus, at the present time, to establish a
supranational global governance framework for public healthcare,
some organizations have embarked on a global mission to promote
a variant of the distinct international relations concept known as
'shared sovereignty.'268 Shared sovereignty, in the context of inter-
national health,269 has been defined as requiring the creation of
public international goods at the expense of nationally sanctioned
private property rights.270 Brazil, a proponent of this version of
'shared sovereignty,' "expressed concern that the ['plan of action'
and 'strategy'] documents [developed at the December 2006 meet-
ing of the CIPIH IGWG] did not refer to medicines as being con-
sidered a public good or that access to health is an overriding
human right."271' Thus, there can be no doubt that the Brazilian
effect of FTAs, according to a government source. This, the email said, and the
proposed global framework described in World Health Assembly resolution
WHA59.24 from May this year, could potentially harm the patent system. The United
States was therefore proposing a more 'pragmatic' solution, as it appeared the WHO
tried to go beyond its technical expertise, the source said.").
268. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed
and Failing States, INT'L SECuRITY, Fall 2004, at 85-120 (discussing how pursuant to
the concept of 'shared sovereignty,' arrangements are created under which
"individuals chosen by international organizations, powerful states, or ad hoc entities
would share authority with nationals over some aspects of domestic sovereignty....
Ideally, shared sovereignty would be legitimated by a contract between national
authorities and an external agent. In other cases, external interveners may conclude
that the most attractive option would be the establishment of a de facto trusteeship or
protectorate. Under such an arrangement, the Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty of
the target polity would be violated, executive authority would be vested primarily
with external actors, and international legal sovereignty would be suspended. There
will not, however, be any effort to formalize through an international convention or
treaty a general set of principles for such an option." (footnotes omitted)).
269. See Jamison, supra note 237, at 515 (arguing that because individual nation
states are unlikely to give up sovereignty in favor of supranational governance, the
problems of collective action in the area of health could in theory be resolved by the
alternative method of "shared sovereignty, whereby individual nation states pool
their resources into a multilateral organization or their commitments into an
international treaty").
270. Id. (arguing that nation states sharing rather than giving up sovereignty must
define the special functions for which international collective action is essential, and
that these functions address problems of the global commons, in which "individual
decisions based on property rights are made ineffective by the fact that use of
resources cannot be contained within boundaries . . .two core functions to address
these problems are the promotion of international public goods and the surveillance
and control of international externalities," which in turn require research and
development, information and databases capable of facilitating sharing across
countries, harmonized norms and standards for national use, and regulation of the
growing number of international transactions).
271. Riaz K. Tayob, Who's Mandate on IPRs Defended by South Against US Attack,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/
twninfohealth06O.htm ("The United States seemed to be challenging the mandate of
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Government has long played a leading role in the international
effort to weaken exclusive individual private property rights.72
And, if all of this were not yet enough, the Health Ministers of
Brazil and other Latin American countries very recently issued
their own public anti-private property declaration.273 This declara-
tion essentially reaffirms the prior calls made in the UNHCRC
and the WHO for the subjugation of exclusive private intellectual
property rights to the right to "access to medicines and critical raw
materials," which is deemed integral to the allegedly more pri-
mary and basic human right to health.274 It also asserts that it is
the sovereign duty and obligation of every government to ensure
the fulfillment of such right.27 5 In order to satisfy this responsibil-
ity, the declaration expressly voices commitment to the utilization
of every conceivable option, exception, derogation and/or exclusion
to providing exclusive private patent, trade secret, or other IP pro-
tection to pharmaceutical products, devices, therapeutic methods
(services), and natural flora, notwithstanding TRIPS and bilateral
free trade agreement provisions to the contrary.276 It is therefore
arguable that the Latin American Declaration seeks to undermine
bilateral free trade agreements reached between the United
the World Health Organisation to deal with issues relating to intellectual property
rights and public health, when the WHO's inter-governmental working group on
public health, innovation and intellectual property met here last week .... The US
position was strongly opposed by several developing countries, including Brazil, Iran,
Chile and Cuba.").
272. See, e.g., MINELLI, supra note 267 (noting that participation to the preparatory
process in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is so "wide that the
FCTC was defined by Ambassador Amorim of Brazil, the chairman of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body, as 'the first multilateral instrument to cover a
public health concern"' (quoting Brazilian Ambassador Celso Amorin, Remarks at the
Meeting of Interested Parties (2002)).
273. See generally, Posting of Thiru Balasubramaniam to IP-Health, Unofficial
English Translation of Declaration of Ministers of South America Over Intellectual
Property, Access to Medicines and Public Health, http://www.lists.essential.org/
pipermaillip-health/2006-May/009594.html (May 24, 2006, 09:05:03). The original
Spanish version was signed by the Ministers of Health from Argentina, Bolivia,




276. Id. But see Int'l Fed'n of Pharm. Mfg. & Ass'n, World Health Assembly
Resolution Recognizes IP is Important Incentive for Development of New Health-Care
Products, May 31 2006, http://www.ifpma.orgfNews/NewsReleaseDetail.aspx?nID=
5022 (attempting to put a positive 'spin' on the WHA resolution).
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States and Chile, 277 Peru278 and Colombia.
2 79
3. Brazil's IPR Regime Shifting from WTO to UNEP/CBD
Brazil is also assisting developing nations and global activists
to re-characterize otherwise lawful (WTO/TRIPS and WIPO-con-
sistent) recognition and protection of exclusive privately owned
life science (genetic resource) patents in compounds extracted and
derived from plants and other forms of biodiversity as potential
violations of international environmental law, unless sweeping
changes are made to the international IPR framework to ensure
277. Chile has been a U.S. bilateral trading partner since 2003. The US-Chile Free
Trade Act was approved by the U.S. House of Representatives on July 23, 2003.
President Bush signed domestic legislation implementing the obligations assumed by
the United States under the agreement on September 3, 2003. It should be noted that
the Lagos administration in office at the time was not associated with the left-wing of
that country's socialist party as was the successor Bachelet administration now in
power. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and
Chile Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement (June 6, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/Section Index.html (follow hyperlink for 2003
Press Releases, then follow June 6, 2003 hyperlink); Press Release, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, Zoellick Statement Following House Approval of Chile and
Singapore FTAs (July 23, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press_
Releases/SectionIndex.html (follow hyperlink for 2003 Press Releases, then follow
July 23, 2003 hyperlink); Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs Chile,
Singapore Free Trade Agreements (Sept. 9, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/09/20030903-3.html; Roberto Espindola, Chile's New Era,
OPENDEMOCRACY.COM, Jan. 16, 2006, http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.
jsp?id=3&debateId=33&articleId=3181.
278. The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement was signed by both parties on
April 12, 2006. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PERU TPA FACTS,
FREE TRADE WITH PERU: SUMMARY OF THE U.S.-PERu TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT
(Dec. 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/
2005/asset-upload file490_8547.pdf; Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, United States and Peru Sign Trade Promotion Agreement (Apr. 12,
2006), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/PressRelease/Section Index.html
(follow hyperlink for 2006 Press Releases, then follow April 12, 2006 hyperlink).
279. The US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement contains IP provisions
virtually identical to those contained in the US-Peru agreement. It was concluded
during late February 2006 and signed by both parties on November 22, 2006. See
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: FREE TRADE WITH
COLOMBIA: SUMMARY OF THE AGREEMENT 4-5 (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/FactSheets/2006/asset uploadfile485_9023.pdf;
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Colombia
Conclude Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/Section-Index.html (follow hyperlink for 2006
Press Releases, then follow Feb. 27, 2006 hyperlink); Press Release, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, United States and Colombia Sign Trade Promotion Agreement
(Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/PressReleases/
SectionIndex.html (follow hyperlink for 2006 Press Releases, then follow Nov. 22,
2006 hyperlink).
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the harmonization of these two regimes.2"' Brazil has opportunis-
tically promoted such changes in recent negotiations among the
parties to the UNEP CBD, which entered into force in 1992.2 l
The treaty's objective is to conserve biological diversity, to pro-
mote the sustainable use of genetic resources, and to ensure that
any benefits flowing from their use are fairly and equitably
shared.282 Although the CBD was originally intended to "protect[ ]
intellectual property rights as part of a package of treaty commit-
ments that mediate competing claims of industrialized and devel-
oping countries," this "approach to intellectual property protection
has evolved in ways that could not have been predicted from a
simple reading of the CBD's text."283
280. The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) has devoted considerable attention to harmonizing intellectual property rights
(sanctioned by the WTO/TRIPs Agreement) with the CBD's objectives. See Helfer,
Regime Shifting, supra note 120 (citing Intersessional Meeting on the Operations of
the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 1999, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/ISOC/5
(May 11, 1999)); JONATHAN CURCI STAFFLER, TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 33-34
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/pbia/themes/trade/training/
Reconciliation%20Between%20CBD%20and%20TRIPs.pdf ("It is argued that the
potential benefits flowing from conservation and exploitation of biological diversity as
called for by the CBD are jeopardized under a global regime of private monopoly
rights . . . In this situation, governments and communities will have little means of
regulating access or demanding a share of benefits because they will be subject to
private ownership."); id. at 34 ("[Aln IPR regime without derogations, namely
inflexible, can first of all seriously hinder the environmentally-sound technology
transfer among States, and particularly from industrialized countries to developing
ones.").
281. See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on
Earth: How the Convention on Biological Diversity Promotes Nature and Human Well-
Being, Apr. 2000), at 5, available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-
sustain-en.pdf ("At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, world leaders agreed
on a comprehensive strategy for 'sustainable development' - meeting our needs while
ensuring that we leave a healthy and viable world for future generations. One of the
key agreements adopted at Rio was the Convention on Biological Diversity."); Kelly
Day-Rubenstein & Paul Heisey, Plant Genetic Resources: New Rules for International
Exchange, AMBER WAVES, June 2003, at 22 [hereinafter Day-Rubenstein], available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/June03/Features/PlantGeneticResources.htm
("The U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was established, with a focus on
the preservation of biodiversity, especially those genetic resources with
pharmaceutical and industrial rather than agricultural uses." (emphasis added)).
282. See Helfer, Regime Shifting supra note 120, at 30.
283. Id. at 28 (stating that the CBD provisions were intended to facilitate the quid
pro quo transfer of proprietary technologies to developing states for access to genetic
resources, where "biotechnology-poor developing countries sought financial benefits
and technology transfers as incentives to conserve rather than exploit the genetic
resources within their borders . . . [and by contrast where] Biodiversity-poor but
biotechnology rich industrialized states [I sought to minimize benefits and transfers
while maximizing access to those resources.").
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The Government of Brazil has worked with other nations to
exploit broad language within the treaty text according intellec-
tual property right protection for genetic resources residing in
developing countries to promote the nationalization of those
resources and the creation of new IP right categories not recog-
nized by the TRIPS and WIPO agreements. 28 4 IPR-related CBD
negotiations have thus concerned two primary issues: "(1) protect-
ing the traditional [public] knowledge of indigenous communities,
and (2) advocating that intellectual property rights applicants
should disclose the country of origin of the [public] genetic
resources or traditional knowledge, which form the basis of their
applications."2 5 The TRIPS Agreement requires neither.2 6 The
CBD text focuses considerably on the issue of access. 287 Appar-
ently, these governments have discovered the inherent value of
284. Commentators have long observed that CBD Article 15(4) and (5) require CBD
parties to obtain the prior consent of other CBD parties on mutually agreed upon
terms, in order to secure access to genetic resources. They have also cited CBD
Article 15(7), which anticipates that legal measures, including IPRs may be used, and
therefore "call[ing] on Parties to take legislative, administrative or policy measures to
ensure the benefits arising from research, development and commercial use of genetic
resources are shared in an equitable way with the provider of the genetic resources."
CATHERINE MONAGLE, CTR. FOR ENVTL. & INT'L L. [CEIL], REVIEWING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY - JOINT DISCUSSION PAPER 4 (Mar. 2001), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/
tripsmay01.PDF (footnote omitted).
285. See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 120, at 29 n.119 ("[T]he terms
'traditional knowledge' and 'indigenous knowledge' refer to knowledge that is 'held
collectively (at the community or national level),' has been 'used for generations by
local communities and [has] contributed to the development of crop varieties, food
security and medicines, as well as the emergence and continuation of artistic work in
the form of music, handicrafts and artisanship.'" (citation omitted)); STAFFLER, supra
note 280, at 33 ("The categories of IPRs traditionally recognized in [the] TRIPS
Agreement are not completely adequate to guarantee the protection of practices and
the knowledge held by local and indigenous communities which have informally
crystallized along the centuries and which play an outstanding role in the
conservation of biological diversity.").
286. Id. at 29-30 (noting that TRIPS does not require that (1) the traditional
-knowledge of indigenous communities' as such be protected, (2) applicants seeking
intellectual property protection provide information about the origin of genetic
resources, (3) the sharing of financial or technological benefits of biodiversity-related
patents and plant innovations with source countries or communities, and (4) members
consider unwritten traditional knowledge as a form of'prior art,' thus permitting such
knowledge to be patented in its original form).
287. See id. at 31 (arguing that the CBD recognizes a state's "sovereign right to
control genetic resources within their borders and to determine conditions of access to
them, [where] access may be granted only upon mutually agreed terms and subject to
the prior informed consent of the state providing the resources;" such access may be
conditioned upon a promise of "compensation, technology transfers, or other benefits
should those innovations prove commercially profitable").
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IPRs, at least, on a national ownership level, and now aim to
secure and allocate it to themselves as against the otherwise legit-
imate claims and interests of private third party developed coun-
try companies that rely upon them to innovate.
In early 2005, for example, Brazil and other parties proposed
the creation of a new international IPR treaty that sanctions the
nationalization of biodiversity and any derivative IP.281 It calls for
tighter patent rules to prevent misappropriation of their 'sover-
eign' biological resources and to ensure fair sharing of benefits
arising from their use.29 The proposal would "require users of bio-
logical resources to first seek informed consent of the country of
origin, and to ensure that the origin of the resources were dis-
closed in patent applications. '"290 Their "chief concern was
'biopiracy,' whereby biological resources could be appropriated by
foreign researchers and used to develop new, patent-protected
products, without benefits being returned to the country of
origin. "291
A proposed treaty would, if adopted as a final text, most likely
become a Protocol to the UN CBD. Brazil and other like-minded
nations have opposed an alternative market-based approach that
involves execution of individual private agreements governing
access to and use of genetic resources.292 They argue that such
approach would require them to police their own biodiversity, and
288. See Priya Shetty, Biodiverse Countries Call For Tighter Patent Rules, Sci. &
DEV. NETWORK, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.scidev.net/News/index.cfm?fuseaction=
readNews&itemid=1954&language=1. Brazil is a member of the Like-Minded group
of Mega-diverse Countries (LMMCs) which contain most of the world's biodiversity.
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. Id.; see also Alan Oxley, The Phantom Menace, TCSDAILY, Mar. 21, 2006,
http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=032106F [hereinafter Phantom Menace]
(defining 'biopiracy' as "either the misuse intellectual property (when patents or
trademarks are erroneously issued) or restricting the access of foreign companies to
genetic resources"); see also Alan Oxley, Green Gold and Cargo Cults, TCSDMLY, Mar.
29, 2006, http://www.tcsdaily.com/article/aspx?id=032906A [hereinafter Oxley, Green
Gold] (noting that the term 'biopiracy' has also been described as a "political term
which means that foreigners (mainly multinational companies, of course) obtain these
products (even buy them in the local market), take them away and create blockbuster
drugs that earn billions.").
292. Alan Oxley, A Healthy Dose of Property Rights is Good Medicine, BANGKOK
POST, Feb. 18, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.williams.edu/go/native/moreipr.htm
[hereinafter Oxley, Healthy Dose] (noting that while countries like Costa Rica have
entered into private agreements granting drug companies access to their genetic
resources, countries like Brazil have proposed the creation of an international
convention granting the country from which the patented material was sourced the
right to determine how products based on a patented invention from it would be
used).
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that entails significant economic costs. 293 A more important reason
is that a (regulatory) convention would permit them to control
how products derived from their biological resources can be used
by others.294 This would consequently provide them with economic
benefits to which they would not otherwise be entitled under the
TRIPS and WIPO agreements. In effect, "[e]ven after a patent has
been granted for an invention using genetic material, the country
from which the material was sourced would have the right to
determine how products based on a patented invention from it
would be used."2 9
Interestingly, a largely parallel framework has arisen in con-
nection with the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), which had been recognized
several years ago (in 2002) as contributing to the three objectives
of the CBD.296 Although the ITPGRFA falls under the auspices of
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)2 97 and engen-
293. See Shetty, supra note 288.
294. See id.
295. See Oxley, Healthy Dose, supra note 292.
296. See Secretariat of the CBD, Statement by Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf, Executive
Secretary, Convention on Biological Diversity to the Governing Body of the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture at it[s] first
Session, at 2 (June 12, 2006) [hereinafter Statement by Dr. Djoghlafl, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/speech/2006/sp-2006-06-12-itpgrfa-en.doc ("At its sixth
meeting, in 2002, the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity recognized that the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture will have an important role for the conservation and
sustainable utilization of agricultural biological diversity, for facilitating access to
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and for the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of their utilization. It thus recognized that your Treaty will
make a significant contribution to the achievement of the three objectives of the
Convention in the strategic area of agricultural biodiversity." (emphasis added)).
297. See Executive Secretary of the CBD, Compilation of Submissions Provided by
Parties, Governments, Indigenous and Local Communities, International
Organizations and Relevant Stakeholders Regarding an Internationally Recognized
Certificate of Origin/Source/Legal Provenance, Addendum, Submission by the
International Agriculture Research Centres of the Consultative Group on
International Agriculture Research [CGIAR], at 3, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/GTE-ABS/1/
3/Add.2 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter UNEP Compilation of Submissions], available at
http://www.biodiv.org/docdmeetings/abs/absgte-Ol/official/absgte-Ol-03-add2-en.pdf
("The Treaty [ITPGRFA] is in harmony with the CBD. The scope of the Treaty is all
PGRFA [plant genetic resources for food and agriculture]. The Treaty creates, inter
alia, a multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing (MLS)."); Day-Rubenstein,
supra note 281, at 27-28 ("[The ITPGRFA] mandates the conservation and
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. . .seeks fair
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of these resources
[and].. establishes a multilateral system to facilitate access to all crops listed... and
to share the benefits derived from such facilitated access under the terms of a
standard Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) . . . established by the [treaty's]
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ders contentious intellectual property rights and benefit sharing
issues of its own, its evolution may likely inform the IP debate
surrounding the CBD.295 Indeed, the scope of Brazil's proposed
international IPR treaty is likely intended to cover the subject
matter of both the CBD and the ITPGRFA (chemical and pharma-
ceutical as well as agricultural food and feed-based genetic
resources), given their similar objectives,299 the ongoing coopera-
tion between their secretariats °° and Brazil's recent ratification of
Governing Body."); CLAUDIO CHIAROLLA, U.N. UNIv., FAO INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON
PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES AND FARMERS' RIGHTS, http://www.ias.unu.edulredirect-
UNU.aspx?ddlID=191&catID=35 ("Article 9.2 of the International Treaty provides
that 'the responsibility for realizing Farmers' Rights, as they relate to plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture, rests with national governments.' Thus, this
provision does not contain an international obligation like that imposed by
the.. .TRIPS agreement.").
298. For example, Treaty Article 12.3(d) provides that "recipients shall not claim
any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the
form received from the Multilateral System." See ITPGRFA, opened for signature
Nov. 3, 2001, art. 12.3(d) (entered into force June 29, 2004) [hereinafter ITPGR],
available at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/itllTPGRe.pdf; KALPAVRIKSH (INDIA) &
GENETIC RESOURCES ACTION INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT
GENETIC RESOURCES: A CHALLENGE FOR ASIA 5-6 (Feb. 2002), http://www.grain.org/
briefings -.files/it-asia-feb2002-en.pdf [hereinafter KALPAVRIKSH] ("Thus, the lack of a
clear ban on patents or any other IPRs on crops for food and fodder is troublesome to
farmers' and civil society organisations. The Treaty envisages the commercialisation
of plant genetic resources in the context of benefit sharing, but does not mention IPRs
as the basis for benefit sharing, as the biotech industry would have liked. The industry
. . . does not support the treaty as the IPR provisions are ambiguous and there is a
lack of reference to contractual agreements for access and benefit sharing... [It] is a
compromise; IPRs on genetic resources have not been excluded, there is no guarantee
against the commercialisation of the genetic resources and there is no clarity on
benefit sharing from commercial use. Nonetheless. . . [i]ssues relating to farmers'
rights, intellectual property rights and international agricultural research can all be
dealt with at the international level through the space the Treaty provides."
(emphasis added)).
299. See ITPGR, supra note 298, at 12.3(a); UNEP Compilation of Submissions,
supra note 297, at 3.
300. See Statement by Dr. Djoghlaf, supra note 296, at 2-3 ("Articles 19 and 20 of
the Treaty and decision VI/6 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity require cooperation between the secretariats and the governing
bodies of the two instruments. I am pleased that we were able quickly to conclude a
memorandum of cooperation between the Convention Secretariat and the interim
Secretariat of the Treaty. I can assure you that the Convention Secretariat will
continue to work closely with the Treaty Secretariat to ensure that the two
instruments go forward in continued harmony."); see also Decisions Adopted by the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Eighth
Meeting, March 20-31, 2006, Curitiba, Brazil, at 180, 204-212, 216, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
CBD/COP/8/31, available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/decisions/COP-08-dec-en.pdf
(referring to Decisions regarding cooperation with other conventions and
international organizations and initiatives, and agricultural biodiversity).
2006] BRAZIL'S IP OPPORTUNISM
the latter.3 °'
According to at least one commentator, there is also a political
reason/message that underlies Brazil's CBD proposal. It is clearly
anti-patent, anti-private property, anti-free market, and anti-
WTO.3°" For all of these reasons, it may be appropriate to perceive
Brazil's continuous efforts to putsch this proposal forward as a
neo-Marxist attempt to nationalize ('take' in 'trust' for the public
for ostensible 'public use')33 natural resources that actually pro-
vide benefits to the state or to favored private individuals, irre-
spective of the costs to both foreign and domestic private
investors.30 4  Alternatively, one may interpret Brazil's interna-
tional proposal as being rooted in the more locally-focused historic
Roman and English common law 'public trust doctrine,' pursuant
to which all natural resources, including air, are currently suscep-
tible to environmental regulation 'for the benefit of the public.'
30 5
301. See Press Release, Embassy of Brazil in London, Brazil Ratifies International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (May 23, 2006), http://
www.brazil.org.uk/newsandmedia/pr20060523.html.
302. See Oxley, Healthy Dose, supra note 292 ("Klaus Topfler, the [former] head of
the United Nations Environment Programme underlined in his message to the
Bangkok conference. Patent represented 'private monopolies' which should be subject
to community ownership. Is this an anti-private property message? Martin Khor is no
fan of private property. He is a longstanding critic of business and a leading
campaigner against the World Trade Organisation, a venerable free market body.
One of his avowed goals is to diminish the effectiveness and authority of the WTO at
large and its agreement on intellectual property." (emphasis added)).
303. It has been claimed that, through national regulation of genetic resources in
compliance with the CBD and the ITPGRFA, participating national governments and
government-supported and/or private Centres of the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) "are bound to hold designated
germplasm 'in trust for the benefit of the international community', and 'not to claim
ownership, or seek intellectual property rights over the designated germplasm and
related information."' See KALPAVRIKSH, supra note 298, at 5 (citations omitted in
original). Whether such entities will actually resist 'taking' natural resources for
their own benefit or to redistribute national wealth to favored citizens is largely
subject to question.
304. See Oxley, Green Gold, supra note 291 ("The main business at this conference
is not to protect biodiversity, but to endorse a return to the sort of economic philosophy
that has impoverished many nations .... [G]overnments in Africa and Latin America,
including Brazil, and India propose an international treaty which will 'improve
access' (i.e. stop foreigners) to these genetic resource [sic] and increase benefits (by
holding up patents and other intellectual property if any shard of a genetic resource is
used in any product patented), until they get their fair share ... The strategy is to
nationalize the resource." (emphasis added)).
305. See ED OWENS, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE WILDLIFE MGMT., FOR THE GOOD
OF THE PEOPLE (July 2001), http://www.nrpa.compublic-trust.htm (explaining the
public trust doctrine); id. at n. 1 ("While interpretations vary, the premise that Saxon
and Norman kings 'owned' all that they ruled is the basis most commonly cited to
justify the premise that hunting of game and wildlife management responsibilities
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No doubt, even American environmental extremists and apolo-
getic political multilateralists would prefer this approach. °6 In
addition, at least one study has likened an access and benefit
sharing (ABS) patent to a national research and development tax
(an indirect regulatory taking) that would likely reduce R&D
investment in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors by
fifty percent and twenty percent respectively. °7
Cynicism aside, the Government of Brazil has taken its par-
ticipation in the CBD process very seriously, and is largely respon-
sible for the progress that took place during the recent mid-
February 2006 CBD Working Group meeting in Granada, Spain.
Brazil was instrumental in helping to craft a draft ABS conven-
tion text, International Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing,
which was then passed on to the CBD Conference of the Parties
(COP) for consideration at their subsequent meeting, held in Curi-
tiba, Brazil, in late March 2006. °8
are elements of the historical record associated with the public trust doctrine."); Wis.
CONST. art. IX, § 1 (discussing the public trust doctrine and its roots in English
common law); see also Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and
Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 285 nn.1-6 (2004).
306. See David Kaye et al., Op-Ed., Pacts Americana?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006
("What can the incoming Democratic Congress do to help reverse the steep erosion of
America's standing abroad, particularly the impression that the United States has
disengaged from global problem-solving? . . . the Senate can . . . approve a raft of
treaties awaiting action .... Early approval of key agreements in areas of great
international concern, like the environment.. .would show the world that the United
States is committed to solving global problems .... There is a pressing need to repair
America's image now .... Approving treaties from [the following] list would make a
good start."). These include the UN CBD, the UN Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. See id; see also
John Pomfret, Schwarzenegger Remakes Himself as an Environmentalist, WASH.
POST, Dec. 23, 2006, at A01.
307. TIMOTHY A. WOLFE & BENJAMIN ZYCHER, PACIFIC RES. INST.,
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT
UNDER A PATENT-BASED ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING REGIME, AUSTRALIA, 1 (2005),
http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/health/2005/ABS EULMMC.pdf ("Whatever
the specifics of ABS prove to be, a patent-based system is equivalent analytically to a
long-run tax on biotechnological and pharmaceutical research and development
investment. . .[Tihe assumed long-run ABS tax... is 50 percent for the biotechnology
subsector and 20 percent for the pharmaceutical subsector.").
308. See Chee Yoke Ling, New CBD Meeting Ends with Draft Elements of ABS
Regime, SOUTH-NORTH DEV. MONITOR (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.choike.org/
nuevo-eng/informes/3946.html ("Brazil's head of delegation, Hadil Fontes Da Rocha
Vianna, said the meeting produced a well-organized and structured basis to fulfill the
Group's mandate to negotiate an international ABS Regime."); CBD COP-8
Highlights: Monday, 27 March 2006, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Mar. 28, 2006, at 1,
available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdflenb09359e.pdf ("Marina Silva, Brazil's
Minister of the Environment, instilled a sense of responsibility to mainstream
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At least until April 2006, sufficient developed country govern-
ment and industry opposition appeared to exist to the draft ABS
convention text introduced in Curitiba to temporarily place it 'on
ice' until 2010, and away from the TRIPS Agreement.30 9 However,
the ground, apparently, had already begun to shift, as the result of
civil society's heightened concerns about the negotiation of new
bilateral free trade agreements alleged to be in conflict with the
CBD 10 And, the TRIPS Council's February 2006 review of the
CBD-TRIPS relationship did not help matters any.31'
Indeed, this dynamic changed further during May and June
2006, due to the concerted efforts of the Governments of Brazil,
India and Norway and the good offices of the WTO Director Gen-
eral," 2 to promote harmonization between CBD and TRIPS. On
May 29, 2006, Brazil and India proposed an amendment to the
TRIPS Agreement, Article 29, that was supported by a number of
environmental issues into public policy, especially cross-cutting issues such as ABS
[and] Brazil's President Luis Inicio Lula da Silva called for adopting an international
regime on ABS, noting that biodiversity is our planet's greatest treasure and that
opposition to fair benefit-sharing is a threat to life on earth.").
309. See also Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, tgerhardsen@ip-watch.ch,
Decision on International Regime On Genetic Resources Postponed Until 2010, to
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=260&res=1024&
print=0 (Apr. 4, 2006) (stating that the COP-8 meeting ended with an agreement "to
pursue negotiations on an international regime, with a deadline of COP-10, to be held
in 2010").
310. See Mario Osava & Haider Rizvi, Biodiversity: Progress at a 'Multilateral
Pace,' INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 1, 2006, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.
asp?idnews=32740 (noting the heightened urgency created by the race against free
trade agreements, and the attendant antagonism between the CBD and the WTO at
the expense of natural resources).
311. See WTO, Council for TRIPS, Note by the Secretariat: The Relationship
Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc.
IP/C/W/368/Rev.1 (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/englishtratop-e/
trips-e/ipcw368_e.pdf.
312. See Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Videoconference Address to the
Opening Session of the European Commission's Green Week 2006 in Brussels,
Belgium (May 30, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/
sppl28_e.htm (stating that the "Appellate Body of the WTO has repeatedly confirmed
that WTO rules are not to be interpreted in isolation of other bodies of law ....
Discussion in the WTO, that is specific to the relationship between the TRIPS
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, is also taking place of course
.... The issues of access to genetic resources, of prior informed consent and of benefit
sharing are currently being explored in the WTO. . . . Our members continue to be
divided on how best to address these issues, with some wanting an amendment of the
TRIPS agreement, and others saying that there is no tension between the WTO and
the CBD warranting such a change. The discussion must still run its course. Whatever
its outcome, it is incumbent on all countries to use intellectual property rights in a
manner that fosters biodiversity - all countries have a responsibility." (emphasis
added)); see also Ocheltree, supra note 126.
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developing countries.313 That amendment, if adopted, would
require "introduction into the TRIPS Agreement of a mandatory
requirement for the disclosure of origin of biological resources and/
or associated traditional knowledge used in inventions for which
intellectual property rights are applied for."314 Thereafter, on
June 14, the Government of Norway introduced its own proposed
TRIPS amendment that supports and is largely consistent with
the Brazil-India proposal, though with certain caveats. 31 '5 Brazil
and India warmly welcomed the Norwegian proposal.316
Arguably, Brazil's ABS draft treaty and proposed TRIPS
amendment amount to nothing more than a national governmen-
tal grab for private industry royalties in the absence of the means
to convert genetic resources and traditional knowledge into legally
recognizable property rights (i.e., patentable subject matter) from
which market relevant (or commercial) innovations can be
derived. They represent nothing less than patent opportunism
313. See Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, tgerhardsen@ip-watch.ch, Developing
Countries Propose TRIPS Amendment on Disclosure to INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://
ip-watch.org/webloglindex.php?p=323&res=1280&print=O (June 1, 2006) [hereinafter
Gerhardsen, Developing Countries Propose]; Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen,
tgerhardsen@ip-watch.ch, Brazil, India, Get Developed Country Support for TRIPS
Amendment on Biodiversity, to INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblogtindex-test.php?p-332 (June 15, 2006); Doha Work Programme, supra note 127.
314. See Doha Work Programme, supra note 127, 1[% 1-2 (establishing "a mutually
supportive relationship between this [TRIPS] Agreement and the Convention on
Biological Diversity, in implementing their obligations, Members shall have regard to
the objectives and principles of this Agreement and the objectives of the Convention
on Biological Diversity"); see also Ocheltree, supra note 126.
315. See General Council, Trade Negotiations Comm., The Relationship Between
the TRIPS Agreement, The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge Amending the TRIPS Agreement to Introduce an Obligation to
Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent
Applications, % 1, U.N. Doc. WT/GC/W/566, TN/C/W/42 (June 14, 2006), available at
http://www.ip-watch.org/files/Norway Proposal.doc ("The TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) can and should be implemented in a
mutually supportive manner .... However, the interaction between the two treaties
would be enhanced by introducing a mandatory obligation in the TRIPS Agreement to
disclose the origin of genetic resources and traditional knowledge in patent
applications." (emphasis added)); Gerhardsen, Developing Countries Propose, supra
note 313 (The Norwegian proposal differs "from the proposal by the major developing
countries in that patents would not be revoked if incorrect or incomplete information
has been given in the patent applications, which is identified after the patent is
granted. The Norwegian proposal says this should be penalised outside the patent
system. [And,] [bly disclosure, the Brazil, China and India proposal includes
disclosure of origin, prior informed consent and benefit sharing. But the Norwegian
proposal calls for mandatory disclosure of origin as a 'binding international
obligation,' not the other areas.").
316. See Gerhardson, Developing Countries Propose, supra note 313.
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cloaked in more diplomatic international regulatory harmoniza-
tion and free technology transfer development language.
B. Brazil Actively Promotes a New International
Paradigm of 'Open Source' / 'Universal Access' to
Knowledge
1. Open Source Methods
A new paradigm of 'open source' methods is being advanced
by Brazil and other developing countries in international fora to
further facilitate 'regime shifting.' Although the notion of open
source methods was not invented by them, the opportunistic Bra-
zilian Government and a group of similar-minded developing
nations317 immediately recognized its value for their own interests.
Unfortunately, some experts from OECD market economies pro-
mote such ideas, as well.
The 'open source' approach towards intellectual property
rights has been broadly described within a recent pamphlet
authored by the former Head of Policy in UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair's Office, who is now the Director of a London-based NGO 15
Both he and the organization are known for their socialist lean-
ings."9 According to these advocates, open source methods are
intended to operate as a 'gift' rather than a 'market' economy.
And, although such methods were originally applied to computer
software,32 ° they are now being extended nationally and interna-
317. A group of developing nations critical of IP's impact on development has
worked alongside Brazil in multiple fora. They are known as the 'Friends of
Development.' See Int'l Env't Governance Dossier, Friends of Development, http:l
www.stakeholderforum.org/fod.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2007) ("During the 31st
Session of the WIPO General Assembly (September 27 to October 5, 2004), the
delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Iran, Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Venezuela co-sponsored
a proposal to establish a 'Development Agenda' for the World Intellectual Property
Organization. The group of countries is commonly referred to as the Group of Friends
of Development. The basic concern of the Group of Friends of Development is to
ensure that WIPO activities and intellectual property discussions are driven towards
development-oriented results.").
318. See The Young Foundation, About, Introduction, http://www.youngfoundation.
org/uk/?p=2 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
319. Id.; see also The Young Foundation, About, Personal Profiles, Staff, Geoff
Mulgan, http://www.youngfoundation.org.uk/?p=32 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
320. See GEOFF MULGAN ET AL., WIDE OPEN: OPEN SOURCE METHODS AND THEIR
FUTURE POTENTIAL, DEMOS 9-10 (2005), available at http://www.demos.co.uk/
publications/wideopen (follow "Full Text as a PDF" hyperlink) (explaining that open
source software is any computer software distributed under a license which allows
users to change or share the software's source code). Different kinds of open source
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tionally to other industry sectors that have nothing at all to do
with software, including biosciences and pharmaceuticals. 21
Indeed, in their view, open source methods are "almost the oppo-
site of traditional intellectual property systems like patents and
copyrights, which seek to keep knowledge restricted to the cre-
ators and people they choose to sell the knowledge to."322 Euro-
pean, Brazilian and South African advocates have argued that
there exists a sound theoretical basis for the idea of 'open busi-
ness' models whether applied either to copyrights or to patents. 23
And some have persuaded their governments to act on it. In
May 2005, for example, the Government of France announced its
intention to establish and support a legal framework under its
bilateral science and technology agreement with China that
"ensure[s] the sustainable development of ObjectWeb ... [an open
source software platform] . . .as a major process for Sino-Euro-
pean collaboration. '324 In light of the French software and telecom-
munications industries' diminishing European and international
market share,325 one should question whether France was moti-
vated to consummate this agreement more by competition than
innovation needs.
Apparently, certain American business executives, scientists
and academics, as well, have taken a fancy to open source meth-
ods,3 26 but for all of the wrong reasons. Representing open source
methods as supportive of the public good of intellectual capital
software share the core similarity that "they insist that the source code be made
available whenever a piece of software is used, distributed, or modified." See id. at 11.
321. See id. at 8-9 (adding that the application of open source methods to wider
areas of social and economic life is attractive given that promise of huge returns from
relatively little investment, as well as a sense that non-professionals outside big
corporations now have a chance to beat those corporations at their own games).
322. Id. at 10.
323. See, e.g., Brazilian Studies, supra note 14, at Summary of Presentation by Dr.
Christian Ahlert.
324. Press Release, ObjectWeb to Expand Intercontinental Collaboration on
Industrial Open-Source Software, OBJECTWEB.ORG, May 13, 2005, http://www.
objectweb.org/phorum/read.php?admview=l&f=25&i=121&t=121.
325. See Martin Arnold, France Failing to Close Hi-Tech Gap, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2006, at 5 (noting that given that the combined revenues of France's top 100 software
companies is still smaller than the three biggest companies in the software sector,
Microsoft, Oracle, and SAP, France's inability to compete against the likes of
Microsoft and Apple has likely triggered trade protectionism); see also Tom
Braithwaite, France to Take Bite Out of Apple Monopoly on iTunes Digital
Downloads, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2006, at 6; Braithwaite, Threat to Apple, supra note
78, at 19; Rob Pegoraro, France Takes a Shot at iTunes, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at
F06.
326. See Sam Palmisano, The Information Puzzle, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 2005, at 54.
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rather than the private good of intellectual property,327 they have
aggressively promoted open source methods as a new global
knowledge paradigm for the development of public international
goods in the information and health sectors. 28 In fact, in July
2003, open source activists, scientists and academics comprised
part of an international group that drafted a letter to the Director
General of the WIPO requesting that the WIPO seriously consider
its promotion of such methods in lieu of intellectual property right
protections. 9
Indeed, the growing open source movement that these groups
are leading endeavors to utilize new legal tools, utilitarian eco-
nomic arguments, a sense of professional elitism, and moral sua-
sion to justify the application of an open source/universal access
model to information and communication technologies as well as
to biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and medical technology.3
327. See id. (arguing that IBM's position on being a leading investor and innovator
in open source movement is not contradictory, but driven by underlying patterns
shaping innovation towards a balanced approach between open source and open
standards, and between intellectual property and intellectual capital).
328. See Kenneth Neil Cukier, Open Source Biotech: Can a Non-Pproprietary
Approach to Intellectual Property Work in the Life Sciences?, ACUMEN J. OF LIFE ScI.
(2003), available at http://cukier.com/writings/opensourcebiotech.html ("If an open
source movement in the life sciences is going to take off, it may not come from the
deep pockets of venture capitalists, who are skittish on how to glean returns on
biotech even when they own all the intellectual property. Instead, it may be borne of
the purse of federal funding agencies, which may see open source projects as a way to
ensure that public monies result in public goods.").
329. See Letter from Members, Consumer Project on Technology, to Dr. Kamil
Idris, Dir. Gen. WIPO (July 7, 2003), available at http://www.cptech.orglip/wipo/
kamil-idris-7july2003.pdf ("In recent years there has been an explosion of open and
collaborative projects to create public goods. These projects are extremely important,
and they raise profound questions regarding appropriate intellectual property
policies. They also provide evidence that one can achieve a high level of innovation in
some areas of the modern economy without intellectual property protection, and
indeed excessive, unbalanced, or poorly designed intellectual property protections
may be counter-productive." (emphasis added)).
330. See James Love & Ralph Nader, What to Do About Microsoft?, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Nov. 1997, http://mondediplo.com/1997/ll/nader; Ralph Nader &
James Love, Ralph Nader Tells Feds to Stop Microsoft, CNN.coM, Nov. 11, 1998,
available at http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9811/1l/nader.idg/index.html;
James Love, Nader Colleague Responds, INFO. WK., June 13, 2002, available at http:l
www.informationweek.com/story/WK20020613S004; James Love, CPT Urges Gore
to Reverse Policy on South African Policies Regarding Access to HIVIAIDS Drugs,
Other Medicines, COMMON DREAMS NEWSWIRE, Apr. 9, 1999, available at http://www.
commondreams.org/pressreleases/april99/040999i.htm; Ralph Nader, A Framework
for ICANN and DNS Management, proposal submitted to Governing the Commons:
The Future of Global Internet Administration Conference organized by Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility in Alexandria, VA, Sept. 25, 1999, http://www.
eff.org/Infrastructure/DNScontrol/ICANN-IANAIAHC/
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They claim, in effect, that traditional intellectual property rules
often have the effect of restricting rather than encouraging the
competition for new ideas."' For this reason, the movement seeks
to transplant what they perceive to be the collegial 'open sharing'
work ethic in academia and the sciences into industry. 2
While it is easy to see why developing country governments
would gravitate towards and seek to exploit any opportunity to
acquire free and open source software (FOSS), 333 it should be noted
that there is actually more than one licensing model of FOSS to
choose from,334 and the definition of 'open source' software itself
remains "very much in flux." 335 This raises several important
questions: which of the two primary FOSS licensing models does
the Government of Brazil and the Friends of Development (FoD)
seek to establish as the new international IP paradigm - the GNU
19990927_nadericann_coms.html; Letter from Ralph Nader & James Love to
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State (Feb. 18, 1999), available at http://www.
cptech.org/ip/health/cl/mafebl8l999.html.
331. See Virginia Barbour et al., The Impact of Open Access Upon Public Health, 84
BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 339 (May 2006), available at http://www.who.int
bulletin/volumes/845/339.pdf.
332. See Cukier, supra note 328 ("The open source movement encompasses the
classical economists' spirit of decentralization that is considered essential to progress,
with a relatively new conception of enlightened community-interest ...likely to
expand well beyond software design."). Such areas may include biotechnology and
bioinformatics, given that there well may be moral imperatives facing the
biotechnology industry that propel it in the direction to improve and preserve life.
333. See Sholto MacPherson, The Penguin Sees Red, CIO GOVT., Jan. 17, 2005,
http://www.cio.com.au/index.php/id;1491647901;fp;4;fpid;21 ("In June 2003 the
financial daily Valor announced plans to migrate 80 percent of all computers in state
institutions and state-owned businesses from Windows to Linux over a three-year
period. The stated goals were to save money, foster the production of local software
and 'democratize access to knowledge,' according to Amadeu .... In the same month
[tihe [Brazilian] House of Representatives announced it would not renew Microsoft
Office licenses and was considering free software alternatives. The House also
migrated to a free software e-mail system .... Since June 2004, Amadeu believes that
taking software development in-house does much more than free Brazil from the
relatively powerless role of consumer. The bulk of money spent on developing open
source software for government is marked for local software developers, keeping
Brazilian currency . . .within the country and improving trade debt. In turn this
would lead to greater employment in the software sector and a more advanced skill
base, which could write and fix source code instead of simply administering the
software. These new skills would improve local administration and support services
and could be exported to other countries that have been slower to move towards open
source.").
334. See Melise R. Blakeslee & Brian E. Ferguson, United States: The Truths and
Myths of Open Source Software, McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (May 31, 2006), http:ll
www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=40128.
335. Am. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF INTELL. PROP. L, AN OVERVIEW OF "OPEN SOURCE"
SOFTWARE LICENSES, http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/opensource.html (last visited
Jan. 3, 2007).
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General Public License (GPL) or the Berkeley Software Distribu-
tion License (BSD)?336 How do they intend to apply their preferred
open source model to the health care sector? 37 And, is this same
model favored by European governments and industry, and by
American companies?
Pursuant to the GPL model, software authors who would oth-
erwise possess or be entitled to exclusive private property rights
(copyrights) in their expressed creations (i.e., the right to exclude
others from use, reproduction and derivative works and distribu-
tion),338 affirmatively waive those rights, including the right to
profit from them, when contributing their work to the software
collective. 39 They do so in exchange for the right to receive attri-
336. See Blakeslee & Ferguson, supra note 334 (stating that a number of
alternatives and variations and tensions exist between the two types of licenses);
Steve Kingstone, Brazil Adopts Open-Source Software, BBC NEWS, June 2, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l1/hi/business/4602325.stm ("Increasingly, Brazil's Government
ministries and state-run enterprises are abandoning Windows in favour of 'open
source' or 'free' software, like Linux .... [Sergio Amadeu of the National Institute for
Information Technology explains] 'If you switch to open source software, you pay less
in royalties to foreign companies.'").
337. For one answer to this question, see KRISHNA RAvI SRINiVAS TRIPS, ACCESS TO
MEDICINES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS: TOWARDS AN OPEN SOURCE SOLUTION (Nov.
2006), http://ssrn.comlabstract=952435 (analyzing the solution of Open Source as a
potential model for drug discovery).
338. See EBEN MOGLEN, FREE SOFTWARE MATTERS: ENFORCING THE GPL 1 (Aug. 12,
2001), http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/lu-12.pdf ("The essence of
copyright law, like other systems of property rules, is the power to exclude. The
copyright holder is legally empowered to exclude all others from copying, distributing,
and making derivative works. This right to exclude implies an equally large power to
license-that is, to grant permission to do what would otherwise be forbidden.").
339. See Stephen Fishman, Open Source Licenses Are Not All the Same, ONLAMP,
Nov. 18, 2004, http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/onlamp/2004/11/18/licenses.html ("The
GPL (General Public License) . . . require[s] that all software constituting a single
work fall under the GPL if any of the software used in the work is GPL .... If a
license contains a strong copyleft provision, anyone who modifies the source code and
distributes it to the public must license the modifications back to the public under the
same terms as the original software. This means that you must give up private
ownership of any changes you make to copyleft software, unless you elect not to make
the modified software available publicly."); cf Letter from Ed Black, Founder, Open
Source and Industry Alliance, to Lois Boland, Acting Direct of the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Office of International Relations (Aug. 22, 2003), http://www.osaia.
org/documents/pto-letter_032108.pdf ("[Tihe GPL and the BSD are not 'waivers' of
intellectual property rights, but assertions of them. Instead of receiving a royalty fee
for the license, the open source licensor is receiving something that might be of even
greater value - access to the licensee's creative output. Significantly, the licensee's
subsequent creative output benefits not only the licensor, but also the entire
community of open source developers and users. In turn, the creative outputs of these
other open source developers benefit the original licensor and licensee, as well as the
open source community as a whole.").
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bution, as a matter of contract (or license). 4 ° They then leverage
that resulting legal contract right to compel future creators of
derivative works to waive also their otherwise exclusive private
property rights. This ensures that they, too, will not profit from
their creations. 41 As a result, the software standard remains
'open' indefinitely, with the effect of forcing more code into the
open community.342 This type of restriction is referred to as a
'copyleft,'343 as opposed to a 'copyright,' and it serves to remove the
software from the 'public domain.""
The operating system Linux is "available under the GNU
General Public Licence (GPL), which is designed to eliminate
340. See Open Source Software and the Free Software Movement: The Committee on
Information and Technology, 61 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.
325, 330 (2006) [hereinafter RECORD], available at http://www.nycbar.org/
Publications/THERECORD.htm (follow hyperlink for 2006 Issue 2). Legal experts
have debated whether GPL is a license rather than a contract; Mitchell L. Stoltz, The
Penguin Paradox: How the Scope of Derivative Works in Copyright Affects the
Effectiveness of the GNU GPL, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1439, 1446-47 (2005) (footnotes
omitted).
341. See Richard Stallman, Copyleft: Pragmatic Idealism, http://www.gnu.org/
philosophy/pragmatic.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2007) ("[F]ree software is motivated by
an idealistic goal: spreading freedom and cooperation. I want to encourage free
software to spread, replacing proprietary software that forbids cooperation, and thus
make our society better. That's the basic reason why the GNU General Public License
is written the way it is - as a copyleft. All code added to a GPL-covered program must
be free software, even if it is put in a separate file. I make my code available for use in
free software, and not for use in proprietary software, in order to encourage other
people who write software to make it free as well. I figure that since proprietary
software developers use copyright to stop us from sharing, we cooperators can use
copyright to give other cooperators an advantage of their own: they can use our
code.").
342. See Blakeslee & Ferguson, supra note 334.
343. See GNU Project, What is Copyleft?, http://www.gnu.org/copyleftlcopyleft.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2007) ("Copyleft is a general method for making a program or
other work free, and requiring all modified and extended versions of the program to
be free as well. The simplest way to make a program free software is to put it in the
public domain, uncopyrighted .... So instead of putting GNU software in the public
domain, we 'copyleft' it. Copyleft says that anyone who redistributes the software,
with or without changes, must pass along the freedom to further copy and change it.
Copyleft guarantees that every user has freedom. Copyleft also provides an incentive
for other programmers to add to free software... To copyleft a program, we first state
that it is copyrighted; then we add distribution terms, which are a legal instrument
that gives everyone the rights to use, modify, and redistribute the program's code or
any program derived from it but only if the distribution terms are unchanged. Thus,
the code and the freedoms become legally inseparable. Proprietary software
developers use copyright to take away the users' freedom; we use copyright to
guarantee their freedom. That's why we reverse the name, changing 'copyright' into
'copyleft.'" (emphasis in original)).
344. See Blakeslee & Ferguson, supra note 334.
2006] BRAZIL'S IP OPPORTUNISM 79
closed source software."345 Despite the appeal of such a model,
especially to those who lack the technical know-how or the finan-
cial means to create their own software platforms, the GPL license
has serious shortcomings. The resulting 'negative' contract
right,346 given its broad scope and indefinite duration, arguably
constitutes an undue, and perhaps, 'total' future restraint on the
alienation of private property, which common law courts have
been known to invalidate. Newly formed and existing small and
medium-sized hi-tech businesses, in particular, would be
adversely affected by such restrictions if they serve as a disincen-
tive for venture capitalists to invest in their companies. The GPL
license furthermore is arguably analogous to a 'house of cards'
waiting to fall if, for no other reason, its terms remain insuffi-
ciently clear and misunderstood by existing and potential par-
ties. 47 As experience has shown, however, if any single member of
the GPL collective violates the terms of this communal contract
(e.g., as concerns 'derivative works'),348 it is likely to trigger a dom-
345. LEMIS, Explaining BSD, http://www.lemis.com/bsdpaper.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2006) (emphasis added).
346. See Stoltz, supra note 340, at 1442 n.19 ("Professor Margaret Jane Radin has
questioned whether a conditional copyright license like the GPL can bind anyone who
uses the licensed software, whether they have voluntarily entered a contract with the
copyright owner or not." (footnote omitted)).
347. See RECORD, supra note 340, at 326 ("The Association is firmly of the view
that, when it comes to GPL, ambiguity should be dispelled to the maximum extent
possible. [On the one hand] . .. activity that is arguably violative of Version 2 of the
GPL has not been challenged, or not been challenged consistently, in order not to
discourage the widespread use of open source software. On the other hand, rather
than concede the desirability of compromise with free software principles, there
appears to be a reluctance to expressly clarify the GPL to make such activity
permissible. The hope seems to be that ambiguity will discourage and limit the
extent of such activity. The Association believes that there is too much at stake to
perpetuate such ambiguity in Version 3. While there may be a 'gentlemen's
agreement' in some quarters of the free software community that certain types of
activity will be tolerated, even if in technical violation of the GPL, not every
contributor to an open source program necessarily subscribes to such a 'gentlemen's
agreement,' and the potential for being subjected to copyright infringement litigation,
and monetary and injunctive relief, is a significant risk for potential licensees.").
348. See Stoltz, supra note 340, at 1441-42, 1444 ("The limitations and exceptions
of copyright also limit copyleft. In particular, the boundaries of copyright law's
definition of a derivative work determine to which versions and revisions the GPL
applies. For software, the definition of a derivative work is uncertain, because the
boundaries separating one distinct 'work of authorship' from another are hard to fix in
a computer system of many tightly interwoven components. Under what
circumstances can two programs be said to combine into one, instead of simply being
two programs that interact with each other? When two programs interact closely
enough to be considered a new, hybrid program (a derivative work of both programs),
the GPL's terms dictate that it must apply to the whole. The legal question of when
two interacting programs form a derivative work will determine how broadly the GPL
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ino effect of copyright infringements (and/or perhaps contract
breaches) along the entire chain of creations, and thus, a potential
litigation free-for-all amongst its members. 49
According to two legal experts, "the GPL license essentially
requires a business model centered around programming and sup-
port services to generate profit," rather than one based on the
software product itself or on its derivatives. 5 ° However, once a
company reduces such services to a uniform, standardized and
repeatable process, thereby commoditizing them, its cost of devel-
oping them and the price it may charge clients for providing them
should drop significantly. Since competitors' prices for rendering
the same or similar services will also fall, it will likely lower the
barriers to entry into the marketplace segment, and make it more
difficult for such service companies to establish their individual
niches. It will likely also place a severe downward pressure on the
salaries and fees paid to in-house and outside consultants that
work for the services providers. 51 The hope is that companies can
and will develop new proprietary value-added consulting services
for which clients are willing to pay higher fees.
Pursuant to the BSD model, on the other hand, businesses
applies, and whether it can help preserve the cooperative values of FOSS
development. If copyright law does not recognize a derivative work where two
programs interact in common ways, the GPL copyleft regime may contain an
enormous loophole for proprietary exploitation... This Note focuses on one ambiguity
that affects the GPL: the scope of what constitutes a derivative work.").
349. See e.g., Robert Jacques, SCO Slams IBM's GPL Linux Defense, INFoMATIcs,
Sept. 30, 2003, http://www.infomaticsonline.co.uk/vnunet/news/2123380/sco-slams-
ibm-gpl-linux-defence; Robert McMillan, SCO: IBM Cannot Enforce GPL,
INFOWORLD, Oct. 27, 2003, http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/10/27/HNscoenforce_1
.html; Jay Lyman, SCO Claims Linux GPL is Unconstitutional, TECHNEwSWORLD,
Oct. 28, 2003, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/31975.html; Sean Michael
Kerner, GPL Awaits Test in SCO Group/IBM Dispute, ENTERPRISE, Jan. 23, 2004,
http://www.internetnews.com/ent-news/article.php/330280; IBM Goes for SCO
Jugular in Test of GPL Validity, LINUXDEVICES.COM, Aug. 19, 2004, http://www.
linuxdevices.com/news/NS9902827613.html; SCO Group, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machines
Corp., No. 2:03CV0294 DAK, 2006 WL 2938820 (D. Utah Sept. 1, 2006); Eric
Raymond, OSI Position Paper on the SCO-vs.-IBM Complaint, OPEN SOC'Y INST.,
http://www.opensource.org/sco-vs-ibm.html.
350. Blakeslee & Ferguson, supra note 334.
351. See Richard Waters, IBM Repackages Its Brain Power, FIN. TIMES, July 11,
2006, at 12 (arguing that Mr. Palisano of IBM is trying to reinvent the services
industry by "[tiurning services, which by definition are delivered by people, into
repeatable processes where IBM can get economies of scale" by isolating and
standardizing many of the components that go into such assignments. This "mak[es]
it easier to apply the same processes to subsequent projects", resulting in the blurring
of the line between the services and software business models, which in turn means
that "revenue growth is no longer limited by the number of consultants that IBM can
throw at projects.").
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are permitted to "build upon free software to create proprietary
software."3 2 This means that, the BSD License allows proprietary
commercial use, and the software released under the license can
be incorporated into proprietary commercial products. In addition,
any works based on and/or derived from the free software may be
released under its own proprietary license.3
Legal experts have noted how 'open source purists' (GPL sup-
porters) object to the BSD License. "[O]pen source purists believe
the BSD license is detrimental to the open source initiative
because it does not require users of BSD-licensed software to
openly release their modifications."354  The objection arises
because "[tihe Berkeley copyright poses no restrictions on private
or commercial use of the software and imposes only simple and
uniform requirements for maintaining copyright notices in redis-
tributed versions and crediting the originator of the material only
in advertising." "' BSD supporters refer to their model as
'copycenter' - between copyleft and copyright. 6
Established software companies seemingly have embraced
the BSD model. One example of this model is the Macintosh Oper-
ating System, which runs partly on BSD-licensed code.357 BSD
352. Blakeslee & Ferguson, supra note 334; see also Wikipedia.org, Berkeley
Software Distribution, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkeley-SoftwareDistribution
(last visited Aug. 30, 2006) (describing the origins of BSD, sometimes called Berkeley
Unix, and its wide identification with versions of Unix available for workstation-class
systems during the 1970's due to the ease with which it could be licensed and the
familiarity it found among the founders of many technology companies during the
1980's, which originated from using familiar systems such as DEC's Ultrix and Sun's
SunOS).
353. Blakeslee & Ferguson, supra note 334.
354. See id.; RECORD, supra note 340, at 326 ("We recognize that there is a tension
in the free software community regarding the use of open source in commercial
products, especially when commercial developers wish to preserve the proprietary
nature of all or some of their enhancements, extensions and compatible software. In
principle, advocates of free software believe that any retention of proprietary rights is
inconsistent with the concept of free software.").
355. OpenBSD.org, OpenBSD Copyright Policy, http://www.openbsd.org/policy.
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (emphasis in original).
356. Id.
357. See Mac OS X for UNIX Users - The power of UNIX with the simplicity of
Macintosh, at 3, http://images.apple.com/macosx/pdf/MacOSX-UNIX -TB.pdf (last
visited Dec. 13, 2006) (touting BSD as one of the most widely respected UNIX
implementation systems that provides Mac OS X with stability, performance, and
compatibility. "Apple has enhanced BSD by adding Mach 3.0 technology based on the
OSF/mk microkernel from the Open Software Foundation, providing memory
management, thread control, hardware abstraction, and interprocess communication
services, and has built on top of this rich Mach/BSD heritage with a number of
powerful innovations, including well-defined, future-proof kernel programming
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code has also been detected operating in some Microsoft products,
though it is not quite clear whether it was self-generated or it sim-
ply migrated there. 8 More recently, IBM has licensed some of its
code under BSD 59
Unfortunately, the movement has more stridently challenged
those within industry and the scientific community that continue
to maintain the traditional proprietary view.360 That view has
held that open source models negate the very incentive for indus-
try to invest in the kinds of research and development that are
needed to achieve incremental and breakthrough innovations that
may then be shared with the developing world.36 1 Given the lower
4th quarter of 2005 and forecasted 1st quarter of 2006 expected
revenues reported by at least two of these companies,362 however,
one must seriously question the authenticity of their motivations
for migrating to open source methods, as well as the economic via-
bility of the open source business model itself.
363
interfaces (KPIs) supporting dynamically loadable file systems, network extensions,
and packet filters, as well as 1/0 Kit drivers.").
358. See Greg Lehey, Does Microsoft run BSD Code?, DAEMON NEWS, http://
ezine.daemonnews.org/200108/dadvocate.html; see also David Sims et al., Microsoft
Plans Shared Source.NET, O'REILLY NET., Jun. 27, 2001, http://www.ondotnet.com/
lpt/a/972.
359. See Posting of George Kraft, IBM TTS SDK now BSD Licensed, to GNOME.ORG,
http://mail.gnome.org/archives/gnome-accessibility-list/2006-MarcmsgOO048.html
(Mar. 27, 2006).
360. See IBM to Give Away 500 Patents - Move Marks Major Shift of Intellectual-
Property Strategy, REUTERS, Jan. 11, 2005, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi zd2970/is_200501/ain8671221 (reporting that IBM's plans to donate 500
patents for free use by software developers in order to encourage other patent holders
to donate their own intellectual property in order to form what IBM calls a "patent
commons" puts it in the vanguard of a movement to redefine patent laws in less
restrictive ways, but is in contrast to zealous patent defenders such as
pharmaceutical and media companies); see also Cukier, supra note 328 (Dr. Lita
Nelson, Director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Patent Transfer
Office, believes that the term 'open source biotech' is so broad that it is meaningless,
that "trying to adapt intellectual property approaches for different classes of
technology, such as processes versus products, would be impossible [given that] 'one
man's infrastructure is another man's product or biotech company,'" and thus open
source would negate the incentive to invest in patents.).
361. See Cukier, supra note 328.
362. See Dan Roberts & Richard Waters, High-Tech Giants Fall Short of Forecasts,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at 1 (discussing earnings of IBM, Yahoo, and Intel); see also
IBM, IBM Reports 2006 First-Quarter Results, IBM.coM, Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.
ibm.com/investor/lq06/lq06earnings.phtml.
363. See Richard Waters, The Prophet of Oracle's Evolving Future, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
17, 2006, at 7 (reporting that while open-source companies benefit from a low-cost
approach to developing and distributing software that threatens to disrupt
established software companies, the lack of control over their own intellectual
property in turn makes open-source companies vulnerable to take over by companies
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Apparently, Brazil has been successful in advocating on
behalf of the free and open source movement because of its ideo-
logical predisposition3" towards communal sharing and bias
against private property and free markets rooted in the United
States."' And, the movement-at-large has seemingly embraced
the Machiavellian tactic of 'divide and conquer' to pit the leaders
of different governments and different industries against one
another to promote such ideology abroad within the market and to
government procurement agencies.3 11 Companies, therefore, have
increasingly turned towards their national governments in an
such as Oracle, which in turn have also dissuaded companies such as Oracle from
buying open-source companies such as Redhat for fear of seeing the software wiped off
the map); see also Richard Waters, Oracle Considers New Linux Venture, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2006, at 15; John Gapper, A Threat to the Fragile Linux Ecosystem, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2006, at 19 (reporting that open-source companies such as Linux
which do not hold intellectual property rights over its software cannot charge for the
software, but make money by providing support and upgrades to make sure it works
with other corporate software, are part of a delicate ecosystem comprising of open-
source volunteers and software companies and distributors, who all have a stake in
taking out more than they put in, thereby resulting in cheap and open operating
platform, but which in turn also curtails the profits that Linux distributors can
make).
364. See JAMES V. DELONG, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., THE ENIGMA OF OPEN
SOURCE SOFTWARE (VERSION 1.0) (Mar. 2004), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/
popll.8opensource.pdf. At least one commentator has cited the economic and
ideological issues surrounding whether governments, in the first place, should give
preference to open source software in making purchases. See also id. at 4 ("Connected
to this limited debate are ... disputes over the proper way to ensure the production of
intellectual products in the computer age, ranging from music to movies to games to
books to pharmaceuticals. The Free Culture Movement, which is based primarily in
academia, regards the production of open source software as a pilot program for non-
property-based, non-market production of these other forms of intellectual
creativity.").
365. See MacPherson, supra note 333 ("When Brazil migrated to open source
software, IBM stepped in to pledge local assistance in writing software for the Linux
operating system. Microsoft's veteran competitor declared its intention to raise Brazil
as a role model for other Latin American countries looking to cut their computer costs,
according to Vania Curiati, IBM's software director in Brazil .... The lessons of
recent history mean open source attitudes in South America are coloured by anti-US
sentiment. Citizens of Ecuador, Guatemala, Chile, Colombia and Argentina have had
fatal encounters with US foreign policy, and US multinationals are often viewed with
as much suspicion as the White House itself. Brazil is no exception .... Therefore it
is hardly surprising that ardent nationalism and anti-US tension have left an imprint
on national politics.").
366. Although IBM's move was primarily against Microsoft, it was apparently
applauded and embraced by Sun Microsystems. See Scott McNealy, Share the 'Crown
Jewels' and Create New Markets, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at 17. It also seemed to
trigger concerns among 'open source' companies. See Richard Waters, Red Hat Buys
JBoss in Boost to Open-Source, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at 27. It is arguable
whether Sun's reliance on this business model contributed to its negative financial
results. See Richard Waters, McNealy Steps Down as Sun Microsystems CEO, FIN.
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effort to employ this doctrine to their competitive advantage and
for protectionist purposes. 67
2. Brazil's Efforts to Nationalize OSMs
The Brazilian Government has obviously observed and been
monitoring this unfolding debate, and has chosen to embrace the
notion of 'open source' with abandon. According to one Brazilian
expert, the Brazilian Government has undertaken a series of pop-
ular initiatives at the national and international levels aimed at
promoting FOSS business methods that, admittedly, "imply a
political risk to Brazil."36 The risk to which this expert obliquely
refers is that the United States may view Brazil's adoption of the
FOSS model as another new form of disguised trade protection-
ism, which may be punishable by withdrawal of U.S. GSP status
and/or susceptible to challenge and retaliatory sanctions at the
WTO. 6 9
The populist rationale underlying the Brazilian Government's
push for 'open source' methods has also been discussed by Brazil's
Minister of Culture:
[Tjhe fundamentalists of absolute property control - corpo-
rations and governments alike - stand in the way of the dig-
ital world's promises of cultural democracy and even
economic growth. They promise instead a society where
every piece of information can be locked up tight, every use
of information (fair or not) must be authorized, and every
consumer of information is a pay-per-use tenant farmer,
begging the master's leave to so much as access his own
hard drive. But Gil has no doubt that the fundamentalists
will fail. A world opened up by communications cannot
remain closed up in a feudal vision of property .... No
country, not the US, not Europe, can stand in the way of it.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2006, at 1; Richard Waters, McNealy Takes the Hits and a Backseat at
Sun, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2006, at 26.
367. See United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); see also
Wikipedia.org, United States v. Microsoft, http://en.wikipedia.orgwiki/Microsoft-
antitrust-case (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
368. Brazilian Studies, supra note 14, at 5 (stating that the Brazilian Government
has taken four actions regarding innovative intellectual property perspectives: (1)
adoption of free software by both the private and public sectors; (2) the Creative
Commons, "a tool for creators and artists to license their creations so that society as a
whole becomes entitled to exercise some rights over the work"; (3) access to medicines
initiative; and (4) the Development Agenda proposed at the World Intellectual
Property Organization by Argentina and Brazil).
369. See Kingstone, supra note 336; Carlos Ball, Why is There No Free Trade in the
Americas?, TCSDaily.com, Feb. 25, 2004, http://www.tcsdaily.com/022504B.html.
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It's a global trend. It's part of the very process of civiliza-
tion. It's the semantic abundance of the modern world, of
the postmodern world - and there's no use resisting it. 7°
It is the opinion of many within the Brazilian Government that
the evolving national and international paradigm of 'open source'
methods can and should be broadened far beyond the realm of
copyrighted content-rich music, films, and computer software to
also include patented healthcare products and technologies, as
well as other scientific and technological know-how . 71 Accord-
ingly, one of the prime directives of Brazil's Federal Institute for
Information Technology is to promote the adoption of free
software throughout the government and ultimately the nation.2
The idea of extending the open source business methods para-
digm from software to healthcare originally arose during Brazil's
'market-friendly' Cardoso administration, which, for political rea-
sons, had guaranteed distribution of HIV/AIDS drugs to all
infected Brazilians, free of charge.373 And, this same model and
policy rationale has since been embraced by the current socialist
Lula administration. 74 The main downside of the drug program,
as both administrations ultimately discovered, however, has been
its extremely high, unsustainable cost.3 7 As a result, from 1999 to
the present, both administrations became skilled in the art of
issuing periodic royalty-free compulsory licensing threats to for-
eign life sciences companies.3 76 For example, in the spring of 2005,
370. Julian Dibbell, We Pledge Allegiance to the Penguin, WIRED, Nov. 2004,
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Cultural Minister, and
former pop star, Gilberto Gil).
371. See id. (noting that Brazil, in its approach to drug patents and in its support
for the free software movement is transforming itself into an open source nation, yet
also noting that in a world divided into the content-rich and the content-poor, it's
increasingly clear to those on the losing side of the divide that the traditional means
of addressing the imbalance - piracy - is a stopgap solution at best, and that sooner or
later some country was bound to square off with the IP empire and be the first to
insist, as a matter of state policy and national identify, on an alternative).
372. See id.
373. See id. (noting that this policy unfolded under the watchful eye of former
Health Minister and politician Jos6 Serra, who has been said to be the individual who
set Brazil on the path to IP independence).
374. See id.
375. See id.
376. See id.; Decreto No. 3.201, Disp6e Sobre a Concessao, de Oficio, de Licenga
Compuls6ria Nos Casos de Emerg~ncia Nacional e de Interesse Piblico de que Trata o
art. 71 da Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de maio de 1996, de 6 de octubre de 1999 [Presidential
Decree on Compulsory Licensing Establishing Rules Concerning the Granting, Ex
Officio, of Compulsory Licenses in Cases of National Emergency and Public Interest
Provided for in Art. 71 of Law No. 9,279 of May 14, 1997] (Braz.); see also Paulo
Reb6lo, Brazil Targets Another AIDS Drug, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 29, 2001, http://www.
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the Government of Brazil declared that it possessed the moral and
legal authority, under both national and international law, to
'take' the HIV/AIDS drug Kaletra from its U.S. owners (patent-
holders) without 'just compensation,' because the issue of health
care is a matter of 'public interest' (i.e. a 'public use'). 7
In other words, the standard articulated by the Brazilian
Government to justify a 'taking' of private property without 'just
compensation' was that of meeting the necessary requirements to
guarantee the sustainability of the government's National STD/
AIDS Program (i.e., a public use). Obviously, Brazil was in over
its head financially, and relied on the derogations (flexibilities)
provided for in the TRIPS Agreement and also within its own
national law to bail itself out. The Brazilian Government, how-
ever, had been suffering from an economic 'emergency' or 'urgency'
that was triggered by its own profligate spending. It had not
experienced, as the TRIPS Agreement envisions and provides for,
and what most health activists described, as a health 'emergency'
or 'urgency.'
Economic emergencies or urgencies of the kind experienced by
Brazil or any other emerging economy are often better addressed
through balance of payment borrowings or project-related financ-
ings obtained from official international development and sover-
eign lending institutions, official export-promoting financial
institutions, or from private banks, or even private aid. Health
emergencies or urgencies experienced by impoverished least
developed countries such as those from sub-Saharan Africa with
respect to HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis are, by contrast,
often better addressed by the dispensation of official development
aid, bilateral intergovernmental aid packages and private aid
grants, as have been generously provided by the U.S. Government
or by U.S. private foundations.3 8 However, the jury is still out on
whether such aid has actually been as transformational as
envisioned."7
wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46353,00.html; Shasta Darlington, Brazil Makes
Demands in Roche AIDS Drug Dispute, REUTERS, Aug. 23, 2001, http://www.
globaltreatmentaccess.org/content/press-releases/aOl/082301RHGAPbrazil.html.
377. See PR Newswire, The Government Declares Anti-Retroviral Kaletra to Be of
Public Interest and Will Produce it in Brazil, PRNEWSWIRE.COM, Jun. 24, 2005, http:fl
www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/06-25-2005/
0003950348&EDATE.
378. See Bush Touts Foreign HIVIAIDS Funding, supra note 204; see also Kenya,
Brazil Press for Funds for Neglected Diseases, MEDIACORP PRESS, May 17, 2006, http:/
/www.todayonline.com/articles/1 18794print.asp.
379. See, e.g., Andrew Natsios, Adm'r of the U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. [USAID],
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It is more likely that Brazil suffers from a perennial knowl-
edge emergency or urgency. This type of deficit is preferably cor-
rected by improving national and local education capabilities, by
attracting foreign private direct investment and by voluntarily
negotiating arms-length, market-based arrangements (or procure-
ment contracts) with the very private industry participants that
can help it to acquire such knowledge. 8 °
Brazil still has the option, in the words of Hernando De Soto,
to act wisely and choose the 'other path.'381 It should not mandate
through force of law free-of-charge open methods-based technol-
ogy transfers to national governments underwritten by private
industry, as a condition to gaining or retaining market access.
This amounts to nothing less than governmental opportunism,
which will serve only to enhance Brazil's welfare dependency at
the expense of its domestic industries' creativity and innovation.
Even more damaging are the Brazilian policies intended to move
this debate into the international sphere.
3. Brazil's Efforts to Internationalize OSMs
Brazil, in addition to proposing the so called 'Development
Agenda' at the WIPO, is in the "forefront of several proposals
regarding intellectual property, such as embracing free software
and creative commons, as well as struggling for the for the proper
balance of patent rights in order to promote access to
medicines."382 It is arguable that open source methods, especially
as applied to the life sciences and information and communication
technology industries, are intended to impair seriously the signifi-
cantly higher value of U.S. and other OECD member intellectual
property assets and the related commercial products and
processes that incorporate them.3
Five Debates on International Development - The US Perspective, Speech at a
Meeting Hosted by the Overseas Development Institute (Oct. 12, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/apgood-oct05/apgoodoctl2/HLnatsios.
pdf (noting that some scholars have begun to doubt the power of aid packages by
themselves to promote self-sufficiency in countries unwilling to emancipate
themselves from the philosophy of welfare dependency).
380. Cf Pachovski & Kogan, supra note 109 (discussing the dangers of Brazil's
current approach).
381. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM
(1989).
382. Brazilian Studies, supra note 14, at 1.
383. See JANE HOPE, OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY PROJECT, OPEN SOURCE
BIOTECHNOLOGY?, http://rsss.anu.edu.au/-janeth/OSBiotech.html (arguing that part
of the appeal to open source approach to biotechnology research and development may
be its capacity to weaken government and industry control over the rate and
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These assets provide the OECD nations, including the United
States, with a considerable comparative trade advantage over
emerging WTO member economies, including Brazil. Brazil has
indirectly sought to impair the value of U.S. IP assets in two ways.
First, Brazil has successfully persuaded diplomats, policymakers,
and non-U.S. businesses that the current WTO IP system suffers
from serious market and ethical failures.3 s Second, it has success-
fully cast those failures as a threat to developing countries'
national sovereignty, cultural identity and ability to benefit equi-
tably from the science and technology transfers."5 In this regard,
many believe that the UN Millennium Development Goals, a pri-
mary purpose of which is to ensure sustainable development,
incorporate such a mandate. Third, as the following discussion
will show, Brazil has also strongly recommended (i.e., demanded,
as a matter of 'fundamental fairness'), that the FOSS replace this
system as the benchmark for internationally harmonized IP rules.
This will ensure that Brazil and its developing country comrades
obtain what they are really after - global redistribution of scien-
tific and technological know-how and the wealth that goes along
with it - in the name of sustainable development.
Certainly, Brazil is not the only emerging economy to promote
open source methods as a new global intellectual property policy
paradigm nationally and at international fora; however, it is,
without doubt, the most vocal. Apparently, Brazil's message has
resonated loud and clear among other developing countries, par-
ticularly those located in Latin America." 6 Suffering from even
especially the direction of scientific progress); see also Robin Bloor, South America
Warms to Open Source, THE REGISTER, Feb. 10, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2005/02/10/southamerica-open-source (noting that Brazil's president Luiz Inacio da
Silva is "keen to bridge what he perceives to be a huge technology gap between Brazil
and more advanced economies" and sees "Open Source as an important means of
doing so." Da Silva appointed Sergio Amadeu, a "former economics professor and
Open Source enthusiast ... [who] wants Open Source to permeate government
software usage, educational software usage and home computer usage" to head
Brazil's National Information Technology Institute, after taking office last year).
384. See Brazilian Perspective, supra note 14, at 6 ("Dr. Lemos provided some
numbers about the traditional copyright-based cultural industry in Brazil. The
numbers demonstrate that a very small number of artists have been able to be
distributed by means of the traditional industry channel. Only very few Brazilian
music CDs are being released every year in the country, in spite of its huge
population.").
385. See id. at 4.
386. See Bloor, supra note 383 ("The trend to Open Source in South America seems
to be stronger than it is anywhere else." Examples include Chile, "where Open Source
is being deployed extensively in schools through the governments high school internet
access network;" Venezuela, where "President Chavez issued a decree.., mandating
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greater knowledge and technology deficits, they have observed
Brazil's diplomatic dips and head jolts, and have eagerly fallen in
place behind Brazil to form a political samba line for the purpose
of dancing to what they will hope to be a new international genre
of open-source music." 7
For all intensive purposes, therefore, the outlines of an inter-
national open source alliance have begun to emerge. Besides Bra-
zil, it consists of India, which has mustered a political
commitment to free software, developing nations that are poor in
IP rights and lacking in the power to enforce them, and certain
developed nations which have a vested (political and economic)
interest in the success of the open source paradigm. To some, this
alliance is a natural response to the rapid rate of technological
change and the chaotic nature of today's modernization process.
8
a. Brazil's Efforts at the World Summit on the
Information Society
The Government of Brazil also challenged the international
IPR framework during both phases of the UN WSIS. The WSIS
meetings had been convened by the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU), a UN-based international standards body. 9
The first of the two phases took place in Geneva, Switzerland dur-
ing December 10-12, 2003.390 During the first phase, Brazil leds91 a
Venezuela's public administration to switch to Open Source;" and Peru, "where the
government recently introduced a bill mandating the use of Open Source software by
the state.").
387. See Colin McMahon, 2 Nations United on AIDS Care: Argentina, Brazil Vow to
Make Generic Drugs, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 25, 2005, at 4 ("[O]fficials from 11 Latin
American nations reached a deal with 26 drug and diagnostic companies to lower the
prices governments pay for anti-HIV drugs and tests. Among the signatories were
Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina ....").
388. See Dibbell, supra note 370.
389. See ITU - About Us, http://www.itu.intlaboutitu/overview/index.html (last
visited Dec. 13, 2006) (summarizing the history of the ITU and its objectives,
mandates and activities).
390. See WSIS: Geneva 2003 - Tunis 2005, http://www.itu.inttwsis/index.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2007); see also WSIS, G.A. Res. 56/183, 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/183
(Jan. 31, 2002), available at http://www.itu.intlwsis/docs/background/resolutions/
56_183_unga_2002.pdf, (recognizing Council of the International Telecommunication
Union's decision to endorse same).
391. See Marcelo D'Elia Branco, WSIS, World Summit on Information Society: The
Rich and the 'Rest of the World,' http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/wsis/Branco.html ("The
main controvers[y] [at] WSIS ha[d] been around the alternative of Free Software as
an instrument to digital inclusion, incentive to innovation and technological
development. In that point, the Brazilian delegation ha[d] been firm and le[d] the
discussion .... A second controversy ha[d] been on the emphasis to deepen the
intellectual property laws about digital stuff vs. the knowledge sharing as a
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bloc of developing countries including India, South Africa and
China 392 in seeking to define the scope of IPRs in an effort to pre-
vent the United States and its OECD allies from 'hardening' the
UN line in support of them. 93 Fortunately, they were unsuccess-
ful. The United States was able to ensure that "the official WSIS
Declaration of Principles include[d] a section promoting intellec-
tual property rights" and "only support[ing] 'increas[ed] aware-
ness . . . offered by different software models, including
proprietary, open-source and free software,' "'3  although the final
mechanism to guarantee the permanent technological innovation and the digital
inclusion. Brazil and India [led] the group that understands that the emphasis to
knowledge sharing among the people is more appropriate to the development of a
democratic information society and it's the unique opportunity for the in growth and
poor countries to overcome the technological delay.").
392. See ROBIN D. GROSS, IP JUSTICE ExEC. DIR., WORLD SUMMIT TO CREATE 'PAY-
PER-USE' SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IGNORED AS BIG BUSINESS DOMINATES IN GENEVA
(Dec. 21, 2003), http://www.ipjustice.org/WSIS/IPJWSISReport.html ("India and
Brazil among other countries unsuccessfully attempted to insert language into the
official WSIS documents that called into question the lack of balance in current
international standards for intellectual property rights, such as the TRIPS
Agreement. But the US flexed its muscle and calls for balance were ignored ....
Another controversial issue in the official WSIS documents was [the lack of] any
mention of Free or Open Source Software development models. An increasing number
of governments have announced plans to switch from proprietary software to Free
and/or Open Source Software to save money and improve quality and security.
Already Governments in Brazil, Peru, India, Australia, Vietnam, South Korea Korea,
China, and South Africa have taken steps to reduce their dependence on Microsoft
software products by announcing support for Free or Open Source Software .... But
Microsoft lobbyists fought hard on this point.").
393. See Kenneth Cukier, Source vs. Force: Open Source Meets Intergovernmental
Politics, Soc.ScI. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.ssrc.org/wiki/POSA/index.php?title=
source vs._Force:_Open SourceMeets IntergovernmentalPolitics ("The hard US
line on open source is widely interpreted as a reflection of Microsoft's lobbying power,
and behind it the broader, US-dominated proprietary software industry. Much of this
lobbying occurs through surrogate trade associations .... These organizations are
closely connected to the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and several are
accredited observers at WIPO. Responsibility for scuttling the first planned WIPO
meeting on open source, for example, is usually attributed to the Business Software
Alliance, which played the leading role in applying pressure on the US Patent and
Trademark Office." (citation omitted)); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECON. AND
Bus. AFFAIRS, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON INTERNET
GOVERNANCE, Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2005/51063.htm.
394. GROSS, supra note 392 (internal citations omitted); see also WSIS, Geneva
2003, Declaration of Principles, Building the Information Society: a global challenge
in the new Millennium, 42, U.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter Declaration of Principles], available at http://www.itu.intldmspub/itu-s/
md/03/wsis/docS03-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf ("Intellectual Property protection is
important to encourage innovation and creativity in the Information Society .... ); id.
27 ("Access to information and knowledge can be promoted by increasing awareness
among all stakeholders of the possibilities offered by different software models,
including proprietary, open-source and free software ... ."); WSIS, Geneva 2003, Plan
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Plan of Action document contained some stronger language. 9 In
addition, language referring to the cultural and economic impor-
tance of shared knowledge and the need of information technolo-
gies to protect cultural diversity, which Brazil had championed,
also made it into the final conference document. 9 s
The second phase of the WSIS took place in November 16-18,
2005.3"7 Although there was no direct mention of intellectual prop-
erty rights during this meeting, 98 there was greater focus on open
source software, and this was reflected in the final conference
documents 39 9 - i.e., in both the Tunis Commitment and the Tunis
Agenda."° And, to ensure that the concept of open source methods
remained in the minds of foreign governments and the media, the
Government of Brazil skillfully convened a press conference dur-
ing the first day of the Summit, at which it announced the execu-
tion of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the
of Action, I 10(d-e), U.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVAIDOC/5-E (Dec. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter Plan of Action], available at http://www.itu.int/dms-pub/itu-s/md/03/
wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0005!!PDF-E.pdf.
395. See Plan of Action, supra note 394, 23(o) ("Governments, through public/
private partnerships, should promote technologies and R&D programmes in . . . a
variety of software models, including proprietary, open source software and free
software . . ").
396. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 394, [ 15, 19, 25, 52-52; see also
Plan of Action, supra note 394, 23(a), 23(c), 23(f), 23(o).
397. See Marty Logan, Internet Can Create, Not Crush, Culture, INTER PRESS SERV.
NEws AGENCY, Nov. 19, 2004, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews3llO2 (discussing
"how to ensure that all the world's people can have access to the Internet and other
information and communications technologies (ICTs).").
398. See Posting of Monika Ermert, Intellectual Property Issues Kept Off WSIS
Agenda, to INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=158&
res=1024 ff&print=0 (Nov. 30, 2005) ("The internet governance debate was the focus
of discussions in Tunis .... [I]ntellectual property will not be a topic of the new
governance forum. In Tunis, there was a consensus that work elsewhere should not
be touched by the WSIS process. A mantra was that IP issues had to be dealt with by
WIPO."); see also Logan, supra note 397.
399. See Ermert, supra note 398 ("During the first phase in Geneva, open source
software was recognized, though it was not declared preferential from a development
point of view as proposed by governments like Brazil, India and the Holy See. Greve
and the open source software advocates during the second phase saw much more
involvement of companies like Microsoft.").
400. See WSIS, Tunis 2005, Tunis Commitment, 29, U.N. Doc. WSIS-05/TUNIS/
DOC/7-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.pdf;
WSIS, Tunis 2005, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, 49, U.N. Doc. WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/
tunis/off/6revl.pdf ("[We support the development of software that renders itself
easily to localization, and enables users to choose appropriate solutions from different
software models including open-source, free and proprietary software." (emphasis in
original omitted)); see also discussion, supra notes 270, 328 and accompanying text.
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Secretariat of the UNCTAD.4 1 The MOU provided for UN train-
ing and education in the use of FOSS in an effort to support the
promotion of such paradigm in the developing world.4 °2
Apparently, Brazil had also been previously successful, with
the assistance of free and open method advocates, in discretely
inserting additional anti-IPR references within an ITU Report on
WSIS Stocktaking released approximately one month prior to the
WSIS' second phase meeting.4 3 This report cites the prior efforts
of the UNESCO to promote open source over proprietary software
as a way to ensure cultural diversity.4"4 As far back as 2003, for
example, UNESCO had incorporated numerous open source and
universal access references within a recommendation to promote
multilingualism and universal access to cyberspace.4 5 Indeed, the
UNESCO website corroborates these and other past activities, as
well as reveals numerous additional ways in which UNESCO con-
tinues to influence the WSIS discussion about the need for open
source software.4 6
401. See UNCTAD & WSIS, UNCTAD and Brazil Support Free and Open-Source
Software, Nov. 16, 2005, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3603
&lang=l.
402. See id.
403. See WSIS, Tunis 2005, WSIS Executive Secretariat: Report on the WSIS
Stocktaking, It 16, 20-32, U.N. Doc. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/5 (Oct. 18, 2005),
available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/5.pdf (describing several Brazilian
Government initiative/programs that are actively promoting open source methods
within Brazil).
404. See id. 74-76; see also 68 ("The WSIS Plan of Action recognises that
cultural and linguistic diversity, while stimulating respect for cultural identity,
traditions and religions, is essential to the development of an Information Society
based on dialogue among cultures and regional and international cooperation.").
405. See UNESCO General Conference, 32d Sess., Oct. 2003, Recommendation
concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to
Cyberspace, I 7, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23, available at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
IJRLID=13475&URLDO=DOTOPIC& URL_SECTION=201.html.
406. See UNESCO, UNESCO and the WSIS, http://www.unesco.org/wsis (last
visited Jan. 3, 2007) ("UNESCO with its unique mandate to promote the free
exchange of ideas and knowledge has played a key role in WSIS. UNESCO's
contribution incorporated the ethical, legal and sociocultural dimensions of the
Information Society and helped to grasp the opportunities offered by the ICTs by
placing the individual at its centre."); see also UNESCO, Consultation meeting on
WSIS Action Line C8 Cultural Diversity and Identity, Linguistic Diversity and Local
Content, May 12, 2006, available at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL-
ID=21663&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html ("In accordance with
the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society and the Consultation Meeting of
Possible Action Line Moderators/Facilitators (Geneva, 24 February 2006), which
designated UNESCO as provisional focal point of WSIS Action Line C8, the first
consultation meeting on Action Line C8 was convened by UNESCO on 12 May
2006.").
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In addition, the WSIS Stocktaking Report discloses efforts
being made by the UNDP to promote open source software.4"7 In
fact, at the WSIS Summit, the UNDP sponsored a parallel semi-
nar on the subject of FOSS. It discussed how the open source
software movement seeks to establish universal human rights and
fundamental freedoms discussed in various other UN projects and
UN documents as the primary justification for facilitating wide-
spread developing country government procurement of open
source software.408 And beyond WSIS, the UNDP has undertaken
other initiatives to promote FOSS among developing countries.4 9
The obvious purpose behind these activities is to promote
regime shifting by incorporating norms from less technical and
less economically focused international organizations. It is now
clear that socialist-minded governments, including the present
Government of Brazil, and civil society activists have become
increasingly prolific and adept at non-economic 'norm-building, '
and at subsequently elevating those norms into 'soft declaratory
407. See WSIS Executive Secretariat, supra note 403, 31.
408. See All's Well That Ends Well! The "Tunis Agenda for the Information Society"
and the "Tunis Commitment," WSIS, Nov. 18, 2005, available at http://www.itu.int/
wsisltunis/newsroom/highlights/18nov.html (reporting that participants in the
morning workshop confirmed their belief that communication is a basic human right,
and that software plays a key role in enabling that communication, and that the
essential values of freedom, equality, and solidarity were enshrined in the 2000 UN
Millennium Declaration, and called on the UN to take a leading role in fostering
productive open source partnerships, to liberate the poor and empower them to use
technology for social and economic development).
409. See David Boswell, Free and Open Source Software at the United Nations,
ONLAMP, July 20, 2006 http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/onlamp/2OO6/O7/20/un and-foss
.html ("The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) created the
International Open Source Network (IOSN) with the goal of helping developing
countries in the Asia-Pacific Region achieve rapid and sustained economic and social
development by using free and open source software. To achieve this goal, the IOSN
acts as an open source information repository, maintains a database of FOSS
programmers and experts, offers technical support and training, and provides
research and development grants to programmers to work on localization efforts and
local font development. IOSN also organizes and sponsors events to help advocate on
behalf of FOSS and creates primers and guides for the use of FOSS in education,
government, and other areas . . . Although the IOSN effort works only within the
Asia-Pacific region, the UNDP is promoting the use of FOSS in other developing
countries [South-Eastern Europe].").
410. See Brazilian Studies, supra note 14, at 4 (Dr. Barbara Rosenberg explained
that "[iun November 2004 Brazil and Argentina alleged...that WIPO - even
though. . .a UN Agency - was not acting in accordance with the Millennium
Development Agenda goal. A development agenda was co-sponsored by a group of
twelve other countries, referred to as the Group of Friends of Development. The GFD
proposed reforms at WIPO to guarantee a transparent, pro-development and
balanced agenda for WIPO's mandate, governance, and norm-setting, as well as equal
representation in the Organization's activities, and increase access to knowledge and
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law' 41' and industry standards412 intended to pollute trade and eco-
nomic fora. A perfect example of this is the effort now underway
to 'import' (regime-shift) the 'soft' non-science-based Precaution-
ary Principle from health and environmental fora into the 'hard'
scientific and technical ICT fora.413
The Precautionary Principle in the information society can
be articulated as follows: In order to enable society now and
in the future to make relevant choices in the use of Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies, as well to mini-
mize harm for human health and the environment caused
by ICT, ICT-related decisions under uncertainty should
favor [] lower complexity over higher complexity[,] open
standards over proprietary standards[,] and adapting the
technology to humans over adapting humans to the
technology, together with technical assistance programs to harmonize developing
countries' legislation to the standard of developed countries." (emphasis added)).
411. See MARK W. JANIS & JoHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW - CASES AND
COMMENTARY 39 (2d ed., West Group 2001) ("Some international lawyers distinguish
between 'hard' and 'soft' law, a distinction with at least two meanings. First, the
distinction may refer to the difference between rules of law meant to be followed and
norms meant merely to set out preferred outcomes .... Second, the distinction
between 'hard' and 'soft' law may refer to the difference between formal sources of law
(such as treaties) and instruments that are not formally legal sources (such as mutual
declarations of government leaders issued at the end of a diplomatic conference).").
412. The EU is now apparently seeking to require open source and royalty-free
software 'inter-operability' standards at the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). See Nicos L. Tsilas, The Threat to Innovation,
Interoperability, and Government Procurement Options From Recently Proposed
Definitions of 'Open Standards', 10 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 8 (2005), available at
http://www.ijclp.org/10_2005/pdf/ijclp_08-10_2005.pdf (discussing mandatory royalty-
free licensing and unfettered sublicensing and prohibition of other reasonable
licensing terms in favor of'FRAND'- fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory); Benoit
Miller, THE EUROPEAN INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK: AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE,
BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE 6-8 (Dec. 2005), http://www.politech-institute.org/
review/articles/MULLERBenoit_volume_3.pdf ("The requirement that a standard be
'irrevocably available on a royalty-free basis' [and] . . .that standards licenses be
'irrevocable' and impose no constraints on 're-use' of the standard is inconsistent with
the licensing policies of every major standards organization, including those that
require royalty-free licensing .... BSA also has concerns with statements in the EIF
regarding open-source software."); ESTEBAN BURRONE, WIPO, STANDARDS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRs) AND STANDARDS-SErTING PROCESS, http:/!
www.wipo.orgsme/en/documents/ip-standards.htm; Priscilla Caplan, Patents and
Open Standards, INFO. STANDARDS Q. (Oct. 2003), http://www.niso.org/press/
whitepapers/PatentsCaplan.pdf.
413. See Claudia Som, et al., The Precautionary Principle in the Information Society
- Impacts of Pervasive Computing on Health and the Environment, 10 HUMAN &
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT, 787-99 (2004). "We advocate precautionary measures
directed towards pervasive applications of ICT (Pervasive Computing) because of
their inestimable potential impacts on society." Id. at 787.
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technology.414
Apparently, anti-private property activists and 'enlightened' aca-
demics believe that open international ICT standards are essen-
tial in order to protect industries and peoples against the evils of
'pervasive computing.'415 In other words, they are necessary to
"avoid[ I strong path-dependency and trends toward market domi-
nance, which destroy diversity."
416
Thus, if not carefully monitored, these seemingly innocuous
statements and declarations could conceivably be assembled,
recombined, or otherwise used with or within documents already
produced to develop an overly broad non-economic framework
from which to reconsider the role of intellectual property law in
international affairs.
b. Brazil's Efforts at the World Intellectual Property
Organization
These issues also have been debated at the WIPO. In late
August 2004, for example, Brazil and Argentina submitted to the
WIPO Secretariat a formal detailed proposal relating to the estab-
lishment of a new development agenda within WIPO.417 Subse-
quently, the WIPO General Assembly convened an extraordinary
session to consider it that spanned from September 27 to October
5, 2004.418
Brazil's proposal requested that the WIPO General Assembly
consider eight issues: 1) adoption of a high-level declaration on
intellectual property and development; 2) adoption of proposed
amendments to the WIPO convention; 3) inclusion within any
WIPO Treaty under negotiation, such as the Substantive Patent
Law Treaty, provisions on the transfer of technology, on anticom-
petitive practices as well as on the safeguarding of public interest
flexibilities; 4) establishment of technical cooperation programs
414. Id. at 796.
415. Id. at 791 ("The application of ICT is expected to become pervasive within
about a decade, that is, all aspects of daily life may be influenced by networked ICT
components (Pervasive Computing). From the perspective of technology assessment,
the combination of the following characteristics of ICT is important for their potential
implications. .. ").
416. Id. at 796. Will this not serve as but another oblique basis for disguised
industry protectionism?
417. See Secretariat of the WIPO, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the
Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, U.N. Doc. WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27,
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between WIPO and developing countries aimed at strengthening
national intellectual property offices (capacity-building); 5) crea-
tion of a Standing Committee on Intellectual Property and the
Transfer of Technology, for the consideration of measures to
ensure an effective transfer of technology to developing countries
and least developed countries (LDCs) (one such measure could
entail establishment of an international regime that would pro-
mote developing country access to the results of publicly funded
research in developed countries and could take the form of a
Treaty on Access to Knowledge and Technology); 6) organization
of a Joint WIPO-WTO-UNCTAD international seminar on intel-
lectual property and development; 7) wider participation of civil
society in WIPO's activities; and 8) establishment of a Working
Group on the Development Agenda to further discuss its
implementation.419
The proposed amendment to the WIPO Convention calls for
each country's stage of development to be taken into account to
ensure that intellectual property protections do not impede access
to culture and technology.
Intellectual property protection is intended as an instru-
ment to promote technological innovation, as well as the
transfer and dissemination of technology. Intellectual prop-
erty protection cannot be seen as an end in itself, nor can
the harmonization of intellectual property laws lead to
higher protection standards in all countries, irrespective of
their levels of development. The role of intellectual prop-
erty and its impact on development must be carefully
assessed on a case-by-case basis. IP protection is a policy
instrument the operation of which may, in actual practice,
produce benefits as well as costs, which may vary in accor-
dance with a country's level of development. Action is
therefore needed to ensure, in all countries, that the costs
do not outweigh the benefits of IP protection. °
At least one representative of the Brazilian Government who
attended the special session noted that the amendment had
received strong support from other developing nations.421
On September 29, 2004, shortly following the commencement
419. See id. at app. 1-2.
420. Id. at 2.
421. See Juliana C6zar Nunes, Brazil Wants New Rules for Intellectual Property,
BRAZZIL MAG., Sept. 29, 2004 (Allen Bennett trans.), available at http://www.
brazzilmag.com/contentview/279/2 (referring to is Roberto Jaguaribe, the president of
the Brazilian Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI)).
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of the special session, a group of European socialist-minded open
source advocates and civil society activists submitted their own
WIPO proposal, otherwise known as the Geneva Declaration on
the Future of World Intellectual Property Organization.422 The dec-
laration demanded that "WIPO [ ] abandon its current culture of
expanding monopoly privileges without regard to social cost and to
instead strike a balance between the public domain and competi-
tion on the one hand and the realm of property rights on the other.
[It] also expresse[d] strong support for the... Argentina and Bra-
zil . . . proposal."42 It focused on the perceived inequities sur-
rounding access to innovations and the scientific and technical
know-how underlying medical, information, and other essential
technologies.4"4 It also called for WIPO to ensure universal access
to all such knowledge as a matter of both morality and interna-
tional law.425
Following the Geneva Declaration, other European activists
submitted their own objections, equating these inequities with
human rights violations, and calling for a reinterpretation of the
WIPO Convention's mandate.426 The Brazilian and Argentine
Governments, along with NGOs, have also recently called for
greater NGO participation in WIPO's enforcement committee,
which, fortunately, the U.S. Government has opposed.427
In conclusion, the 'open source methods' paradigm provides a
highway for assembling the anti-private property, anti-IP, anti-
free market and anti-globalization troops to mount a prolonged
attack against the established international economic and legal
order. That order is designed to protect exclusive private prop-
erty, including IPRs, and to preserve the role of free markets in
financing and commercializing scientific and technological knowl-
edge. The open source approach, if adopted, will fundamentally
change for the worse the entire international system of research
and development, scientific and technological innovation, foreign
trade and FDI. An organized effort should therefore be mounted
422. See Geneva Declaration on the Future of the WIPO, http://www.cptech.orgip
wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Geneva
Declaration on the Future of WIPO].
423. Open Soc'y Inst. & Soros Founds. Network, Declaration on the Future of WIPO,
Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information/news/wipo_20040929.
424. See Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO, supra note 422, at 1.
425. See id.
426. See e.g., Ovett, supra note 223.
427. See Posting of Thiru Balasubramaniam, US Delegation Opposes Consumer
Groups' Inclusion On WIPO ACE Panels, to FromGeneva, http://fromgeneva.blogspot.
com/2006/05/us-delegation-opposes-consumer-groups.html (May 17, 2006, 11:44).
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to resist the implementation of these ideas in every international
organization and in every country, beginning with Brazil.42
c. Brazil's OSM Regime Shifting has Trade
Protectionist Undertones
The Brazilian Government's prior record of upholding the pri-
vate intellectual property rights of foreign companies is hardly
stellar, and it does not bode well for IP-reliant Brazilian compa-
nies. To date, Brazil has extolled the virtues of universal, afforda-
ble, and 'open public access' to medicines at the expense of private
property rights.429 Its ostensible objective is to procure well-recog-
nized branded drugs, medical services and medical devices and
technologies at cost or below-cost prices from reputation-vulnera-
ble multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to
protect the health and lives of all Brazilian AIDS victims.4 30 The
Government of Brazil, with the assistance of health care extrem-
ists, has secured these prices, time and again, by threatening to
invoke Brazil's compulsory licensing provisions or to enact domes-
tic non-patentability laws that rely on an overly broad interpreta-
tion of TRIPS provisions and a manufactured public need.4 31
428. See e.g., Frances Williams, Fears of Polarisation If Bush Nominee Takes Top
WIPO Post, FIN. TIMES, (Asia), May 12, 2006, at 5, available at http://news.ft.com/cms/
s/fcb83c38-e10e-1 lda-90ad-0000779e2340.html.
429. See discussion supra Part III.A.
430. The Brazilian Government no doubt cites the TRIPS agreement as
justification. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law - Balancing Profit
Maximization and Public Access to Technology, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 48-49
nn. 187-88 (2002) ("[Tthe TRIPS Agreement specifically allows signatories to exclude
from patent protection certain inventions that are protected in other countries.
Additionally, it also provides for the withholding of patent rights for inventions that
are necessary to protect human life or health. In light of this, the law already
embodies the concept of excluding certain types of inventions from being eligible for
patent protection." (footnotes omitted)).
431. See discussion supra Part II.B.4. Other countries have observed and copied
Brazil's tactics. See Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, tgerhardsen@ip-watch.ch,
Thailand Compulaory License on AIDS Drug Prompts Policy Debate, to INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/webloglindex.php?p=499&res=1280&print=O (Dec.
22, 2006, 5:01 pm) ("On 29 November, the Thai Government announced that it would
issue a compulsory license to the Government Pharmaceutical Organization of
Thailand . . . [entitling] the government-owned company [to] produce HIV/AIDS
product, efavirenz (Stocrin), despite it still being under patent by Merck .... In the
announcement, the government said that under the Doha Declaration (agreed to at a
WTO ministerial in Doha, Qatar in 2001), and the TRIPS, 'member countries have a
right to issue a safeguard measure to protect public health, especially for universal
access to essential medicines using compulsory licensing on the patent of
pharmaceutical products.' It also referred to the Thai Patent Act, saying that the
government had the right to use any patent rights 'for non-commercial public uses.'"
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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These threats have provided Brazil, an emerging economy, as well
as developing country governments such as the new 'democrati-
cally' installed military Government in Thailand, with the politi-
cal capacity to override any pharmaceutical patents they choose
"for public health concerns [or interests]."432 It has also enabled
such countries to insist that market-based royalty rates for
licensed patented drugs not apply,43 i.e., in no case should an 'ade-
quate' rate of compensation exceed five percent for purposes of
computing a much lower (nearly zero) compulsory licensing roy-
432. See Darren Schuettler, Activists Hail Thai Move to Make Generic AIDS Drugs,
REUTERS, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.pamf.org/health/healthinfo/reutershometop.cfm
?fx=article&id=33242 ("Thailand, faced with ballooning costs for HIV-AIDS drugs,
has issued its first compulsory license to make a cheap version of a foreign-made drug
and fired a shot across the bow of big pharmaceutical companies. The action drew a
swift riposte from U.S. drug maker Merck & Co Inc, which holds the patent on
Efavirenz. The firm denounced the Health Ministry decision... But AIDS activists
and health experts cheered loudly . .. Merck will receive a 0.5 percent royalty on sales
of the locally produced drug . . .Thailand's state-owned drug maker, said it would
import generic Efavirenz until the GPO made its own version in June 2007."
(emphasis added)). This would more than suggest that previous Merck below-market
royalty rate of 1% was too high, and that practically anything more than a zero
royalty rate would be too much!
433. See WHO, Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent on
Medical Technologies, Health Economics and Drugs, TMC Series No. 18, at 81-82,
U.N. Doc. WHOITCM/2005.1 (2005), prepared by James Love, Consumer Project on
Technology, available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/technical-cooperation/
WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf ("WTO gives its Members very broad latitude in
determining remuneration. The TRIPS Agreement does not require a country to make
up the lost profits that the patent owner would have enjoyed with a monopoly and
pricing freedom. Under Article 31, countries have discretion to consider private
market licensing transactions, as well as other data, and to consider also a wide range
of policy objectives in determining remuneration for use of patented inventions.
Countries are not required to mimic market results, and indeed, may set royalties at
levels that are plainly designed to change market outcomes, such as to lower market
prices, and make medicines more affordable . . . . A determination of what is
'adequate' remuneration may vary between countries. Very low royalty rates will be
appropriate in cases of low income countries, especially for medical technologies that
are used to treat diseases of high incidence, and/or when the cost of the treatment
poses an economic hardship .... In recent cases involving remuneration for the use of
patents on medicines, governments have set royalties between 0.5 and 5% of the price
of the generic product."); see also Consumer Project on Technology, CPT Page on
Royalties on Patents for Health Care Inventions, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/
royalties (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); see also id. at 6 ("There is extensive experience of
voluntary technology licensing in the private sector. The evidence of compensation for
private, market-based license arrangements provides an important context for
making determinations of royalty and remuneration arrangements in cases of
compulsory licensing. There is some conflicting evidence on cross-industry licensing
averages, but there seems to be agreement in reports from the pharmaceutical
industry and others that licensing fees for the pharmaceutical industry congregate at
4-5%.").
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alty rate.43 6
Yet, arguably, for all of the international recognition that its
HIV/AIDS 'universal access to medicines' program has received,
including from international financial institutions,435 it appears
that Brazil's true policy goals have evolved, and are now more
likely trade, politics, and ideology-related than health-related. At
least one prior study has revealed that Brazil is likely cloaking its
actual intentions with a new form of disguised trade protectionism
that has multiple purposes.43 s These purposes include: 1) gaining
negotiating leverage at the WTO Doha Round against developed
countries on the issue of agricultural subsidies;4 37 2) exercising its
legal option to cross-retaliate against the United States if the lat-
ter fails to comply with a prior adverse WTO ruling on cotton sub-
sidies;4 38 3) developing a technically proficient and export-capable
national generic drug industry that could compete domestically
and internationally with China and India, and ultimately secure
Brazil's independence from the very international institutions
that have supported and assisted it all along;439 and 4) articulating
a new international development agenda that gives short shrift to
private property (IP) rights - i.e., that converts private goods into
public international goods.44° In other words, Brazil, an aspiring
member of the UN Security Council, is arguably seeking a leader-
434. It may be argued, however, that activist James Love has intentionally 'low-
balled' what an 'adequate' royalty rate would be. This would help him to establish a
framework for the much lower non-market compulsory licensing royalty rates he has
cited. At least one IP practitioner has noted how 'adequate' market-based royalty
rates for pharmaceutical products may be much higher than the 4-5% cited by Mr.
Love, depending on various factors, including its stage of development (i.e., whether a
patented discovery is in the research and development, clinical trial or
commercialization stage when it is licensed). See Posting of Stephen Albainy-Jenei,
What's a Reasonable Royalty Rate?, to Patent Baristas Blog, http://www.
patentbaristas.com/archives/2005/11/17/whats-a-reasonable-royalty-rate/#comments
(Nov. 17, 2005).
435. See generally CHRIS BEYRER, VARuN GAURI AND DENISE VAILLANCOURT, WORLD
BANK OPERATIONS DEP'T, EVALUATION OF THE WORLD BANK'S ASSISTANCE IN
RESPONDING TO THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: BRAZIL CASE STUDY 25 (2005), http://www.
worldbank.org/ieg/aids/docs/casestudies/hivbrazilcase-study.pdf (discussing
Brazil's program's interactions with the World Bank).
436. See Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil and the G-20 Group of Developing Countries,
in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION 109 (Peter Gallagher, et al.
eds., 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/casestudiese/
case7_e.htm.
437. See id.
438. See generally Pachovski & Kogan, supra note 109 (discussing Brazil's
breaking of U.S. drug patents).
439. See generally id.
440. See generally id.
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ship role in international affairs through acts of IP opportunism
rather than innovation.441
The Brazilian Government's posturing on the world stage,
nevertheless, may not reflect a national consensus, as suggested
by at least one leading Brazilian industry expert.
The Lula government has operated under a 'market-seek-
ing consensus.' It has only moved aggressively and with
determination when the objective was to. open foreign mar-
kets. There is not, however, a government-wide consensus
on the opening of the national market. Promoting exports
by financing, visiting places and striking business relation-
ships is easy to agree on. Opening markets to increase com-
petition, quality and integration into the world economy
has proven to be quite a different story and the administra-
tion has had to spend a lot of political capital mediating
between at least two major "factions" within the govern-
ment itself - one on either side of the internationalization
debate. Brazil needs an "efficiency-seeking" consensus that
is broader and less one-sided if it intends to move forward
as a major global player.442
Rather, it may be more indicative of a hard-line, nationalist and
populist ideology held by a particular faction of the current social-
ist government. If this is true, the more moderate forces within
the Government of Brazil must act quickly to contain and mini-
mize any damage that has thus far been done to long-term diplo-
matic and Brazilian industry interests.
Ideology has indeed been an important part of Brazil's 2004
trade policy. Shunning agreements with the world's (not
just Brazil's) most important trading partners has raised
suspicion regarding the government's 'ideological' approach
441. See Natasha T. Metzler, Brazil Uses Compulsory Licensing Threat in
Negotiations, PHARMEXEc DIRECT, July 18, 2005, http://www.pharmexec.comI
pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=170954; Nadezhda Pitulova, Abbott Criticizes
Brazil's Move to Copy Company's HIVIAIDs Drug, KANSAS CITY INFOZINE, June 28,
2005, http://www.itssd.org/media (follow link to article's title); Nadezhda Pitulova,
U.S. Delegation to Brazil Will Discuss Proposal to End Drug Patents, ScRIPPS
HOWARD FOUND. WIRE, June 16, 2005, http://www.itssd.org/media (follow link to
article's title); Mary Ann Liebert, Brazil, Abbott Reach Tentative Deal on Kaletra -
Threat to Suspend Antiretroviral Patents in Abeyance for Now, 24 BIOTECHNOLOGY L.
REP. 583 (2005).
442. Mdrio Marconini, Brazil's Trade Policy 2004: The Good, The Bad, and the
Uppity, VIEWPOINT BRAz., Jan. 17, 2005, available at http://www.councilofthe
americas.org/coa/publicationsNiewPointBrazil/ViewPointBrazilindex.html (follow
link to Marconini piece) (emphasis added).
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to trade, as it does not seem to reflect either 'public opinion'
or the state of Brazil's industry ....
... The private sector, those with their 'pockets' on the line
in the evolving trade drama, is simply not happy with the
government's taking important decisions in the absence of
comprehensive prior consultations ....
The perception that the government is willing and able to
continue to act 'unilaterally,' without seeking internal sup-
port on matters as sensitive as China, Mercosur or the
FTAA is a source of weakness in Brazil's current trade pol-
icy regime. The perception that the government will inva-
riably sacrifice trade interests in the presence of even loose
support for crucial elements of its geopolitical agenda...
has undermined the very necessary trust it needs to engage
in such high-pitched pursuits. The perception that the gov-
ernment has been arrogant in purporting to know better
than those directly involved in trade and trading has done
great damage to its image, strategy and the sustainability
of its trade policy. 43
Consequently, if the OECD nations, including the United States,
are to make any progress in securing Brazil's compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement, especially as concerns the sensitive issues of
compulsory licensing and patent abrogation, they must take this
important dynamic into account.
C. Brazil Aims to 'Take' U.S. Private Property for
Brazilian 'Public Use' Without 'Just Compensation'
1. Introduction
'Property' refers not simply to the underlying estate
but to all the uses that can be made of that estate. James
Madison put the point well in his essay on property: "as a
man is said to have a right to his property, he may be
equally said to have a property in his rights." Take one of
those rights - one of those sticks in the 'bundle of sticks' we
call 'property'- and you take something that belongs to the
owner. Under the Fifth Amendment, compensation is due
that owner."4
It is evident that Brazil has invested substantial time, energy and
443. Id.
444. See Roger Pilon, Sr. Fellow and Dir. of the Ctr. for Const. Stud. at the Cato
Inst., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Constitution Committee on Judiciary
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resources into reforming the current global IPR framework, or the
established international order. It has arguably done so in order
to create an environment in which it may systematically and legit-
imately 'take' the exclusive private property owned by American
and other OECD nation citizens for Brazilian 'public use' without
paying 'just compensation.' If Brazil is permitted to succeed in
this endeavor, it will have accomplished that which no U.S. presi-
dent or Congress is legally sanctioned to do.
2. Property and the U.S. Constitution: Individual vs.
Public Rights
In the United States, an individual's inalienable right to
invent and create, and to enjoy the fruits of his or her labors (i.e.,
the private property he or she invents, creates, acquires, earns or
converts to use), is recognized and protected by the U.S. Constitu-
tion and its accompanying Bill of Rights. These documents also
guarantee individuals that their private property will be protected
against arbitrary and wanton government interference, 44 ostensi-
bly intended to serve the public good.446
3. Individual Natural Rights Include the Right to Private
Property
Many of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the
WIPO Agreement are informed by the U.S. Constitution's imposed
limitations on the sphere of government and its anticipation of
individuals' natural rights. Included among those rights is the
exclusive right to own and enjoy private property.447 The history
surrounding the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and its accom-
panying Bill of Rights instructs us that an individual's rights,
including his or her exclusive property rights, must be preserved
United States House of Representatives (Feb. 10, 1995), available at http://www.cato.
org/testimony/ct-pi210.html (footnote omitted).
445. See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1-2 (1978) ("That all
lawful power derives from the people and must be held in check to preserve their
freedom is the oldest and most central tenet of American constitutionalism."
(emphasis added)).
446. See also PETER GOLDSMITH ET AL., FOOD SAFETY IN THE MEAT INDUSTRY: A
REGULATORY QUAGMIRE 8 (2002), available at http://www.ifama.org/conferences/
2003Conference/papers/goldsmith.pdf (discussing the role of the individual in the U.S.
Constitutional system in the context of food safety, "[tihe US system is rooted in the
Bill of Rights and the sanctity of the individual. 'The Constitution of the United
States... places great symbolic weight on human rights. It elevates the basic rights of
man to supreme constitutional status."' (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
447. See TRIBE, supra note 447, at 427-28.
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and protected by and from government." 8 "Property is not, how-
ever, entirely a natural right. The Founders understood that it
would need to be further defined in statute." 9 In support of this
proposition, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., defined the right to private property as
a basic civil right.45 °
4. Patents are Exclusive Private Personal Property
Every U.S. citizen possesses an exclusive inalienable right to
his or her discoveries and inventions that is recognized by Article
I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the U.S. Constitution.4 1 The founders
understood that temporary exclusive rights granted in property
served as an adequate incentive to encourage the research and
innovation by inventors and creators 45 2 needed to "propel [the
United States] from a small, agrarian colony into an advanced and
448. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 376-77 n.4 (1958); TRIBE, supra note
445, at 3-4 ("[A] Bill of Rights directed against federal abuses was thought necessary
in addition to separation and division of powers. . .institutional boundaries in the
absence of such a list of liberties were not deemed quite sufficient to preserve
individual rights." (footnote omitted)); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Aug. 1787 - Mar.
1787, at 438-40 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955); Letter from James to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Oct. 1788 - Mar. 1789, at
16,18 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Oct. 1788 - Mar. 1789, at
659-61 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
449. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Takings Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION 342 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005).
450. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("[Al
fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the
personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights
in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized." (footnote omitted)).
451. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power . .. [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
452. A series of correspondences between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
reflects the framers' justifiable concern with promoting innovation through excessive
grants of copyright monopoly. Yet they seemed to agree that a limited monopoly term
was necessary. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787),
in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Aug. 1787 - Mar. 1788, at 438, 440 (Julian
P. Boyd ed., 1950); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788),
in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Mar. 1788 - Oct. 1788, at 440, 442-43
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Oct. 1788 - Mar. 1789, at 14, 21
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6,
1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Mar. 1789 - Nov. 1789, at 392 (Julian
P. Boyd ed., 1958).
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prosperous country."453 Such progress would not have been possi-
ble had the U.S. Government appropriated or retained for itself
the rights to own and use patented inventions without first
obtaining inventor consent or providing them with an economic
return for their efforts.
It has been the general practice, when inventions have
been made which are desirable for government use, either
for the government to purchase them from the inventors,
and use them as secrets of the proper department; or, if a
patent is granted, to pay the patentee a fair compensation
for their use. The United States has no such prerogative as
that which is claimed by the sovereigns of England, by
which it can reserve to itself, either expressly or by implica-
tion, a superior dominion and use in that which it grants by
letters-patent to those who entitle themselves to such
grants. The government of the United States, as well as the
citizen, is subject to the Constitution; and when it grants a
patent the grantee is entitled to it as a matter of right, and
does not receive it, as was originally supposed to be the
case in England, as a matter of grace and favor.454
Thus, in the United States, the right conferred by a patent grant
is a form of exclusive personal private property anticipated by the
U.S. Constitution.455 It is a right to temporarily exclude others
from making use, offering for sale, selling, or importing an 'inven-
tion' into the United States, and it has long been recognized as
falling within the protection of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause.456 Once the statutory conditions for obtaining a patent
have been satisfied, only the patent owner or other authorized
party possesses the affirmative right to exercise and enforce the
patent in the marketplace to derive benefits from it. 457
453. James E. Rogan, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intell. Prop. and Dir. of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Remarks at the Hearings on Competition and
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Feb. 6, 2002,
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/rogan.htm [hereinafter Rogan Remarks].
454. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881) (emphasis added); see also
Hollister v. Benedict, 113 U.S. 59, 67 (1885).
455. See Rogan Remarks, supra note 453.
456. See generally James, 104 U.S. at 356; Hollister 113 U.S. at 59.
457. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning
Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/#ptsc (last visited Dec. 15,
2006) ("A patent for an invention is the grant of a property right to the inventor ....
What is granted is not the right to make, use, offer for sale, sell or import, but the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the
invention.").
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5. Trade Secrets are Exclusive Private Personal Property
Similar to patents, the right inherent in a trade secret relates
to its holder's ability to temporarily exclude others from making
use, offering for sale, or importing the otherwise undisclosed
'invention." The U.S. Supreme Court recognized over twenty
years ago that trade secrets have legal significance deserving of
protection. 459 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court held that,
Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tan-
gible forms of property... [T]o the extent that [a private
company] has an interest in its health, safety, and environ-
mental research data cognizable as a trade-secret property
right under [state] law, that property right is protected by
the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.6 °
6. The Bill of Rights Limits Government Action Against
Exclusive Private Property
a. Federal Government Action - 'Just Compensation'
The 'just compensation' requirement was added in 1791, as
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.46 ' It effectively
limits the powers of the federal government otherwise conferred
by Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution, including the power of
eminent domain, which is the power to take private property for
public use by federal, state, or local government.62 This limitation
458. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001-02 (1984) ("The Restatement
[of Torts (First)] defines a trade secret as 'any formula, pattern, device or compilation
of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.' . . . Because of the
intangible nature of a trade secret, the extent of the property right therein is defined
by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to
others.").
459. See id. at 1003-04.
460. Id. at 987, 1003-1004.
461. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.").
462. See Kmiec, supra note 449, at 342 ("[T]he federal [government's] power of
eminent domain resides in, and is limited by, the Necessary and Proper Clause
(Article I, Section 8, Clause 18), or by Congress's implied powers as confirmed by the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Under this perspective, Congress may exercise the
power of eminent domain only in order to effectuate one of its delegated powers.
Similarly, the executive is limited to property takings allowable only under Article II
executive powers, but they are far more restricted. Inasmuch as James Madison came
to support and propose a Bill of Rights because he realized the range of congressional
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and inasmuch as the Takings Clause
is primarily his offering, such a reading has historical credence." (citations omitted)).
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is intended to prevent government from sacrificing the rights of
individuals for the public good.4
Several rationales have been advanced to explain the inten-
tion underlying the Bill of Rights' "no taking without just compen-
sation" clause: 1) to prevent the government from deliberately
redistributing wealth, directly or indirectly; 2) to prevent the gov-
ernment from indirectly reallocating property among citizens by
generating a uniformly desired good or by reducing a uniformly
disliked public bad, without otherwise affecting the distribution of
wealth; and 3) to prevent government from acting out of some high
sense of morality to forbid a formerly accepted and tolerated use of
property.4"
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the 'just compensation'
requirement as ensuring payment that amounts to 'full and ade-
quate compensation' 465 or 'a full and perfect equivalent for'
whatever interest in or share of real or personal property has been
taken.466 It also ruled that the value of the property interest in
question shall be determined "by refer[ring] to the uses for which
the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business
and wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably
expected in the immediate future .... 467 In other words, just
compensation must reflect the fair market value of the property,
or what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller.6 8
If circumstances render it difficult to calculate fair market
value, or such value is not otherwise ascertainable, then other
data must be utilized that will yield a fair compensation that
reflects the true economic value of the asset taken.469 A similar
463. See TRIBE, supra note 445, at 463 ("[T]he just compensation requirement
appears to express a limit on government's power to isolate particular individuals for
sacrifice to the general good."); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)
("The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.").
464. See TRIBE, supra note 445, at 463.
465. Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 573 (1898).
466. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
467. Chicago B. & Q. R. v. Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 250 (1897).
468. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
469. See Miller, 317 U.S. at 374; United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S.
506 (1979); United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984); United States v.
Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 (1948); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339
U.S. 121 (1950); Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 337 (1923); United States
v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949).
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standard, as applicable to patents, 7 ' has since been codified into
federal law.47' Calculating 'just compensation' remains particu-
larly difficult where direct or indirect government action or threat
of action (e.g., the threat of issuance of a compulsory license or
enactment of a law that would abrogate or seriously undermine
patent or trade secrets rights) actually results in an artificial or
irregular diminution in the fair market value of such property.472
The due process of law to which the Fifth Amendment refers
relates to both substantive and procedural safeguards guaranteed
to individuals against arbitrary governmental actions.473 An indi-
vidual's due process rights are deemed to be implicated "whenever
government action seemingly conflict[s] with substantive individ-
ual rights." 74 It has thus been said that these rights include the
right to the preservation and protection of private property, even
to a greater extent than had been afforded by the common and
statutory law of England prior to the formation of the United
States. 5 Procedurally speaking, the due process clause guaran-
teed, at a minimum, the right to notice and a hearing prior to dep-
rivation of such a substantive right.476
b. State and Local Government Action - 'Takings'
The notion of 'due process of law,' and its application to the
Takings Clause, was extended to the States by the 14th Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution in 1868 .4" The 14th Amendment
has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court as requiring the
protection, at the state and local level, of virtually all of the rights
470. See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 968-69 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(illustrating that where a government action is deemed a "compulsory compensable
license" in the patent, just compensation, a "reasonable royalty" for that license -
another method of estimating the value lost - must be provided. A court should base
compensation on "what the owner has lost, not what the taker has gained.").
471. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000) (allowing the U.S. Government to use a patentee's
invention without his permission in exchange for paying "reasonable and entire
compensation").
472. See Brazil, Gilead Agree AIDS Drug Price Cut, TODAY ONLINE, May 10, 2006,
http://www.todayonline.com/articles/117593.asp.
473. See TRIBE, supra note 445, at 501 ("These procedural safeguards have their
historical origins in the notion that conditions of personal freedom can be preserved
only when there is some institutional check on arbitrary government action."
(footnote omitted)).
474. Id. at 507.
475. See id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
476. See id. at 507-08.
477. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .. ").
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guaranteed to individuals by the Bill of Rights at the Federal
level.47 This entails both procedural and substantive rights,
including those protected by the 'takings' clause. 47 9 The U.S.
Supreme Court recently affirmed the purpose behind the 'takings
clause' in the very recent case of Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.4 s°
According to the Court, the takings clause was "designed not to
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking."481
c. Direct and Indirect 'Takings'
The U.S. Supreme Court's 'takings' jurisprudence has
addressed the issue of private property 'takings' mostly in dis-
putes involving states and local municipalities, where it was
alleged that real property had been unfairly appropriated without
adequate compensation.4 2 The Court has held that a taking can
occur even in the absence of a direct physical appropriation of, or
ousting from, private property.4 3 If a government regulation
478. See TRIBE, supra note 445, at 507 ("Thus, apart from the specific declarations
of the Bill of Rights - virtually all of which later came to be applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment - there was no attempt
to tie the invocation of due process protection to positive rules." (footnote omitted)).
479. See id. at 508 ("The fifth and fourteenth amendments' due process clauses as
interpreted in the Supreme Court's substantive due process analyses have furnished
a broad definition of the 'liberty' that was in turn afforded procedural protection
against arbitrary deprivation.").
480. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
481. Id. at 537 (quoting First English Evan. Luth. Ch. v. Los Angeles, 483 U.S. 304,
315 (1987)) (emphasis in original omitted); see also id. ("As its text makes plain, the
Takings Clause 'does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a
condition on the existence of that power.'" (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 314)).
482. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39. The Lingle decision has already prompted at
least one legal scholar to debate the Court's holding that a 'takings' analysis should
not and does not incorporate a 'due process' analysis - i.e., they are separate and
independent of one another. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, LINGLE V. CHEVRON AND ITS EFFECT
ON REGULATORY TAKINGS 1-5 (2005), available at http://d2d.ali-aba.orgtfiles/thumbs/
coursematerials/SL012-CH09_thumb.pdf; see id. at 1 ("[Clontra to Lingle, the
Court's takings tests remain based on substantive due process concepts, primarily
under the rubric of 'fairness.' It suggests that property rights-based takings analysis
would be clearer, easier to administer, and more consistent with the language and
meaning of the Takings Clause.").
483. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 ("Our precedents stake out two categories of
regulatory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment
purposes. First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical
invasion of her property-however minor-it must provide just compensation. A second
categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of 'all
economically beneficial us[e]' of her property." (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted)).
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deprives an owner of substantially all of the beneficial use, enjoy-
ment, or value of his or her private property, then a taking is
deemed to have occurred. 4 In Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., for
example, former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor discussed how both
"the permanent physical invasion" of private property and "the
complete elimination of a property's value", i.e. the "'total depriva-
tion of [its] beneficial use,'" are equivalent in that they both "evis-
cerate the owner's right to exclude others from entering and using
her property."485 She explained that the Court's historical analysis
has generally focused on the severity of the burden that govern-
ment imposes indirectly via regulation on private property rights,
rather than on the failure of a regulation to substantially advance
legitimate state interests.486
Similarly, the intangible personal property right reflected in a
patent or trade secret, to temporarily exclude others from making
use, offering for sale, selling, or importing one's invention, is also
susceptible to forced government appropriation (a 'taking') and
may be entitled to Fifth Amendment protection."7 This type of
taking, however, has typically been found to occur indirectly via
regulation.4 8 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a regulation
that compels the disclosure of otherwise undisclosed proprietary
trade secrets amounts to an unauthorized taking of intangible pri-
vate property where it impairs, in a substantial manner, the bene-
484. Id. at 539 ("The Court has held that physical takings require compensation
because of the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however
minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner's right to exclude others
from entering and using her property - perhaps the most fundamental of all property
interests.... In the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of a property's
value is the determinative factor." (citations omitted)).
485. See id. at 539 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1117 (1992)).
486. See id.
487. See discussion supra Part III.C.5; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., 467 U.S. 986,
987 (1984) ("To the extent [a private company] has an interest in its health, safety,
and environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property right under [state] law,
that property right is protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
488. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 705 (2003) ("Today, there
are at least two categories of takings where just compensation is due: (1) a physical
occupation of the property at issue, the traditional idea of a taking; and (2) a
regulatory taking. Regulatory takings are governed by the legal standards outlined in
Monsanto. In Monsanto, the Supreme Court held that the appropriation of an
intellectual property interest by a government action requires just compensation for
its use when a federal law deprives the intellectual property owner of virtually all
investment-backed expectations in the intellectual property. The Supreme Court's
decision in Monsanto . . . makes clear that an intellectual property interest is
deserving of protection under the Fifth Amendment tantamount to real property."
(citation omitted)).
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ficial use, value, and enjoyment of that property.489 Indeed, the
U.S. Federal Court of Claims has gone so far as to analogize a U.S.
Government infringement of a privately held patent to a compen-
sable taking under Fifth Amendment eminent domain theory.4 9 °
At least one legal commentator has characterized compulsory
licenses as "the eminent domain of intellectual property. 49
1
d. Takings for 'Public Use'
Another very recent and extremely controversial U.S.
Supreme Court decision, Kelo, et al. v. New London, has tempora-
rily placed the U.S. Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence in con-
flict with itself.492 It narrowly concerns the legality of a
municipality's forced sale (taking) of private real property belong-
ing to one class of individuals (current land owners) for the benefit
of a different class of individuals (for the private use of future pur-
chasers and lessees newly constructed dwellings and commercial
office space), incident to a municipal economic redevelopment
plan. 93 The Court's majority ruled that it was not necessary for
the replacement property to be actually used by the general public
489. Id.; see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998 ("The District Court found that
Monsanto had incurred costs in excess of $23.6 million in developing the health,
safety, and environmental data submitted by it under FIFRA. The information
submitted with an application usually has value to Monsanto beyond its
instrumentality in gaining that particular application. Monsanto uses this
information to develop additional end-use products and to expand the uses of its
registered products. The information would also be valuable to Monsanto's
competitors. For that reason, Monsanto has instituted stringent security measures to
ensure the secrecy of the data. It is this health, safety, and environmental data that
Monsanto sought to protect by bringing this suit."). Consequently, the Supreme
Court agreed with the District Court's determination that the government regulation
had "appropriated Monsanto's fundamental right to exclude, and that the effect of
that appropriation [had been] substantial." Id. at 989.
490. See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(discussing how the taking of patent rights by the government was analogous to an
eminent domain taking under the Fifth Amendment, which requires just
compensation to the victim); Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 696 (Fed.
Cl. 2003) (finding that patent rights are property that may be taken by eminent
domain pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498); see also Bradley M. Taub, Why Bother Calling
Patents Property? The Government's Path to License Any Patent and Maybe Pay for It,
6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRop. L. 151, 154 (2006) ("Government takings via
eminent domain in a patent context come in the form of intangible compulsory
licenses to use or manufacture patented inventions." (citation omitted)).
491. See Anupam Chander, The New York Times and Napster: How The Supreme
Court's Ruling In Favor Of Freelance Writers Could Keep Online Music Sharing Alive,
FINDLAw, July 30, 2001, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20010730-
chander.html.
492. See Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
493. See id.
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to be considered a 'public use.'494 Rather, redevelopment use need
only have a conceivable public character or serve a public purpose
to be deemed legitimate.49 5
This decision is troubling, in the first instance, because con-
trary to prior court jurisprudence it focused on the legitimate
state interests that the particular regulation sought to advance
rather than the burden that it placed on private property rights.
It then proceeded to effectively liberalize the 'legitimate state
interest' requirement. The majority explained that a conceivable
public character or public purpose would be inferred if the eco-
nomic development plan had either eliminated some undesirable
'social and economic evil,' such as crime, time-consuming and
costly data research, etc., or had sought to create some broad pub-
lic benefit (e.g., a community that is "beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled").496 It does not matter whether some private individuals
would benefit at the expense of others in the process.497
In response to the public outcry following the Kelo decision
and the growing number of state and municipal-led economic
redevelopment plans resulting in real property takings, President
Bush issued a new Executive Order (EO) entitled, Protecting the
Property Rights of the American People.49" This EO is largely
based on prior EO 12630,499 which had been issued during the
494. See id. at 2662-64.
495. See id. at 2665.
496. Id. at 2663 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)); id. at 2664.
This reasoning was apparently consistent with the rationale underlying the Court's
earlier decision in Ruckelshaus, where the Court held that there was a compensable
'taking' of private property for a 'public use,' even though some private persons would
benefit at the expense of others. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1014-15
(1984).
497. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 ("Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a
public purpose will often benefit individual private parties .... 'The public end may
be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a
department of government - or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that
public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community
redevelopment projects."' (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 34)).
498. Exec. Order No. 13, 406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36, 973 (June 23, 2006) ("It is the policy
of the United States to protect the rights of Americans to their private property,
including by limiting the taking of private property by the Federal Government to
situations in which the taking is for public use, with just compensation, and for the
purpose of benefiting the general public and not merely for the purpose of advancing
the economic interest of private parties to be given ownership or use of the property
taken.").
499. See id. § 4(c) ("This order shall be implemented in a manner consistent with
Executive Order 12630 of March 15, 1988."); see also Exec. Order No. 12, 630, 53 Fed.
Reg. 8, 859, §§ 1(c), 3(b-c) (Mar. 15, 1988).
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Reagan administration to deal with the much larger problem of
state and local environmental regulatory-based takings that had
plagued the U.S. countryside during the 1970s and early 1980s.'0
It recognized that "governmental actions that do not formally
invoke the [eminent domain] condemnation power, including reg-
ulations, may [in fact] result in a taking for which just compensa-
tion is required.""'1
Beyond the impact that the Supreme Court's Kelo decision
has already had on the U.S. law of real property takings, it has
since also encouraged U.S. state and local governments to propose
laws that would allow for the issuance of compulsory licenses to
control drug prices."52 More importantly, however, it is arguable
that this decision will have much broader and serious ramifica-
tions internationally. For example, foreign governments are
500. See Harvey M. Jacobs, The Politics of Property Rights at the National Level -
Signals and Trends, 69 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N. 2, 181, 181-182 (2003) ("[T]hrough the
1988 Executive Order 12630... the administration sought to initiate a national level
process analogous to environmental impact assessments (EIAs) called takings impact
assessments. Under this procedure, all government agencies were required to
conduct an analysis of the anticipated impact of proposed laws, rules, and regulations
on private property rights. This order was promoted by its advocates as a prudent
'look before you leap' action, like EIAs. Its advocates maintained that the intent of
the order was to clarity the impact of proposed governmental action so that legislators
and agency heads could then decide if the social benefits of laws, rules, and
regulations outweighed the costs to private individuals.").
501. Exec. Order No. 12, 630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8, 859, § 1(a) (Mar. 15, 1988). EO
12630's guidelines were updated after the release of a 2003 General Accounting Office
report which found that federal agencies had conducted few 12630 takings
implications assessments during the 1990s. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 162
CONG., REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REGULATORY TAKINGS:
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER ON GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AFFECTING PRIVATE
PROPERTY USE 2 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031015.pdf;
see also William G. Laffer, Realistic Options for Reducing the Burden of Excessive
Regulation, HERITAGE FOUND., Jan. 19, 1993, http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Regulation/CM15.cfm ("[Federal] agencies [could have] easily circumvent[ed] EO
12630 simply by routinely finding 'no takings implications' each time they perform
the 'Takings Implication Assessment' required by the Attorney General's guidelines
for implementing the Order.").
502. See Tamsen Valoir, Legal: State Compulsory Licenses, PHARMACEUTICAL
EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1, 2005, at 44, available at http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec/
article/articleDetail.jsp?id=197791 ("Vermont and the District of Columbia have
proposed legislation that would allow them to issue compulsory drug licenses to
patent holders under the eminent domain process. Under these bills, states would
then contract with a generic manufacturer to produce the drug, paying the drug
company a 'reasonable royalty' - a proposed four percent-on each sale."); see also Tim
Shorrock, Capital Appropriations: One Man's Plan For High-Concept Health Care
Legislation, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 2005, at 19, available at http://www.
motherjones.com/news/outfront/2005/07/capital-appropriations.html.
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likely to rely on the majority's misreading of precedent when con-
sidering how to treat intellectual property rights, such as patents,
trade secrets, and copyrights privately held by U.S. corporations
and individuals operating within their borders. Will the Govern-
ment of Brazil now be more emboldened to use the threat of a com-
pulsory license to constructively take U.S. HIV/AIDS, and other
drug or biomedical technology patents for an ostensible 'public
use' that benefits one class of individuals (Brazilian citizens and
industries) at the expense of another (U.S. citizens and indus-
tries), without paying just compensation?
e. U.S. Private Property Rights Are Entitled to
Constitutional Protection Abroad
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Government
cannot act against, and must affirmatively protect, outside of the
territory of the United States, any and all of the constitutional
rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens by the U.S. Constitution and
the Bill of Rights within the United States. 3 The Fifth Amend-
ment right against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation falls within this obligation. 4 This has
remained the law of the land for over 150 years. 5
f Constitutional Limitations on the Federal Treaty-
Making Power
The obligation of the federal government to protect the pri-
vate property rights held by U.S. citizens outside of U.S. borders
against unlawful appropriation also extends to takings effectu-
503. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1957) ("[R]eject[ing] the idea that when the
United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution .... When the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be
stripped away just because he happens to be in another land .... The language of
Art[icle] III, [Section] 2 manifests that constitutional protections for the individual
were designed to restrict the United States Government when it acts outside of this
country, as well as here at home.... This Court and other federal courts have held or
asserted that various constitutional limitations apply to the Government when it acts
outside the continental United States. While it has been suggested that only those
constitutional rights which are 'fundamental' protect Americans abroad, we can find
no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and choosing among the remarkable
collection of 'Thou shalt nots' which were explicitly fastened on all departments and
agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.").
504. See id.
505. See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 135 (1851).
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ated pursuant to treaties. °6 While treaties and federal statutes
constitute the "supreme law of the United States," and are effec-
tively equal to one another in status, they are both inferior to the
U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. °7 The U.S. Supreme
Court recognized this hierarchy almost fifty years ago, in the case
of Reid v. Covert.0 Thus, according to the Court, it is arguable
that the President cannot execute and that Congress can neither
ratify nor enact legislation implementing a treaty with another
nation that effectively violates any of the Constitutional protec-
tions afforded U.S. citizens."9 Furthermore, "the records of the
Virginia Ratifying Convention contain specific discussions of the
scope of the treaty power. These discussions confirm that the
Framers did in fact envision [constitutional] limitations on the
treaty power."510
Consequently, the President, in the exercise of his Article II
powers, and the Congress, in the exercise of its Article I powers,
would therefore be constitutionally precluded from executing and
506. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (The Supremacy Clause provides that "[tihis
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
507. "By the supremacy clause, both statutes and treaties 'are declared ... to be the
supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other.'. As
statutes may be held void because they contravene the Constitution, it should follow
that treaties may be held void, the Constitution being superior to both." Legal Info.
Inst., Constitutional Limitations on the Treaty Power, CORNELL L. SCH., http://www.
law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art2fragl8_user.html#fnb328 (quoting Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)); id. at n.329 ("'The treaty is ... a law made by
the proper authority, and the courts ofjustice have no right to annul or disregard any
of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States. It need
hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in
violation of that instrument."' (citations omitted) (omissions in original)).
508. See Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) ("There is nothing in this language
[Article VI, Section 1] which intimates that treaties do not have to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution. Nor is there anything in the debates which
accompanied the drafting and ratification of the Constitution which even suggests
such a result .... It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-
let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition-to construe [the treaty
provision in] Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an
international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions." (footnote
omitted)).
509. See id. at 18 ("The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to
all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the
Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined .... This Court has regularly
and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty." (footnote
omitted)).
510. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 413 (1998) (footnote omitted).
116 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1
implementing a treaty the provisions of which did not adequately
protect U.S. citizens against non- or poorly compensable takings of
their intellectual property by a foreign treaty party's govern-
ment.51' Indeed, this is perhaps why the U.S. Government has
insisted that a takings clause be included within Article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement,51' Chapter 11 of North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the recently executed Central American
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and approximately 2,200 bilat-
eral investment treaties it has consummated or is currently nego-
tiating with other nations around the world.513
It is apparent that the inclusion of a takings clause has served
to promote cross-border investment and international trade, and
to prevent a foreign government's hold-up (the substantial dimi-
nution in the value) of private investments via oppressive regula-
tion514 or outright threat of expropriation once considerable
upfront costs have already been sunk.1 5 Legal commentators have
noted that the 'investor-to-state' provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11
broadly define the term 'expropriations' so that it includes both
511. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8, 859, §§ 2(a)(1), 2(c)(2) (Mar. 15,
1988). A Takings Impact Assessment would be required if a treaty obligation results
in the adoption of administrative, regulatory, and legislative policies and actions that
affect, or may affect, the use of any real or personal property. Id. However, "[aictions
taken . . .in preparation for or during treaty negotiations with foreign nations ...
qualify neither as 'policies that have takings implications' under § 2(a)(1), nor as
'Actions' under § 2(c)(2)." Id.
512. See Council for TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 11 Of The General
Council Decision Of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, art. 31, § 2, U.N. Doc.
IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005) ("Where a compulsory license is granted by an exporting
Member . . .adequate remuneration . . . shall be paid . . .taking into account the
economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been authorized in the
exporting Member.").
513. See EMMA AiSBEr-r ET AL., REGULATORY TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 1-2, Oct. 25, 2005, available at http:lare.
berkeley.edu/courses/EEP131/old-files/lectureNotes/CarolEmmafragment.pdf.
514. See Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, Multilateral Investment Treaties and
Environmental Expropriation of Foreign Investment, 5 CTR. FOR ENERGY, PETROLEUM
AND MINERAL L. & POL'Y INTERNET J. 2 (2000), available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/
cepmlp/journal/html/vol5/article5-2.html.
515. See AISBETT, supra note 513, at 2 ("Signing a treaty with an expropriation
clause is one way a government can pre-commit not to expropriate foreigners' assets
... The hold-up problem occurs where the host attempts to capture rent from a
project. Even when the host's objective is to solve a legitimate public problem, and not
to capture rent, it may behave inefficiently when the investor is a non-citizen.
Consider environmental regulations that decrease a firm's profits, which investors
may label creeping expropriation or regulatory takings. When a government weighs
the benefits and costs of a new regulation, it may ignore the regulation's impact on
profits repatriated by foreigners." (emphasis in original)).
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direct nationalization measures and indirect creeping expropria-
tions - i.e., regulatory takings.516 No matter the form, therefore, a
government taking for any 'public use' is still subject to compensa-
tion requirements, as a matter of due process.517
The Government of Brazil is aware of and likely seeks to
exploit a new model international investment agreement that
challenges this kind of thinking. Anti-private property NGO activ-
ists and academics have embraced the new model because it
would provide developing country governments with the sovereign
right to take indirectly (through legislation and/or regulation) title
to foreign-owned intellectual property, such as patents and trade
secrets, for a public (health, environment, safety, etc.) purpose,
without paying just compensation.518 Such an agreement only adds
to the confusion over the scope of private property rights that has
been triggered by several troubled NAFTA decisions and the
recent U.S. Supreme Court Kelo ruling. It also further encourages
emerging and developing economies like Brazil and Argentina to
challenge the international IP framework.
It is evident that successive U.S. administrations, despite
their divergent views towards the scope of private property rights,
have made a considerable effort to protect the private property
rights of U.S. citizens doing business abroad. And, this may have
included conducting 'takings impact assessments' with respect to,
and/or by actually incorporating Fifth Amendment-type takings
clauses within many of the multilateral and bilateral treaties they
have negotiated with foreign nations.
However, are such efforts enough, from a U.S. constitutional
516. Id. at 1 ("[NAFTA Chapter 11] entitles investors to take expropriation claims
against the host country directly to international courts .... [It also defines the term]
expropriation broadly: it includes not only direct measures, such as nationalizing
industries, but also 'creeping' expropriation or 'regulatory takings,' that arise when
governments impose new regulations and restrictions on firms' activities.").
517. See id. at 6 ("[Alccording to Article 1110, even if the host's actions are for a
public purpose, non-discriminatory, and in accordance with due process, they are still
subject to compensation requirements.").
518. See HOWARD MANN ET AL., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 17, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2005/investmentmodel_int_agreement.pdf; see also Daniel M. Price, Partner at
Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment Workshop on
the IISD's Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable
Development (May 5, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.carnegieendowment.
org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=808) ("With respect to expropriation, under
the model agreement, if a country expropriates property through a series of
regulations, and states that the regulations are for the public good, the property owner
does not have to be compensated." (emphasis added)).
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law perspective, to prevent the Government of Brazil and other
opportunistic foreign governments from exploiting those divergent
views internationally? After all, the Brazilian Government has
regularly threatened to issue compulsory licenses against and/or
to abrogate U.S. private patent and trade secret rights outright,
and this has had the effect of substantially diminishing the value
of such IPRs and weakening the negotiating leverage of the IP
holders. Furthermore, the Brazilian Government has pursued this
approach through exercise of its police power for the ostensible
purpose of benefiting the Brazilian 'public interest.' Or in other
words, in the interests of Brazilian citizens and companies, Brazil
has done so without intending to pay U.S. rights holders just com-
pensation for their private property. Is the U.S. Government
legally obligated to do more than it already has to ensure the pro-
tection and enforcement of U.S. private property rights abroad?
Must it not guarantee that treaty takings provisions are imple-
mented fully by foreign treaty party governments - i.e., that just
compensation in the form of full and adequate economic value, is
actually paid to U.S. citizens when a foreign government issues or
threatens to issue a compulsory license, or undertakes or threat-
ens to undertake some other form of patent or trade secret abroga-
tion? How is it possible for the Government of Brazil to claim that
it is entitled to the private IPRs of U.S. citizens that the U.S. Gov-
ernment can neither legally appropriate for itself for a public
interest without paying just compensation, nor otherwise abandon
at the expense of rights holders?
IV. BRAZIL MUST STOP UNDERMINING U.S. PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Brazil's Efforts Against Counterfeits do not
Compensate for its Continued IP Opportunism
1. Brazil Has Made Some Progress Against Counterfeits
Within the past year, the Brazilian Government has adopted
legislation to address the rampant piracy of U.S. copyrighted
products in the music, film and software industries. It has also
established a Council to Combat Piracy and Intellectual Property
Crimes, a 99-point national Anti-Piracy Action Plan, stepped up
IPR enforcement along its border with Paraguay, and increased
its seizure rate of copyrighted materials. 19 Prior to these efforts,
519. See U.S. COM. SERV., IN'L TRADE ADMIN. IN THE U.S. DEP'T OF COM., COUNTRY
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the Brazilian Congress' Deputies had formed a Commission of
Parliamentary Inquiry on piracy and amendments to the criminal
code." ' Foreign inventors and investors should applaud the Bra-
zilian government's efforts because they reflect an official
acknowledgement that IP piracy is no longer tolerable as national
policy.
2. Brazil's Institutions and Ideology Must Change to
Stem IP Opportunism
Notwithstanding these efforts, U.S. Government officials
remain concerned that Brazil continues to fall short in providing
adequate and effective protection of U.S. IPRs. 12' Despite Brazil's
enactment of modern copyright legislation, significant challenges
to effective copyright enforcement, particularly with respect to
optical media and internet piracy, remain. 22 Furthermore, Brazil
continues to be 'one the world's largest pirate markets'5 23 and thus
poses a real risk to patent as well as copyright-based technology
owners.
524
Brazil's inability to make any significant progress in address-
ing its acute patent-processing backlog dilemma has partly con-
tributed to this problem. As of January 2005, U.S. industry had
estimated Brazil's patent backlog at approximately 47,000 pat-
ents, for which industry had paid substantial upfront processing
fees. 25 As of January 2006, however, it was revealed that the pat-
ent backlog was actually as large as 130,000 patents. 26 Of these,
17,000 are for pharmaceutical patents, each bearing an upfront
COM. GUIDE FOR BRAz. 6 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter CCG 2006], available at http://www.
focusbrazil.org.br/ccg/ (follow Entire CCG in One Document hyperlink, open PDF file).
520. Id; see also U.S. COM. SERV., INT'L TRADE ADMIN. IN THE U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR BIAz. 28 (Jan. 2005) [hereinafter CCG 2005],
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri2.nsf/en/gr-01304e.html
(follow hyperlink for Doing Business in Brazil: The 2005 Commercial Guide for US
Companies (PDF)).
521. See CCG 2006, supra note 519, at 6.
522. See id.
523. CCG 2005, supra note 520, at 28.
524. See BRAZIL MARKET RESEARCH, supra note 7, at 2 ("Software piracy continues
to be a large problem for Brazil. In March of 2005, the Business Software Alliance
(BSA) estimated that 64 percent of all software used in Brazilian computers was
pirated. In March 2004, the estimate was 55 percent, and in 2003, BNAmericas
estimated the problem at 61 percent.... Beyond increased internet accessibility, the
Government of Brazil's insistence that government agencies use free open source
software is hurting the development of the domestic industry and some U.S. software
suppliers.").
525. See CCG 2005, supra note 520, at 28.
526. See CCG 2006, supra note 519, at 7.
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U.S. $30,000 filing fee, and some have been pending for several
years 527
What is more troublesome than this tragic administrative
problem, however, is the ideological manner in which Brazil has
used this and other hidden governmental failures as an excuse
to deny legal protection to foreign private property - IPRs. 28
One such failure concerns the inability of Brazil's health infra-
structure to efficiently distribute medicines to rural communities
and to effectively treat and care for those patients whom it can
reach.529 Another such failure concerns Brazil's lack, until very
recently, of a national innovation system5 30 that could support
Brazil's less than efficient 531 national industrial development pol-
527. See id.
528. See id. at 6 ("[Dlebate continues within the Brazilian Government, legislature
and society over issues relating to patents, compulsory licensing and access to
medicines.")
529. See Margareth Cris6stomo Portela & Michel Lotrowska, Health Care to HIVI
AIDS Patients in Brazil, 40 REVISTA SAJDE PUBLICA (April 2006), available at http://
www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci-arttext&pid=S0034-89102006000800010&lng=&
nrm=&tlng=en ("The Brazilian health care system is undermined by serious
operational problems and several different local realities, many of them below the
desired care standards."); Looking at Health Care, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
CANADA, CULTURE PROFILES PROJECT: BRAZIL, available at http://www.cp-pc.ca/
english/brazillhealth.html ("Health and sanitary conditions in Brazil vary widely
from region to region. The big cities have many physicians who have trained abroad.
In smaller towns and interior areas of Brazil however, there is a shortage of doctors,
nurses and hospitals. While Brazil offers a public health care system, its coverage is
not extensive.").
530. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Rediscovering the Value of Intellectual Property
Rights: How Brazil's Recognition and Protection of Foreign IPRs Can Stimulate
Domestic Innovation and Generate Economic Growth, INT'L J. ECON. DEV. [hereinafter
Kogan, Rediscovering]; Maria Beatriz Amorim PAscoa, In Search of an Innovative
Environment - The New Brazilian Innovation Law, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/sme/
en/documents/brazilinnovation.htm; Maria Jose Amstalden Sampaio, Perspectives
From National Systems and Universities, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
AGRICULTURE - THE WORLD BANK'S POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE IN ASSISTING BORROWER
AND MEMBER COUNTRIES 50 (Uma J. Lele et al. eds., 1999).
531. For example, in a paper released during 2004, one commentator noted that
during Brazil's import substitution era (1940-1980) and its 'quasi-stagnation' period
(1981-2003), "[the] Brazilian state was incoherent in spelling out and implementing
its policies; 3) pre-existent institutions made the economic system less flexible; 4) in
particular, still today, there are only seven big banks in Brazil; 5) industrial structure
remained by and large the same during the whole period; 6) imitation during the first
stage has been harmed by very low standards of education, which only recently have
started to change only recently." Michele di Maio & Mario Sylos Labini, Notes from
the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Industrial Task Force Meeting, INITIATIVE FOR POL'Y
DIALOGUE (Shana Hofstutter ed., Mar. 17-19, 2004), at 13, available at http://www0.
gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/IPMarch2005Notes.pdf [hereinafter Initiative for Policy
Dialogue Notes]; Donald Hay, Institudo de Pesquisa Econ~mica Aplicada, INDUSTRIAL
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icy.532 Furthermore, Brazil's ideological reluctance to recognize
private IPRs in the field of life science technologies, despite the
existence of national patent and data exclusivity legislation, has
placed its drive towards innovation-based development at risk and
ignited international passions in the pharmaceutical and biotech-
nology industries.5 1
The Government of Brazil has, with the assistance of anti-
private property and anti-free market activists, academics, and
bureaucrats, continued to employ opportunistic policies and prac-
tices534 to compel international, primarily U.S., pharmaceutical
companies to significantly reduce their drug prices to an at-or-
below-cost level.535 If the companies refuse, Brazil then threatens
to break, i.e. to take, their patents via issuance of a compulsory
license that it argues is sanctioned as a permissible flexibility
within the TRIPS Agreement.536 Leading Brazilian scientists are
now at the forefront of this policy movement because they recog-
nize how it can contribute to Brazil's national industrial and tech-
nological development.537
POLICY IN BRAZIL: A FRAMEWORK 1-2, 7-8, 10-11, 15 (Mar. 1998), http://www.
ipea.gov.br/pub/td/tdO551.pdf.
532. Brazil only recently introduced its newly updated national industrial policy.
See Patricia Marega, Brazil's New Industrial Policy, PINHEIRo NETO ADVOGADOS,
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr124394e.html ("On
March 31, 2004, President [Lula], and the Minister of Development, Industry and
Foreign Trade, Luis Fernando Furlan, launched a new industrial, technological and
foreign trade policy entitled Building the Brazil of the Future.... The main goals...
consist in promoting the smooth and steady economic growth of Brazil by
implementing a more efficient and versatile national production, increasing the
export of goods (such as software and pharmaceuticals), decreasing the external
vulnerability, and boosting investment rates. The New Industrial Policy does not call
for any immediate measures, nor does it intend to rush toward reaching its goals.")
533. See CCG 2006, supra note 519, at 7 ("Invoking TRIPS provisions, Brazil has at
times threatened to issue compulsory licenses for anti-retrovirals used to treat HIV/
AIDS if satisfactory supply agreements, including reductions in price, could not be
reached; to date, Brazil has not issued a compulsory license."); BRAZIL MARKET
RESEARCH, supra note 7, at 3 ("The [Government of Brazil] has threatened to break
patents for imported HIV/AIDS medication, saying generic equivalents can be
produced in Brazilian laboratories. Often the intention to break patents is announced
after pharmaceutical industries refuse to negotiate price reductions, indicating that
the threat is being used as a bargaining chip .... To justify its threats, the GOB
refers to a WTO clause that allows compulsory licensing in cases of national health
emergencies."); Kogan, Rediscovering, supra note 530, at 179-187.
534. See Initiative for Policy Dialogue Notes, supra note 531, at 9-13, 16, 26-28.
535. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
536. See id.
537. Chamas, supra note 7 ("In Brazil, the adoption of intellectual property
mechanisms follows a particular logic, conducive with a specific level of technological
and industrial development. The country takes advantage of the . . . degree of
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Indeed, it is arguable that Brazil has used its domestic patent
laws, in combination with tariffs and other trade barriers, to mask
a hidden state-centralized agenda and ideology of patent opportu-
nism. Brazilian Government and industry have made no secret of
their desire to develop a strong generic drug manufacturing capac-
ity in order to preserve the domestic market for Brazilian compa-
nies, and compete with Chinese and Indian producers and
distributors for both the third world and developed world markets.
It has also been very willing to interpret international trade, envi-
ronment, health, and human rights law liberally in order to
achieve this objective. Brazil has spent many years honoring pat-
ented processes not patented products, despite the fact that its
1996 Patent Law required recognition and enforcement of both
patented products and processes." 8 This has permitted Brazil to
reverse engineer many foreign drugs and to then reconstitute
them through application of new synthetic processes, as a com-
pletely unique molecule or product susceptible to national patent-
ing. 39 The Brazilian Government, with NGO support, has
freedom offered by the international agreements for the conformance of rights (the
TRIPs Agreement, for example) to undertake a more equitable implementation at the
national level .... Since the nineties, Brazil has promoted a broad and deep revision
in various legal instruments (Industrial Property Law, Copyright Law, etc), as well as
inaugurating certain dispositions (Plant Variety Law, Regulation for the Access to
Biological Resources etc). Intellectual protection in the biomedical field differs from
the protection in the agricultural field due to the distinctive nature and dynamics of
each of these fields. In health biotechnology the patents perform a fundamental
role .... Safeguards such as compulsory licensing are vital ...." (emphasis added)).
538. See Lei No. 9279, de 14 de maio de 1996, art. 42, available at http://www.
araripe.com.br/law9279eng.htm#patcap5 ("A patent entitle [sic] its owners the right
to prevent third parties from manufacturing, using, offering for sale, selling or
importing the following: I - a product that is the subject of a patent; II - a process, or
product directly obtained by a patented process." (emphasis added)).
539. See Maurice Cassier & Marilena Correa, Patents, Innovation and Public
Health: Brazilian Public-Sector Laboratories' Experience in Copying AIDS Drugs, in
ECONOMICS OF AIDS AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS CARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 91 (2003), available at http://www.iaen.org/papers/anrs.php
(follow hyperlink for Chapter 3) ("The Brazilian experience of AIDS drug production
has shown that reverse engineering is a source of acquisition of knowledge for a
laboratory."); EUR. FED'N OF PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES AND ASS'NS [EFPIA],
POSITION PAPER - BRAZIL 1 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.efpia.org/4-pos/
Brazil2004.pdf ("In 1996, Brazil enacted an overall good patent law; unfortunately,
Brazil has not enforced its patent law consistently and has allowed for a slow erosion
of the law. The principle concern of the research-based pharmaceutical industry is
Article 229-C of the 1999 amendment to the patent law, which gives the National
Sanitary Supervision Agency (ANVISA) authority to approve pharmaceutical patents
before they are issued. Other concerns include the large patent backlog, the lack of
respect for data confidentiality and the lack of linkage between ANVISA and the
patent office resulting in copies of pharmaceutical products receiving sanitary
registrations as well as compulsory licences in case of public interest.").
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continued to justify a policy that favors the use of legal 'safe-
guards' by referring to the extreme economic hardships that it
would endure if it were otherwise required to pay the higher
prices that patents usually demand.54 °
According to one prominent Brazilian scientist and intellec-
tual property expert, IPRs are dispensable and may be wielded as
both a sword and a shield by the Brazilian Government, if, and
when, it is convenient and in the national interest to do So.
5 4 1
Interestingly, some within Brazil's pharmaceutical industry agree
that maintaining strong protection of foreign patents works
against their economic interests. They see the protectionist bene-
fits that may be gained from the Brazilian Government's empha-
sis of the possible health risks engendered by according
unnecessary protection to foreign patents and trade secrets. 42
Based on this evidence, one may credibly argue that some Brazil-
ian Government regulators and domestic companies seek for Bra-
540. See CLAUDIA INES CHAMAS ET AL., CTR. FOR THE MGMT. OF INTELL. PROP. IN
HEALTH RES. & DEV. [MIHR], Developing Innovative Capacity in Brazil to Meet
Health Needs, in INNOVATION IN DEV. COUNTRIES TO MEET HEALTH NEEDS -
EXPERIENCES OF CHINA, BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA: COUNTRY REPORTS FOR
SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND
PUBLIC HEALTH 98-99 (Ingrid Hering ed., Apr. 2005) available at http://www.who.intl
intellectualproperty/studies/MIHR-INNOVATION%20EXPERIENCES%200F%20
South%20Africa,%20CHINA,%20BRAZIL%20AND%20INDIA%20MIHR-CIPIH%20
REPORTS%2014-04-05.pdf ("The Decree n. 9, 313 of November 13, 1996 assured all
patients infected by HIV free access to all medication necessary to their treatment....
Currently 15 antiretrovirals ["ARVs"] are made available by the Ministry of Health,
with eight of them already produced locally. Some [HIV medications] are not
protected by patents, having being commercialized before Law n. 9, 279. Those
having patent protection increase therapy costs considerably.... Access to medicines
has since become increasingly expensive. The [Brazilian] strategy for maintaining
the antiretroviral access policy has various dimensions: systematic follow-up of
patents in force, as well as in the public domain, in this field of knowledge;
negotiations with the suppliers; use of the [TRIPS] safeguards; local production and
import of generic medicines; intensification of local R&D activities to try to close the
technological gap; and adjustments in the legal procedures to facilitate access
measures."); see also Posting of James Love, james.love@cptech.org, AIDS: Expenses
Reignite Discussions Over Patents, 0 GLOBO, Apr. 16, 2006, to IP-Health, http:l/
lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2006-May/009499.html (May 8, 2006, 16:28:19).
541. See CHAMAS, supra note 540, at 105-106 ("Intellectual property rights are
strategic and fundamental assets for the maintenance and expansion of health policies.
As can be noted from the Brazilian experience, the wisdom of developing strategies in
the field of international diplomacy associated with strategies for access to medicines
and the reduction of prices is capable of making a difference. As IP rights are in
constant evolution on the international scene and the Brazilian legal system, certain
recommendations are valid." (emphasis added)).
542. See Marcos Oliveira, Patentes: Tempo de Crise, Tempo de Mudanqa [Patents:
Time of Crisis Time of Change], ABIFINA INFORMA (Jan. 2006), available at http:/!
www.abifina.org.br/informaNoticia.asp?cod=62.
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zil to acquire foreign, particularly U.S., technologies
opportunistically to advance both its evolving national industrial
and innovation agenda and its international economic/trade inter-
ests. All of this leads one to believe that Brazil must change its
ideology and reform its institutions to stem IP opportunism.
3. The Old Ways Are Simply No Longer Acceptable
In some respects, Brazil's exploitation of patents and trade
secrets belonging to foreign knowledge-based life sciences and
information and communication technology companies is no differ-
ent than the opportunistic practices of other countries during past
industrial eras. However, there are three crucial differences that
must be emphasized. First, there are now binding multilateral
treaties (the GATT/WTO/WIPO Agreements) and politically active
international institutions to regulate and guide cross-border
industry and government policies and practices relating to tariff
rates, dumping, subsidies, market access and compliance, invest-
ments and intellectual property. Second, there are time-tested
industry and mercantile customs and industry standards codes in
place that may be referenced as precedent to determine the shape
and direction of evolving industry practices surrounding new hi-
technologies. 43 Third, there is documentary evidence of successful
national systems of innovation that recognize and protect exclu-
sive private property rights, including IPRs. 44 In other words,
Brazil should not take comfort in the old ways to justify its current
bad habits. The world-class countries that previously employed
these methods and the prior informal international order upon
which they relied have since largely evolved.
543. See National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Standards
Bodies, http://www.nist.gov/oiaa/stnd-org.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2007)
("International standardization is well-established for many technologies in such
diverse fields as information processing and communications, textiles, packaging,
distribution of goods, energy production and utilization, shipbuilding, banking and
financial services. International standards will continue to grow in importance for all
sectors of industrial activity for the foreseeable future. International standards can
facilitate world trade by effectively removing technical barriers to trade, leading to
new market opportunities and economic growth.... [WTO] Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) explicitly recognizes that international standards play a
critical role in improving industrial efficiency and facilitating world trade.... There
are a diversity of bodies involved in the preparation of standards used globally. ...
[I]n certain technology sectors, consortia organizations are popular means for the
development of global standards. Consortium technical categories include areas such
as e-commerce, the Internet, multimedia, web services and so on.").
544. See Kogan, Rediscovering, supra note 530, at 157-74, 200-209, 227-248.
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B. Continued IP Opportunism May Cost Brazil
Significant Bilateral and Regional Benefits
Apart from commencing an action at the WTO, the U.S. Gov-
ernment possesses a portfolio of bilateral and regional options to
address Brazil's continuing IP opportunism.
1. Brazil-United States Science & Technology Cooperation
Brazil and the United States have "traditionally enjoyed
friendly, active relations encompassing a broad political and eco-
nomic agenda"54 including joint science and technology coopera-
tion. There has even been a growing consensus between Brazil
and the United States concerning the benefits of sharing science
and technology know-how and the importance of protecting the
intellectual property rights that underlie it.546 As a result, a num-
ber ofjoint projects and initiatives between the two countries have
evolved; they have included the participation of both governmen-
tal and private (industry, university and nonprofit) institutions. 47
The basis for such cooperation resides in the periodic renewal
of the long-term Brazil-U.S. bilateral science and technology
agreement.548 Under the auspices of this science and technology
(S/T) 'umbrella agreement,' other institutional agreements have
been reached. A number of joint Brazil-U.S. R&D technical capac-
ity and knowledge-building activities have proceeded under these
agreements. In fact, there are a broad variety of joint research
projects and academic exchanges currently being pursued, for
example, in the areas of energy,549 earth and space science, 550 and
agricultural biotechnology. 15 In addition, the technical standards
545. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF W. HEMISPHERE AFF., BACKGROUND NOTE:
BRAZIL (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm.
546. See Brazilian Embassy in Washington D.C., Brazil-U.S. Cooperation, http:l!
www.brasilemb.org/science-tech/tech4.shtml (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
547. See Kogan, Rediscovering, supra note 530, at 257-59.
548. See Science and Technology, U.S.-Braz., Feb. 6, 1984, 35.5 U.S.T. 5116.
549. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Secretary Abraham Announces
Energy Partnership with Brazil - Supports President Bush's Call for International
Energy Cooperation (June 20, 2003), http://www.energy.gov/news/1071.htm; Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Secretary Abraham Announces Agreement with Brazil
on Hydrogen Energy Research - Supports President Bush's Hydrogen Initiative,
International Partnerships (Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.energy.gov/news/1324.htm.
550. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EMBASSY OF THE U.S. - BRAZIL, U.S.-BRAZILIAN ESTH
COOPERATION (2006), http://www.embaixada-americana.org.br/index.php?action=
materia&id=2470&submenu=esth.php&itemmenu=174; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS - BRAZIL: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES,
(2003), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/brazenv.html.
551. ADIRANA DELGADO ET AL., IADB, BRAZIL: TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND
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agencies of the U.S. and Brazilian Governments have executed
MOU to ensure the development of consistent science-based
national measurement standards in the chemistry, physics and
engineering fields.5 2
The Bush administration, however, can be persuaded not to
fund further bilateral S/T collaborations, and to even terminate
others, if Brazil's IP opportunism is seen as threatening the eco-
nomically valuable IPRs of innovative U.S. companies and inven-
tors, and hence, America's scientific, technological and economic
competitive advantages.
2. Inter-American Development Bank Program Financing
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has long been
instrumental in encouraging private investment, supporting small
businesses, and promoting economic growth in the Latin Ameri-
can region, including Brazil.553 For example, in the past the IADB
earmarked loans for Brazil that focused on promoting S/T infra-
structure capabilities and improving market sector participation
in such programs.
Although the IADB's early support for national S/T policies
focused mostly on government 'institution-building,' they have
since placed "a greater emphasis on supporting the business sec-
tor's efforts at technological modernization." 54 The primary objec-
tive has been to raise competitiveness by enhancing enterprise
NEW MANAGEMENT APPROACHES IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH-AGROFUTURO (2004),
http://www.iadb.org/exr/doc98/apr/br1595e.pdf.
552. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Institute of
Standards and Technology of the Department of Commerce of the United States of
America and the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization, and Industrial
Quality of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of the Federative
Republic of Brazil, U.S.-Braz., Apr. 10, 2002, available at http://www.nist.gov/oiaa/
nistinmetro.pdf. The MOU will terminate unless otherwise renewed on April 9, 2007.
See id.
553. The Bank has made 371 loans totaling approximately $28.4 billion and bank
disbursements to Brazil have totaled approximately $27.4 billion. See IADB, Brazil
and the IDB, http://www.iadb.orgcountries/home.cfm?language=english&id-country
=br&parid=l (last visited Jan. 7, 2007); id. (follow disbursement hyperlink to see
disbursement data). (last visited Jan. 2, 2007); see also ANTONIO GIUFFRIDA, LADB,
LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE: THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND
PHARMACEUTICALS 17, available at http://www.iadb.orgsds/doc/SOC123.pdf.
554. Alberto Melo, The Innovation Systems of Latin America and the Caribbean
(LIDB Working Paper No. 460, 2001), available at http://www.iadb.org/res/
publications/pubfiles/pubWP-460.pdf (emphasis added). The loan proposal for the
Science and Technology Program (880/OC-BR) of $320 million, of which $160 million,
was approved by the IADB. See IADB, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, BRAZIL
(1995), available at http://www.iadb.orgEXR/doc98/apr/br880e.htm.
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level innovation.555 In 1996 and 1999, for example, the IADB
funded two health-related projects said to include the acquisition
of pharmaceuticals as a small component of Brazil's national pro-
gram to improve public procurement and distribution of
medicines.556 The project was also to have resulted in the prepara-
tion of a study that would yield recommendations concerning how
to improve human and institutional capacities. 57 And more
recently, the [ADB approved funding for a portion of a proposed
Brazil agri-food project involving the development of intellectual
property-rich biotechnology-based processes.555 The project seeks
an 80% increase in the rate of patent filings/registrations by
2007.519
It cannot be confirmed, however, that these funds were actu-
ally used in this manner. Previous Brazilian Government, IADB
and World Bank oversight failures that have only recently come to
light likely compromised these institutions' ability to monitor suf-
ficiently whether good manufacturing practices were being fol-
lowed, how imported pharmaceutical raw materials were being
used, and if foreign patents were being protected during the terms
of these loans. 6° In other words, there is no proof that Brazil had
not diverted these subsidized medicines to local generic manufac-
turers to enhance their reverse-product engineering, production
and national process patenting capabilities.56'
555. See MELO, supra note 554, at 45-46.
556. See GIUFFRIDA, supra note 553, at 5, 10 and App.; see also Jillian Clare Cohen,
Public Policies in the Pharmaceutical Sector: A Case Study of Brazil, 54 LCSHD
PAPER SERIES 1 (Jan. 2000).
557. See GIUFFRIDA, supra note 553; Cohen, supra note 556.
558. See DELGADO, supra note 551.
559. See id.
560. See Cohen, supra note 556, at 19 ("In the past, manufacturers in the public
and private [pharmaceutical] sectors [of Brazil] have not been consistently subject to
sufficient monitoring for GMP [good manufacturing practice] standards, nor rigorous
testing of product quality. The same applies to raw materials. . . . "); see also CHRIS
BREYER ET AL., WORLD BANK OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP'T, EVALUATION OF THE
WORLD BANK'S ASSISTANCE IN RESPONDING TO THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: BRAZIL CASE
STUDY 25, available at http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/aids/docs/casestudies/hiv_
brazil casestudy.pdf ("[Tihe World Bank has taken the position that although the
[National AIDS Program] has a strong record of achievement, both AIDS projects
suffered from: (a) the lack of an adequate monitoring and evaluation system to
improve targeting and steer the program to higher impact and more sustainable
interventions; and (b) insufficient supervision by the Bank and the government of
procurement activities implemented by decentralized entities, including local
governments and NGOs.").
561. See Cohen, supra note 556, at 10-11. During this time period (1998), Brazil's
pharmaceutical sector had become the world's sixth largest national market in terms
of value ($10.3 billion of a total of $302 billion), and the leading national market
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Furthermore, the IADB's Multilateral Investment Fund
(MIF) arm has also been involved in funding Brazilian projects
that promoted the development of open source computer software
in Brazil."6 2 Apparently, the policy objective underlying these
small loan facilities was consistent with Brazil's evolving national
policy of requiring all sectors of government to procure only open
source software programs for their internal use.563 And, it also
seemed consistent with Brazil's call for open source software to
become the new international standard during the 2005 WSIS.5 1
Since the United States has traditionally been a steward and
supporter of the IADB and its project-related work, a high-rank-
ing cabinet official (usually the U.S. Treasury Secretary) has
retained a seat on the IADB's decision-making Board of Gover-
nors.56 5 This seat has also served to represent U.S. national inter-
ests. The U.S. administration, therefore, need not continue its
support for, and may even vote against, proposed IADB funding of
Brazilian projects, if the Government of Brazil fails to cease its
constructive takings of U.S. private property for public use with-
out just compensation. In fact, the U.S. Government has already
used its influence to prevent the IADB from disbursing previously
within Latin America, the world's then-fastest growing regional pharmaceutical
marketplace. Id. at 10, 11, 19. Although Brazilian pharmaceutical companies had
secured only 30% of their domestic market (1997), they nevertheless possessed
pharmaceutical reproductive capabilities with respect to both therapeutic ingredients
and finished products, and could easily have drawn from the 60-70% of
pharmaceutical raw materials they had then been importing.
562. The IADB administers the MIF, a technical assistance mechanism of the
Bank, in accordance with an agreement with MIF's Donors Committee. See IADB,
How Does the MIF Work?, http://www.iadb.org/mif/v2/where-money.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2006); see also IADB, Project Database, http://www.iadb.orgmif/v2/
projectsort.asp?Type=country&Paraml=BR&C=8&Status=99 (last visited Dec. 18,
2006); IADB, Project Database, SME Metasys (MIF/AT-474), http://www.iadb.org/mif/
v2/projectview.asp?ID=1874&C=8 (last visited Dec. 18, 2006) ("The project will
develop a computing infrastructure that uses PC or special end-user workstations and
is geared toward SMEs... Two knowledge-management solutions will be offered: an
ERP and a search engine . .. All software applications will be based on Open Source
solutions." (emphasis added)); IADB, Project Database, Competitive Support Program
for Software SMEs (MIF/AT-649), http://www.iadb.org/mif/v2/projectview.asp?ID=
1925&C=8 (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
563. See CCG 2005, supra note 520, at 32, 51; Brazil Gives Nod to Open Source,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 16, 2003, available at http://www.wired.com/news/
infostructure0,1377,61257,00.html.
564. On November 16, 2005, Brazil's Minister of Culture and the Secretary-General
of UNCTAD "signed a memorandum of understanding [ I to support the promotion of
free and open-source software (FOSS)." UNCTAD and Brazil Support Free and Open-
Source Software, supra note 401.
565. See IADB, About the IDB - Board of Governors, http://www.iadb.org/aboutus/
IV/go-governors.cfin?language=english (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
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approved funding to an intended beneficiary government where
that government's policies were determined to threaten U.S.
national interests, 66 and it may even consider doing so again.
67
3. U.S. Export-Import Bank Program Financing
Brazil has ranked as the U.S. Export-Import Bank's
(Eximbank) second largest market in Latin America after Mex-
ico. 568 The Eximbank is the official export credit agency of the
United States.569
The Eximbank has enjoyed a productive relationship with
Brazil since at least the 1940s, when it helped to finance the con-
struction of Brazil's first steel manufacturing plant at Volta
Redonda in the state of Rio de Janeiro. 7 ' From 1997 through
2005, Eximbank directly authorized for funding approximately
$3.17 billion, consisting of approximately, $1.18 billion in loans,
$1.16 billion in loan guarantees and $833 million in export credit
insurance supporting Brazilian company purchases of U.S. goods
and services.57'
566. See generally 108 CONG. REC. H3558-H3564 (Apr. 30, 2003) (discussing
testimony before the House of Representatives reacting to the recommendation to the
IADB President by the U.S. Representative to block disbursal of loans to Haiti).
567. See Christopher Swann & Richard McGregor, Renminbi Weakness Tests U.S.
Patience, FIN. TiMEs, Mar. 29, 2006, at 4 ("If the Treasury were to find that the
renminbi was 'misaligned' and that this was damaging the US economy, then China
would have 180 days to move towards a resolution before a host of sanctions kicked in.
These would include using the US vote to block any increase in voting rights at the
International Monetary Fund, disapproval of international financing, preventing the
issue of trade insurance and guarantees ... and less favorable status under US anti-
dumping laws.").
568. See Ian V4squez, Re-authorize or Retire the Export Import Bank?, CATO INST.,
May 8, 2001, available at http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-iv050801.html.
569. See generally Eduardo Aguirre, Jr., Export-Import Bank Financing for U.S.
Exports to Latin America, SETON HALL J. DIPL. & INT'L. REL. 135 (2003) (discussing
financing for U.S. exports to Latin America).
570. See Embassy of Brazil in London, Economy and Finance, Historical
Perspective, http://www.brazil.org.uk/economy/historical.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
571. Annual reports detail EximBank funding by year: fiscal year (FY) 2005: ($0
loans, $43.2M loan guarantees, $35M export credit insurance); FY 2004 ($76.9M
loans, $81.2M loan guarantees, $55M export credit insurance); FY 2003 ($52.7M
loans, $120.1M loan guarantees, $55.1M export credit insurance); FY 2002 ($24.1M
loans, $20.5M loan guarantees, $29.4M export credit insurance); FY 2001 ($623.7M
loans, $69M loan guarantees, $36.1M export credit insurance); FY 2000 ($0 loans,
$404M loan guarantees, $83.1M export credit insurance); FY 1999 ($152.8M loans,
$50.7M loan guarantees, $310.2M export credit insurance); FY 1998 ($68.7M loans,
$171.4M loan guarantees, $112.9M export credit insurance); and FY 1997 ($177.2M
loans, $198.2M loan guarantees, $116.2M export credit insurance). These reports can
be found at the Export Import Bank of the U.S., Annual Reports website at http:ll
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The Eximbank has also supported a few large public infra-
structure and private commercial projects during this period that
have provided social as well as economic benefits to Brazilians.
They have included a 469-megawatt combined cycle power plant
in Araucaria, Brazil, a $1.1 billion integrated ethylene and poly-
ethylene complex in Rio de Janeiro, and a municipal water filtra-
tion and waste-water-treatment facility.572 Since 2000, Eximbank
has also operated a program (the 'Sub-sovereign Program') to pro-
vide Brazilian municipalities and state governments with the
financing needed to procure essential infrastructure-related goods
and services. 73 In addition, Eximbank financing and/or loan guar-
antees have helped to secure important goods and services
purchases by Brazilian aircraft,7 4 oil and gas production,575 con-
struction,576 health care577 and textile companies.7 8
Although the trade policy of the Eximbank is largely shaped
by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), a cabinet official who is
www.exim.gov/about/reports/ar/index.cfm (follow hyperlinks for annual reports) (last
visited Jan. 2, 2007).
572. See Aguirre, supra note 569, at 137.
573. See id. at 138; see also Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Ex-Im
Bank Announces New Program to Accept the Credit of Emerging Market Cities,
States (Aug. 11, 2000), http://www.exim.gov/pressrelease.cfm/2000 (follow Aug. 11,
2000 hyperlink); Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Ex-Im Bank Opens
Financing in the Public Sector of Brazil, Increases Credit Limit for Brazilian Banks
by $1 Billion (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.exim.gov/pressrelease.cfm/1998 (follow Dec. 3,
1998 hyperlink).
574. See Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Ex-Im Bank Supports
Export of Sikorsky Commercial Helicopters to Brazil (Sept. 7, 2004), http://www.
exim.gov/pressrelease.cfin/2004 (follow Sept. 7, 2004 hyperlink).
575. See Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Ex-Im Bank Finances U.S.
Export Sale to Build High-Technology Depp Water Oil and Gas Production Platform
Off Brazil (May 25, 2005), http://www.exim.gov/pressreleases.cfm/2005 (follow May
25, 2005 hyperlink); see also Sustainable Energy & Economy Network, Project Profile:
Petrobas Oil and Gas Developments, http://www.seen.org/db/Dispatch?action-
ProjectWidget:637-detail=l (last visited Dec. 18, 2006); Sustainable Energy &
Economy Network, Project Profile: Canoas 250MW Gas-Fired Power Plant, http://
www.seen.org/db/Dispatch?action-ProjectWidget:422-detail=l (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
576. See Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Ex-Im Bank's Medium-
Term Financing to Assist Brazilian Buyers in Purchase of U.S. Construction,
Manufacturing, and Equipment (Feb. 16, 2000), http://www.exim.gov/
pressreleases.cfmI2000 (follow hyperlink to Feb. 16, 2000).
577. See Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Ex-Im Bank Supports U.S.
Exports to Equip New Hospital in Brazil (Aug. 3, 2000), http://www.exim.gov/
pressreleases.cfmn/2000 (follow hyperlink to Aug. 3, 2000).
578. See Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Ex-Im Bank Facilitates US
Cotton Sales to Brazil (Mar. 23, 2000), http://www.exim.gov/pressreleases.cfin/2000
(follow hyperlink to Mar. 23, 2000).
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a non-voting member of the Eximbank,57 9 the U.S. Congress, nev-
ertheless, ultimately bears the legal and political responsibility
for deciding whether to periodically reauthorize, through appro-
priations, the Bank's international lending activities... for a suc-
cessive five-year period. Given the debate over HIV/AIDS drug
patent rights that arose during the previous 2001-2002
reauthorization hearings"' and the Senate's more recent concerns
that Eximbank financing has been increasingly exploited by bene-
ficiary countries, like Brazil, at the expense of U.S. jobs and eco-
nomic competitiveness, 82 Brazil must recognize that the U.S.
Congress is likely to take its responsibility very seriously. Indeed,
Congress revisited Eximbank reauthorization in the fall of 2006,
and passed legislation that was subsequently signed into law in
late December. 83 It will provide the Bush administration with the
579. See Office of the USTR, Who We Are, USTR Mission, http://www.ustr.gov!
Who We Are/Missionofthe USTR.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2006) [hereinafter
Mission of the USTRI.
580. See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 9, cl. 7 (granting the Congress the power to make
appropriations, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law . . . ."; see also U.S. Government Printing Office,
Congressional Appropriations: About, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/appropriations/
about.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2007) ("The executive branch may not spend more
than the amount appropriated, and it may use available funds only for the purposes
established by Congress.").
581. California Representative Maxine Waters proposed legislation that would
have "prohibit[ed] EXIM from assisting in the export of any good or service to or by
any country that is challenging an intellectual property law or government policy of a
developing country, which regulates and promotes access to HIV/AIDS
pharmaceutical or medical technology." California Congressman Ray Ose challenged
this effort by proposing legislation that would deny developing country purchasers
Eximbank financing if they were in any way involved in intellectual property rights
litigation with a company doing business within any of five U.S. industry sectors.
Neither of these bills ever made it out of committee. See Letter from Maxine Waters,
California Congressional Representative, to Colleagues, The Export-Import Bank
Should Not Oppose AIDS Drugs! (May 4, 2001), http://www.cptech.orglip/health/
country/waters05042001.html; U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules,
Summary of Amendments Submitted to the Rules Committee on H.R. 2871 - Export-
Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2001 (Apr. 30, 2002), available at http://www.
rules.house.gov/archives/sum-exim_107 .htm.
582. See 151 CONG. REC. S8, 408-409 (daily ed. July 18, 2005), Statement of Senator
Grassley Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance; see also Senator Chuck
Grassley of Iowa, Grassley Wins Initial Approval of Funding Ban for Project
Benefitting Brazilian Ethanol Producers (July 20, 2005), http://finance.senate.gov/
press/Gpress/2005/prg071905.pdf (Export-Import Bank's approval of credit insurance
for ethanol dehydration plant in Trinidad using Brazilian ethanol found to violate the
Export-Import Bank's authorizing statute by causing substantial injury to U.S.
producers of the same commodity. Thus, no further taxpayer funds should be provided
for this facility).
583. See Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-438, 120
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latitude needed to modify the Eximbank program consistent with
U.S. national interests.584 In effect, Brazil's eligibility to receive
such preferential treatment may be subject to new conditions.
4. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
Program Financing and Underwriting
The OPIC, a U.S. government development agency, has
helped Brazilian companies to procure the financing and associ-
ated insurance coverage needed to acquire essential capital assets
and investments from U.S. sources without risk of impairment or
loss. OPIC effectively compliments the private sector in managing
the political risks" 5 associated with FDI. 5
86
Brazil has been among the top recipients of OPIC-backed pri-
vate investment between 1996 and 2004.58 These contracts
entailed the provision, installation and/or expansion of telecom-
munications, cellular and internet services and networks, the con-
struction of gas pipelines and power plants, hydroelectric plants
and hotels, the leasing of power plant turbines and railroad equip-
ment, and the development of oil and gas fields. 8 Although
OPIC's support for Brazilian projects has dropped off significantly
during the past two years (2005-2006), at least one significant
U.S. trade mission to Brazil was, nevertheless, organized during
this period.589 Yet, considering that the Brazilian Government
Stat. 3268; White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on Bill Signings (Dec. 20,
2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061220-3.html.
584. See id.
585. OPIC insurance coverage indemnifies for asset impairment or loss due to asset
expropriation or nationalization by governments, and for asset damage or loss arising
from politically motivated violence such as civil or international wars. See OPIC,
Insurance, http://www.opic.gov/lnsurance (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
586. See OPIC, About Us, Our Mission, http://www.opic.gov/aboutlmission/index.
asp (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
587. See OPIC's Deep Pockets, NEW AM., Aug. 4, 1997, at 9 ("Of the nations
receiving U.S. private investment backed by OPIC, Brazil was the largest recipient.").
588. See U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE NEWSLETTER, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR Bus.
AFFAIRS, NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY UPDATE: U.S. EXPORTS = U.S. JOBS (June 1,
1995) http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/economics/Trade PolicyNewsletter/9506.html
(indicating that during 1995, Brazil received over $250 million of OPIC insurance and
financing); David Ivanovich, Enron Pipeline in Bolivia Gets U.S. Loan Guarantee,
HOUSTON CHRON., June 15, 1999; OPIC, Annual Reports 2000-2004, Investment
Activities, http://www.opic.gov/pubs/handbooks/annualreport/ (follow hyperlink links
to Annual Reports from 2000 to 2004); Press Release, OPIC, U.S. Small Business
Uses OPIC Loan to Expand Clean Energy Technology in Brazil (Jan. 11, 2006), http:l!
www.opic.gov/news/pressreleases/2006/prOll106.asp.
589. During October 2005, the U.S. Commerce Department and OPIC
representatives organized and attended a renewable energy trade mission to Brazil.
The mission's purpose was "to help U.S. firms find business partners and sell
132
2006] BRAZIL'S IP OPPORTUNISM 133
had threatened during the spring of 2005 to issue compulsory
licenses against U.S. HIV/AIDS drug patent holders and to abro-
gate such patents altogether under a newly proposed Brazilian
law, this drop-off was probably not a coincidence. 590 The Govern-
ment of Brazil must remember that the USTR, a cabinet official,
serves as the influential vice chairman of the OPIC.591
5. Continued U.S. Generalized System of Preference
Status
Since, at least 1997, Brazil has enjoyed a growing trade rela-
tionship with the United States, which still remains Brazil's sin-
gle largest trading partner. In 2003, Brazil's exports to the United
States were valued at US$ 21.3 billion, fourteen percent of which
(approximately $3 billion) enjoyed duty-free status pursuant to
the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).592 From Janu-
ary to November 2005, Brazil exported overall approximately $24
billion worth of goods to the U.S. spanning numerous industry sec-
tors, fifteen percent of which (approximately $3.6 billion) qualify-
ing under the U.S. GSP program.593
At the recent Doha Round trade negotiations that took place
in Hong Kong in late November and early December 2005, the
United States and the EU became of one mind concerning the seri-
ous threat posed to their joint prosperity by widespread IP oppor-
tunism in developing countries.594 However, recognizing that not
all developing countries (especially those least developed coun-
tries) possess the means and capabilities to address that growing
threat through regulation and law enforcement, U.S. Commerce
Secretary Carlos Gutierrez and EU Trade Commissioner Peter
Mandelson arrived at a temporary solution - to grant developing
renewable energy equipment and services in Rio de Janeiro, Sdo Paulo, and Salvador
da Bahia." See U.S. Commercial Service, Brazil Renewable Trade Mission Oct. 17-19,
BUYUSA.GOV, http://www.buyusa.gov/kern/brazilrenewabletrademission.html.
590. See Pachovski & Kogan, supra note 109.
591. See Mission of the USTR, supra note 579.
592. See Breaking Patents Is Not the Way to Go, Says US to Brazil, BRAZZIL MAG.,
May 18, 2005, available at http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/2470/49.
593. See CCG 2006, supra note 519, at 2; AMcHAM BRAZIL, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES: FINAL REPORT 2 (Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.amcham.com.br/update/
2006/update2006-12-15d dtml.pdf; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN TRADE
STATISTICS, Top TRADING PARTNERS - TOTAL TRADE, EXPORTS, IMPORTS (Dec. 2005),
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0512.html.
594. See Duncan Hooper & Kevin Costelloe, US, EU Threaten 'Zero Tolerance' for
Copyright Violations, Bus. DAY, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/
world.aspx?ID=BD4A121407.
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countries an extra seven and one-half years before they must pro-
tect copyrights and trademarks.595 However, this extension does
not apply to other more advanced emerging economies, such as
Brazil, China or India; nor does it apply to any country with
respect to patents or trade secrets.
Although Congress has renewed the U.S. GSP many times
since its enactment, its renewal and Brazil's continued eligibility
to benefit from it should not be taken for granted.596 In fact, the
USTR, on two recent occasions, requested public comments to
determine "whether . . . the program should be changed so that
benefits are not focused on trade from a few countries .... ,5 In
595. See id.
596. See VIVIAN C. JONES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE [CRS], GENERALIZED
SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE, (Sept. 26, 2006), http:fl
www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33663.pdf, at Summary [hereinafter
JONES, CRS] ("In previous years that the GSP was set to expire, its subsequent
renewal was generally considered non-controversial. Even when the preference was
allowed to lapse, as it has at several times in its history, it was widely expected that
Congress would retroactively renew the preference, as in the Trade Act of 2002.
However, this year, due, in part, to the present impasse in multilateral trade talks in
the World Trade Organization Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and congressional
concerns regarding the inclusion of certain more advanced developing countries such
as India and Brazil in the program - renewal of the preference seems more tenuous.
The Bush Administration favors GSP renewal, but also appears willing to review and
modify the program in order to respond to congressional concerns."); see also id. at
CRS 14-15 ("As early as January 2006, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck
Grassley commented that renewal of GSP was 'not a foregone conclusion' and that its
extension was likely to be tied to the United States receiving certain reciprocal
benefits as part of a successful conclusion of the Doha Round of trade talks. In ...
May 2006, Senator Grassley repeated these concerns, mentioning especially India and
Brazil, two major beneficiaries of the GSP that he perceived as 'two of the countries
most responsible for holding up the Doha negotiations.' On that basis, he warned that
he might oppose GSP renewal as a result of their obstruction, or make sure that
eligibility requirements are tightened so that more advanced developing countries,
such as India and Brazil, are removed from the program." (footnotes omitted)); Mark
Langevin, U.S. -Brazil Trade Relations: Finding Post-Elections Overlap, INFoBRAZIL.
COM, Nov. 18-26, 2006, http://www.infobrazil.com/Conteudo/FrontPage/Opinion/
Conteudo.asp?IDNoticias=1019&IDArea=2&IDGrupo=9 (Phil English, U.S.
Congressman and Co-Chair of the Brazil and Steel Caucuses stated "'I think it's going
to be a hard argument to pass GSP... preferences for Brazil, and at this point, the
level of interest in Congress in indiscriminately extending trade preferences is pretty
well exhausted. I do think that we will revive the GSP program because we recognize
the importance of giving [LDCs] and takeoff economies access to our market and the
ability to compete with China. I think Brazil is going to have a huge burden in
arguing for inclusion in the future, on that basis.'").
597. See JONES, CRS, supra note 596, at CRS 15; see also Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP): Request for Public Comments, 70 Fed. Reg. 58502 (Oct. 6, 2005)
[hereinafter GSP Public Comments Request] (requesting public comments to
determine "whether the Administration's operation of the [GSP] program should be
changed so that benefits are not focused on trade from a few countries and developing
countries that traditionally have not been major traders under the program receive
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2004 and 2005, Brazil was among the top ten recipients of U.S.
GSP benefits. 98 It is quite possible, therefore, that Brazil's contin-
ued eligibility under the program may depend on whether or not
the USTR and U.S. industry perceive the Brazilian government's
failure to address rampant patent or trade secret opportunism as
threatening.599 According to the USTR, developing countries and
their industry exports are entitled to receive GSP status as an
incentive for promoting conduct consistent with U.S. trade policy,
including recognition and protection of strong intellectual prop-
erty rights. 0 During late December 2006, the Congress and the
administration ultimately decided to extend GSP status for less
benefits."). The type of information requested in such comments is unrelated to the
information relevant to its annual review of product coverage and competitive need
limits under the GSP program.
598. See GSP Public Comments Request, supra note 597 ("In 2004, the top ten GSP
beneficiary developing countries by trade volume (not including trade in petroleum
products) were India, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia, Turkey, Philippines, South Africa,
Venezuela, Argentina, and Russia."); see also REN9E JOHNSON, CONG. RES. SERV.
[CRS], GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES RENEWAL: AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS 1,3,6
(Nov. 29, 2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/78423.pdf ("Agricultural
imports under the GSP totaled $1.9 billion in 2005, about 7% of all U.S. GSP imports
.... In 2005, the top six BDCs [beneficiary developing countries] ranked by import
value - Thailand, Brazil, Argentina, India, the Philippines, and Turkey - accounted for
56% of agricultural imports under the GSP. Brazil and India accounted for nearly
one-fifth of agricultural imports under the program. These countries are among those
identified by critics of the current program as countries whose GSP benefits should be
limited or curtailed .... If the administrative changes being evaluated by the TPSC
are implemented by USTR, certain beneficiary countries, including Thailand, Brazil,
Argentina, India, the Philippines, and Turkey, might be graduated from the program
and no longer be eligible to receive benefits under the GSP.").
599. See OFFICE OF THE USTR, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES
GUIDEBOOK 16-19 (Jan. 2006), http://www.ustr.gov/TradeDevelopment/Preference
Programs/GSP/SectionIndex.html (follow hyperlink to U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences Guidebook); see also Letter from Lila Feisee, Director for Intellectual
Property, Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), to Sybia Harrison, Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.bio.orglip/international/
20060331.pdf ("Contrary to Brazil's own patent statute, and its obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement, ANVISA has recently propagated guidelines that declare
'secondary medical use' inventions are not patentable. In several well-publicized
instances, the [Glovernment of Brazil has also threatened to revoke legitimately
granted patent rights to compel the owners of certain patents to conduct business on
favorable commercial terms. BIO Members are deeply concerned about developments
in Brazil that systematically deprive biotechnology innovators of adequate and
effective protection for their products."); JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS - CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 319-335 (4th ed.
2002); Greg Mastel et al., Smart Pills: Protecting IP Rights Overseas, IP L. & Bus.,
Sept. 2004, available at http://www.ipww.com (follow hyperlink to Smart Pills article).
600. See James E. Mendenhall, Acting Gen. Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.,
Piracy of Intellectual Property, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (May 25, 2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.
cfm?id=1514&wit_id=4302.
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developed countries for a temporary period - from six months to
611two years.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Brazil Must Evolve for its Own Sake, and the
World's
Economists generally recognize that the national practice of
industrial and technology IP opportunism is, to some extent, to be
expected. Developing countries and emerging economies face
enormous pressures to maintain an evolutionary track in a world
that continually progresses. The current information society is
taking shape much more rapidly than previous globalization eras
due to significant and continuous scientific, technology and com-
munication advances. Consequently, the acquisition of foreign
advanced technologies through opportunistic abuse of intellectual
property laws serves as the most effective means by which such
countries may, at least initially, maintain a modicum of forward
momentum. °2 However, such practices should neither continue
nor be justified forever. Once developing countries rise to become
emerging economies, such as Brazil, they must grow up and
evolve!
While it may be understandable that a lack of natural and/or
human capital resources may give rise to a national sense of inad-
equacy, insecurity, and urgency, such feelings, if unchecked, could
nevertheless devolve into something much more harmful. Argua-
bly, Brazil is now demonstrating a type of intransigence at inter-
national institutions, through its efforts to help reform and
replace the current paradigm of international intellectual prop-
erty law. It also refuses to enter into extra-regional trade agree-
ments or to recognize and enforce foreign intellectual property
rights. While Brazil's bravado has garnered the applause and
admiration of a group of impoverished nations and socialist-
minded activists and advocacy groups, the indelible nature of its
national and international activities likely threatens the interests
601. See Press Release, House Committee on Ways and Means, House Approves
Omnibus Trade Bill (Dec. 8, 2006) http://waysandmeans.house.gov/News.asp?
FormMode=print&ID=460 ("[Tihe U.S. House of Representatives approved Omnibus
Trade Bill H.R. 6406, a bill addressing a number of trade issues, by a 212-184 vote.");
Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs the Tax Relief and Health Care
Act of 2006 (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/
20061220-2.html.
602. See Shapiro & Hassett, supra note 116, at 10.
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of most other countries, the established global system of innova-
tion and economic growth, and the economic prospects for Brazil
itself.
B. OECD Nations Will Not Pay for Brazil's Continued
IP Opportunism
Brazil's past failure and/or inability, like that of other emerg-
ing economies, such as Russia, India and China (the BRIC
nations), to vigorously uphold the exclusive private intellectual
property rights of foreign and domestic owners through well
enforced national laws, has contributed further to OECD nations'
subsidization of the cost of global innovations. This has occurred
through payment of the higher prices charged for technology-rich
products invented, commercialized, and sold within such coun-
tries, coupled with stiffer local enforcement of home country intel-
lectual property laws."3 Higher prices have resulted chiefly from
OECD country industries' inability to recover their costs of invest-
ment in both R&D and commercialization, let alone, to earn a rea-
sonable profit. Two cases in point are pharmaceuticals and
computer software.
Anecdotal evidence suggests, for example, that prior to 2006,
U.S. purchasers of patented/copyrighted software programs could
often load their software onto three or more different computers
within a defined workplace or home office 'user' space even if used
by more than one registered user, which enabled many families to
afford the purchase of such products. 64 The number of software
product users and computers upon which software may be loaded
has, over time, however, been restricted to only a single registered
user and/or to a single computer."5 The concern about piracy has,
603. John Gardner, Healthcare in the Developing World: Obstacles and
Opportunities, TCSDAILY.COM, May 19, 2006 ("[T]here will be even more pressures on
U.S. drug companies to give up their intellectual property rights and patent
protections, under the rationale of improving access to healthcare. But where will the
innovations of tomorrow come from, if not from profits on the drugs of today?").
604. See e.g., Trend Micro Download License Agreement, http://www.trendsecure.
comldownloadlindex.php (last visited Jan. 7, 2007); Aid4Mail License Grant, http://
www.aid4mail.comlicense.php (last visited Jan. 7, 2006); Adobe End User License
Agreement, http://www.adobe.com/products/eula/central (last visited Jan. 7, 2006);
End-User Agreement for Microsoft Software, http://download.microsoft.coml
download/l2/5/12538ba0-3d24-4f00-aabl-dd9ff4aacfc9/enstudent eula.pdf, see also
Adney Patrizio, Microsoft OneCare Jumps Out to a Big Star: Cut-Rate Pricing and
Three-User License Spur Popularity, WINPLANET, Aug. 14, 2006, http://cws.internet.
com/article/3348-.htm.
605. See e.g., Overview for ACT! 2007, Single User by Sage, CoMPUSA, http://www.
compusa.com/products/product-info.asp?productcode=341564 (last visited Jan. 7,
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in effect, caused an increase in the consumer cost of such items. 0 6
In addition, the cost of pharmaceuticals continues to rise and
increase the cost of U.S. health care, putting it beyond the reach of
many Americans. And, while U.S. generic and 'universal access'
drug laws can alleviate some of these pressures, and open source
software platforms that lead to cheaper products can provide U.S.
consumers with more 'bang for the buck,' they still do not address
industry's difficulty of securing an adequate enough 'return on
investment' to facilitate future investments in invention and
innovation.
If OECD nation-based companies cannot protect their exclu-
sive private intellectual property from exploitation by misplaced
Brazilian and other foreign government policies, and are unable to
earn an adequate market-rate return on investment, plus a rea-
sonable profit to boot, they will have less of an incentive to invent
and innovate. Tax incentives such as R&D credits and other
rewards are helpful but not compensatory. Markets are profit-,
not cost-driven. Government mandates provide even greater disin-
centives to invest and innovate. This is not rocket science, but
simply, human nature.
Over the course of the 20th century, life expectancy
increased by 30 years; annual deaths from major killer dis-
eases such as tuberculosis, polio, typhoid, whooping cough
and pneumonia fell from 700 to fewer than 50 per 100,000
of the population; agricultural workers fell from 41 to 2.5
percent of the workforce; household auto ownership rose
from one to 91 percent; household electrification rose from
8 to 99 percent; controlling for inflation, household assets
rose from $6 trillion to $41 trillion between 1945 and 1998.
These are but a few of the wonderful things that have
occurred during the 20th century.
... What human motivation accounts for the accomplish-
ment of these and many other wonderful things? The
answer should be obvious. It was not accomplished by peo-
ple's concern for others but by people's concern for them-
selves. In other words, it's people seeking more for
2007); Apple Computer, Inc. Software License Agreement Single Use License, http://
store.apple.com/Catalog/US/Images/singleuser.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2007);
Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition (Retail) End-User License Agreement for
Microsoft Software, http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/home/eula.mspx (last
visited Jan. 7, 2007).
606. See BETTER Bus. BUREAU, Computer Software Piracy, http://www.bbb.org
Alerts/article.asp?ID=434 (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
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themselves that has produced a better life for all
Americans.
What about all those people who've invented and marketed
machines that do everything from diagnosing illnesses to
controlling air flight? Were they basically motivated by a
concern for others, or were they mostly concerned with
their own well-being?
One of the wonderful things about free markets is that the
path to greater wealth comes not from looting, plundering
and enslaving one's fellow man, as it has throughout most
of human history, but by serving and pleasing him.6"7
Since the United States has had the strongest level enforcement of
IPRs among the OECD nations, an increasing number of know-
how-rich industries, including those based within the Member
States of the EU have continued to relocate their R&D enterprises
within U.S. borders. The cost of innovation has thus been
reflected mostly in the higher prices of technology-rich products
sold within or to the United States. These prices are higher than
those paid by consumers in other regions that offer relatively
weaker IPR protections - from Europe and Canada to emerging
and developing economies. And, in certain OECD countries, price
controls, and parallel trade in below-cost and illicit generic drugs,
as well, contribute to higher product prices.
Arguably, emerging and developing country governments'
non- or limited protection of IPRs, strict price controls on health
care and other products, and allowance of parallel trade should
constitute the exception rather than the rule, and it should apply
only to least developed countries suffering from actual health
emergencies and lacking actual manufacturing capacity. The
insistence by socialist-minded governments, and anti-private
property and anti-market activists and academics, that the world
should essentially become 'flat,' with free and open source and
universally accessible knowledge, will only further threaten
America's industries and innovation potential in the future.
607. See Walter E. Williams, The Economics of Caring vs. Uncaring, CAPITALIST
MAG., May 10, 2006, available at http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4653.
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